Korea announced that it had reached a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) with China in November 2014. This agreement signifies the strong interest of the Korean government and companies in entering the domestic market of China, including its cultural sectors.
This study considers cultural industries as an important sector in the cooperation between Korea and China. A comparative analysis was conducted on the development of local cultural industries of China in three environments: industry, market, and policy. Based on the results from the comparative analysis, the study provides suggestions for furthering Korea–China cooperation in the cultural sectors.
The primary findings of this study can be summarized as follows: In Chapter 2, we analyze the overall environment of the Chinese cultural sectors. The cultural industries of China have maintained a steady growth of 20% CAGR over 10 years since 2004; its cultural market was the third-largest in the world in 2012. The Chinese government has fostered its cultural industries since the beginning of the 10th Five-Year Plan period (2001–2005) to strengthen the competitiveness of these industries in preparation for joining the World Trade Organization in 2001. Korea–China cooperation in the cultural sectors has been active, particularly in the export of online games and co-production of films and animation. Trade and investment are expected to further increase once the Korea–China FTA is signed and various entry barriers are eliminated.
In addition, we compare the current situation of the Chinese cultural sectors by region and suggest regional groups in the cultural sectors. Beijing, Shanghai, and Zhejiang comprise the first-tier group, having well-endowed industry, market, and policy environments. The second-tier group includes locations in the east coast with relatively better infrastructure, such as Jiangsu, Fujian, and Guangdong Provinces. Tianjin and Guizhou are noted for their similarities in display of strong willingness to provide policy support for cultural industries.
In Chapter 3, we compare the regional environments by sub-sectors. In the broadcasting sector, Beijing, Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Shandong as well as Hunan, Sichuan, and Shaanxi are selected as ideal locations because these regions possess the requisite environments in industry, market, and policy for development of the broadcasting sector. In the film sector, Beijing, Shanghai, and Zhejiang are the major regions. While three locations all have excellent environments, most resources are concentrated in Beijing, which implies that development of the Chinese film sector will be centered on Beijing for the foreseeable future. In the online game sector, the availability of communication infrastructure greatly affects development in the sector. Thus, industry and market are developed mainly in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong where the communication infrastructure is well-established. In the animation sector, Shanghai represents the best location in terms of industry, market, and policy environments together, followed by Beijing, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hunan, Guangdong, and Fujian.
In Chapter 4, we propose a cooperative direction and cooperation strategies in detail by region-sector matching, on the basis of previous analytical results and suggest four groups for 31 provinces/municipal cities, namely, first-, second-, third, and fourth-tier groups. The first-tier group (i.e., Beijing and Shanghai) has cultural sectors with an excellent infrastructure and competitive sub-sectors, such as broadcasting, film, online game, and animation. The second-tier group (i.e., Fujian and Sichuan) has a small number of competitive sub-sectors; at the same time, the local governments are active in fostering cultural industries. The third-tier group (i.e., Henan and Tianjin) requires a medium-term approach compared with the previous two groups. Finally, the fourth-tier group (i.e., Jilin and Neimenggu) requires a long-term approach through continuous monitoring.
In addition, we argue that the characteristics of each sub-sector should be carefully considered for the local-level cooperation in cultural sectors. In the film and online game sectors, a small number of major players are dominating the market or industry of the country. In such situation, regional grouping is not very useful. Strengthening cooperation with major regions, such as Beijing and Shanghai, seems to be a better strategy. In contrast, in the broadcasting and animation sectors, the development of industry or market is partly determined by the support from the local government or relevant companies. Therefore, facilitating cooperation with a number of regions is recommended for the broadcasting and animation sectors.
Finally, we propose that collaboration in the cultural sector between Korea and China should thoroughly examine the locational context involving industry, market, and policy environments. Depending upon the level of strength of industry, market, and policy environment, a customized strategy can be formulated in a manner to induce maximum benefits from the local environment. On the basis of the preceding analytical results, we suggest the cooperation strategy of the general cultural sector (Shanghai and Henan), broadcasting sector (Beijing, Zhejiang, Shandong, and Sichuan), film sector (Beijing and Zhejiang), online game sector (Sichuan), and animation sector (Guangdong and Hubei).
In Chapter 5, we discuss the strategies for the Korean government and companies to expand cooperation with China in the cultural sectors. First, regarding cultural services, the Korean government should adopt a gradual approach in the course of post-FTA negotiations with China. In other words, the Korean government can utilize the reservations list similar to that in the Korea–U.S. FTA for future liberalization in the cultural services, include the “Protocol on Cultural Cooperation” in the FTA, and discuss the opening of the online game sector with the Chinese government. Moreover, the Korean government should build a foundation for cooperation with China, enhance support for Korean companies entering the Chinese market, and improve the existing system related to the cultural industry.
With regard to the Korean companies, we suggest that they should strengthen their planning capability and creativity, diversify business partners and products, and carve out a niche market. In addition, localization (i.e., establishing a subsidiary or an R&D center in China) can be adopted as a long-term strategy.

After Vladimir Putin won the 2012 Russian presidential elections, one of his first Presidential decrees involved creation of a ‘strong Russia’. In particular, the post-Soviet space has been given renewed focused, because the world powers including Russia have tried to reorganise their power relationship in and around this region. The post-Soviet sphere has become an area for strategic competition where pro-Russian regional groups and anti-Russian or pro-European multilateral organisations co-exist.
In 2014, the Russian government adopted three goals in connection with its foreign policy, and one of goals is to strengthen regional integration in the Eurasian Continent, efforts for which is to be led by Russia. In this sense, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) which came into existence officially on January 1 2015 has implications as Russia’s ambitious regional integration project for the CIS area.
From these perspectives, this research has three goals: the first goal is to examine the economic significance of EEU in terms of spatial reorganisation of the global economy; the second is to analyse EEU’s political impact from the perspective of Russia’s international strategy; and the third goal is to examine the response or policies of relevant countries (world powers such as US, EU and China and countries in the CIS area) regarding the EEU. This research eventually leads to providing implications and policy directions for the Korean government’s Eurasia Initiative.
The second chapter of this research covers the background and current situations related to regional structural changes in the global economy, which also serves as the theoretical background for this research. The next chapter analyses Russia’s international strategy and EEU’s expansion policy. The analysis in this chapter shows Putin’s ambition to build up strong regional power groups. The fourth chapter examines strategies and policies towards EEU of major global powers such as the US, the EU and China, each of which has different policies and/or strategies depending on its economic and/or political relations with Russia and countries in Central Asia. The fifth chapter demonstrates how various countries in post-Soviet sphere set up their strategies and/or policies towards EEU, in particular, focusing on whether countries in this region joined the EEU; Kazakhstan and Belarus as members of Customs Union which automatically become the member of the EEU.
This research will contribute to a better understanding of the internal dynamics and future perspectives of Eurasian regional integration, spatial changes connected to international relations in the post-Soviet space, and energy-related relations from the beginning of EEU. In addition, this research could lay a foundation for the Korean government in setting up mid-to-long-term strategies towards the EEU.

The world’s food demand has been increasing due to population increase, increasing incomes of developing nations and the resulting changes in diets, and the increasing use of biofuels. However, grain production and exports is greatly dependent upon only a few countries, and with the recent global climate change, questions over sustainability have been increasing steadily. Korea’s case looks particularly serious because most of its grain supply, except for rice, is imported This study analyzes how to secure a stable supply of grains with a high level of reliance on imports, and examines our current efforts to secure primary grains, which include wheat, corn, and soybean. It also looks at other countries in similar situations and their current trends in securing grain supply; potential partnerships with those countries are also discussed as well as policy implications.
Our analysis suggests each grain needs to be matched with a partner country based on its characteristics and with a specialized plan. Also this study focuses on grain import trends and policies for grain procurement in China and Japan, whose sufficiency patterns look similar to ours and could pose political implications for our use. Based on the analysis, this study suggests the following tasks to secure a stable grain supply, with the first task being the national grain procurement system, initiated in 2010, which entails a joint effort between a private enterprise and the government to secure a grain distribution network and their intentions on selling grains domestically and also exporting to Korea or other countries nearby. In the long term, a national grain procurement system requires strategy, large capital, and expertise related to the international grain market, and ultimately requires participation from private enterprises with capital, professionalism, and a quick decision-making process.
The second task is a long-term plan to support private enterprises by organizing an investment environment, ODA, provision of relevant information, and etc. For instance, Japan, whose sufficiency patterns look similar to ours, could pose political implications for our use. The effort by the Japanese government has lasted over a long period of time and has yielded success stories such as the Cerado farm in Brazil. Additionally, aside from the government, general trading companies played a key role in creating cooperation between private enterprises.
The third task is supply and demand control via public stock increase. Expanding overseas agricultural development and securing an overseas grain distribution network stocks represent long-term plans, as we need to have a stable stores domestically in order to cope with sudden grain price hikes or supply restrictions in producing countries.
The fourth task is risk management via domestic commodity futures listing. Domestic grain market insecurity spreads instantly and globally in the form of price fluctuations, and an ultimate solution call for a way to control risk in price fluctuations instead of simply securing grain supply. If a grain commodity future is listed on the domestic exchange, current spot trades will become more diversified, and we will have measures to minimize risk that comes with price fluctuations.
And finally, we can invest in agriculture overseas with global cooperation. Securing a stable grain supply is not only Korea’s concern but a universal condition for survival, and it must be addressed by global cooperation. Many countries have realized the importance of agriculture and created investment funds to support agriculture from a long-term perspective and to yield not only quick monetary results but also improvements in other grain-supply-related areas. Likewise, the Korean government must look further and consider aggressive cooperation and investment in not only grain production but also the front-back industry including transportation, storage, and distribution by means of close partnerships with countries in similar situations.

 The government of India has recently legislated coverage and classification standards for Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) of India based on the size of investment in accordance with the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act amended in 2006.
According to the census of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises implemented in 2006/07 based on the newly amended Act of 2006, a number of MSMEs and employment as of 2012 is estimated to be 47 million and hundreds of millions, respectively. And, total production and fixed asset is estimated to be US$344 billion and US$220 billion dollars, respectively. Meanwhile, a proportion accounted for by MSMEs in total production of manufacturing industry and GDP has decreased, respectively, to 37.5%-7.3% in 2011 from 42%-7.8% in 2006 and 2007.
Most MSEMs of India are classified as Micro-enterprises with small scale of investment (under Rs. 2.5 million for manufacturing, Rs. 1 million for non-manufacturing). These enterprises are unregistered so that they are not qualified for any incentives and support from the government, and account for over 90% (in average) of production, investment and employment of total unregistered MSMEs. Meanwhile, in case of registered enterprises, micro-enterprises comprise about 95% of their number, a level similar to the unregistered sector; they accounts for about 40% of total production and investment, which is smaller in relative terms than the unregistered sector.
As mentioned, although most MSMEs of India are small, their contribution to the Indian economy is very significant, especially for generating employment and balancing the regional economy, in addition to boosting exports. MSMEs of India account for about 40% of total employment, and exports from MSMEs have increased by 16% over the last 10years.
To enhance competitiveness of MSMEs, the Indian government provides MSMEs with various support programs and policies such as the National Manufacturing Competitiveness Program and 12th 5-year national development plan.
Entrance of Korean small and medium enterprises into India increased after the mid 2000s and most are from the manufacturing sector. Small and medium companies from Korea tied to large companies have expanded market share with highly valued products. However, the pace of expansion of small and medium, along with large companies, has been slowing down due to the recent economic slowdown.
Recently, Korean small and medium companies are facing difficulties related to securing market information, land acquisition, local financing; and also excessive dependency on large companies. These represent obstacles that could hinder sustained market expansion of Korean companies in the Indian market. Furthermore, Korean small and medium companies are out of coverage regarding any incentives from the Indian government, because the average size of investment of Korean small and medium companies is about US$1.6 million, far beyond the investment cap to be recognized as an MSME in India.
The Korean government needs to review some creative policies for supporting small and medium companies and promoting cooperation between MSMEs of two countries. First establish a ‘Korea-India Public-Private Cooperation Center for MSME’ in both countries so that it could provide a single window, one-stop service. Second, establishment of a ‘Creative Economic Innovation Center’ is also recommended. It would be able to play the role of promoting and developing innovative agenda for Korean small and medium companies trying to enter the Indian market. Lastly, Korean and Indian governments need to consider creating a joint fund for MSMEs that are trying or have already entered the other side of the market, offering an effective solution for companies experiencing financial problems. The India-Israel joint fund is available for anyone looking for a reference and benchmark.

Korea and ASEAN have actively pursed the movement of free trade with other Asian countries. As a result, they participated in many Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) not only with Asian countries but also with other continental countries. In order to pursue the further economic liberalization, both parties feel the needs of liberalization of labor movement between Korea and ASEAN, especially from ASEAN to Korea. Both Korea as the labor importer and ASEAN as the labor exporter aware of the potential positive economic benefits generated from liberalization of labor movement between them. In particular, even though ASEAN countries realizes the importance of remittance from labor export, there is only few research dealing with this issues. In this study, we tried to find out the magnitudes of potential economic effects from further labor movement liberalization between Korea and ASEAN by using computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, then we suggest useful policy implication to enhance economic freedom between two groups. At the end we suggest the ways to utilize foreign labor forces in domestic labor market.
Social problems such as aging and low birthrate in Korea will dampen its future economic growth due to the shortage of labor. To handle with this issue properly, we realize that it is the right time to analyze the economic effect of further liberalization of labor movement and to set up proper application plan of foreign labor based on the simulation results. When foreign labor force is expanded, we predict it can generate some positive economic effects through the expansion of usable domestic work force. At the same time, we face the negative aspects of labor liberalization as well.
The aim of this study is to show the economic effect of labor movement liberalization between Korea and ASEAN, and to suggest useful policy implication to utilize foreign labors in domestic labor market. By designing various simulation scenarios, we find the changes of macroeconomic variables such as economic growth, terms of trade, wages, remittance etc due to the liberalization of labor movement.
The summary of research results is as following. First, Korea as of a labor importer will experience positive growths of GDP and welfare while labor exporters such as Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos will confront decreases of GDP and welfare. The result of basic scenario that assumes 3 percent increase of ASEAN labor movement into Korea shows that Korea’s GDP and welfare will increase 1.17%, and USD 5.7 billion respectively. Second, the real wage of skilled labor and unskilled labor will be decreased by 1.25% and 1.37% respectively. However, the return rate of capital in Korea will be increased by 0.62%. Third, remittance of labor exporters can play very important role in boosting of economic growth in developing countries. The simulation result shows that the total size of remittance will reach about USD 18 billion. Each ASEAN labor exporting country will receive about 4.2~4.9 remittance when Korea government expand 3 percent of labor import. Forth, basically CGE model takes the assumption of imperfect substitutability between domestic labor and foreign labor. When we take the perfect substitutability assumption between two different labor groups, the economic effects that we found in previous scenarios will be turned into negative. This implies that strengthening of policy that introduces labor force with high substitutability will magnify the economic effect from labor shifts from ASEAN to Korea. Fifth, when we differentiate the quality of labor between domestic and foreign labors we find the previous result is over-evaluated. That is, when we assume the productivity of foreign labor is 80% of that of domestic labor, the overall result will be reduced.
Even though the simulation results show positive economic impact from further liberalization of labor movement between Korea and ASEAN, it is not proper that we just suggest that Korean government should reduce the existing regulations on foreign labor import because the CGE model does not consider other social costs generated from labor import. As more of labor force come into our economy, some negative social problems such as additional social security cost and socal integration cost will be accrued. If this is the case, the positive economic effect will be reduced. In order to maximize economic benefic and minimize the negative side effect, Korean government will expand liberalization of labor movement in the areas of agriculture, fishery, some service sectors such as domestic service, nursing or care service, and unskilled-low income manufacturing sectors.
Even though this study shows positive effect of labor liberalization, it does not necessary mean that we need to eliminate all restrictions on foreign labor employment. Instead of eliminating the existing regulations that restrict free movement of labor, we need to modify regulations elastically because we need the room to consider the use of Korean residents abroad and North Korean workers after South-North Korea unification. Finally, we need to deliver the importance of remittance to governments of developing countries from our experience. Korean government conducts many Knowledge Sharing Program with Asian developing countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Sri Lanka etc. Through this program, we need to consult on management of remittance to those governments.

 In May 2013, Korea gained the status as an observer to the Arctic Council at the Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, which opened new doors to participating in the discussion and joint response to the arctic issues in the Arctic Council. Therefore, it is expected to strengthen future cooperation with member countries in research and economic development in the Arctic. This study reviews the current status and future changes of the Arctic Council and the coastal states' arctic policy, and elicits policy implications for multilateral and bilateral cooperation in this region.
The major issues that the Arctic Council is dealing with are divided into four categories: Environment and Climate, Biodiversity, Oceans, and Arctic Peoples. The Arctic Council has been delivering collaborative responses to these issues mainly based on six working groups. Recent trends focus on ensuring the presence and participation of indigenous peoples in the Arctic.
In addition, building bilateral cooperation with coastal states of the Arctic Ocean should also be taken into consideration. Five arctic coastal countries (USA, Canada, Russia, Norway, Denmark) emphasize the following: national security and sovereignty, environmental protection and climate change, indigenous protection, collective response to the issues and intensification of cooperation, enhancing economic benefits through energy development and promoting sustainable development, bolstering the foundations for research, emphasis on cooperation among five Arctic coastal states and strengthening their status in the Arctic Council in accordance with their arctic policy.
Governance in the Arctic council is facing changes due to a change in the chair state and reinforcement of economic development in the region. Thus, it is required to understand the task forces’ issues that reflect what the Arctic Council is currently focusing on. Arctic council initiated individual task forces for Circumpolar Business Forum, Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Prevention, Action on Black Carbon and Methane, and Enhancing Scientific Cooperation in the Arctic, and establishes policies and regulations.
Cooperation channels in the Arctic region can be summarized in two: multilateral and bilateral cooperation. It is essential for Korea to contribute on a multilateral level by participating in projects and working groups of the Arctic Council. Given the fact that the observer status in the Arctic Council is renewed, depending on the evaluation that takes place every four years, Korea is due to update its status in 2017. Therefore, more concrete and practical cooperation and contribution are required. The bilateral cooperation will also make it easier when these multilateral cooperation is given support. On the other hand, it is also required to study the legal system and mechanisms of the Arctic Council as a soft-law regime, which is expected to serve as an example upon which to build and participate in similar multilateral cooperation activities in the future.

   A new and important debate on the role of manufacturing has recently emerged in advanced economies. Recovery of growth potential, job creation and response to economic crisis has become priority in most advanced economies. The global economic crisis has brought back into focus the need for a stable manufacturing base. Accordingly, many debates shed new light on industry policy in order to restore industrial competitiveness. In this context, this study reviews industrial strategies and policy measures taken by the European Union (EU) and its Member States and draws policy implications for Korea's industrial policy.

   While cross-border links by global value chain (GVC) have been densely developed among the European industries, they have experienced a decline in terms of production and employment in their economies at the same time. The share of the EU in global manufacturing production has declined considerably and this elicited concerns on its association with decrease in growth momentum and innovation in European economies. However, this ‘deindustrialization’ of European economies differs substantially from country to country. Among Western European countries, Germany has been successful in maintaining the importance of the manufacturing sector stable. As for the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), the level of deindustrialization has been low, due to the integration of their economies into the European production network after their accession to the EU. These various levels of deindustrialization have been reflected in macroeconomic indicators, such as in current account. For instance, Northern European countries have maintained or increased current account surplus, Southern European countries have recorded recurrent current account deficits. The contrasting performances of Northern and Southern Europe is reflecting industrial competitiveness. Particularly, Southern European countries have undergone difficulties in upgrading their industries to more technology-intensive industries.

   In order to enhance industrial competitiveness, the European Commission has been coming up with various policies encompassing cost and non-cost factors. In particular, Europe 2020, the EU’s growth strategy, was designed to create synergistic effects between different sectoral policies; industrial policies as well as policies for SMEs and R&D were simultaneously implemented. First of all, Europe 2020 suggests seven flagship initiatives: ① Innovation Union, ② Digital agenda for Europe, ③ Youth on the Move, ④ Resource efficient Europe, ⑤ Industrial policy for the era of globalization, ⑥ An agenda for new skills and jobs, and ⑦ European platform against poverty. Among them, Innovation Union, Digital agenda for Europe, An Industrial policy, and An agenda for new skills and jobs are directly related to the enhancement of industrial competitiveness.

   Currently, the EU is running Horizon 2020, the largest EU research and innovation programme ever with nearly 80 billion euros in funding available for 2014-2020. According to the European Commission, Horizon 2020 can be seen as an important means to create jobs, to stimulate economic growth and to improve quality of life. Despite SMEs' key role to boost the EU economy, it seems that both global financial crisis and the European sovereign crisis have rather been imposing heavy burden on SMEs. Therefore, the European Commission needed to take further and more significant measures to release the full potential of SMEs. As a result, the Small Business Act (SBA) and Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (COSME) were enacted.

   In order to examine industrial policy at the country level, this study reviews the cases of Germany, Sweden, Italy and Poland. Germany, with a strong background in manufacturing and being an important exporter in the global market, has been maintaining significant industrial competitiveness by expanding R&D expenditure and strengthening R&D cooperation. Based on the long-term and systematic plan, the German federal government has been establishing and implementing such strategies from High-tech strategy to New High-tech strategy as well as Industry 4.0. Together the federal government, the private sector and the academic community are participating in an active manner to execute the policies, and the satisfaction level of the German companies regarding government policy has been increasing. These policies are expected not only to reinforce the connection between science and industry, but also to eventually allow Germany to maintain the leading status in global competition.
  
   Huge amount of spending on R&D investment has played an essential role in improving industrial competitiveness of Sweden. Although most of R&D investment in Sweden had been made by business enterprises and universities, Swedish government has added on to further increase the volume of R&D expenditure and ratio of R&D performance since mid-2000. Meanwhile, through a mid-term blue print, The Swedish Innovation Strategy (Sweden 2020), the Swedish government provided directions and strategies to enhance national competitiveness. The main factor that enabled the Swedish industrial policy successful is the effective and practical cooperation between private and public sectors throughout the process; from designing and establishment of concrete industrial policies to their implementation.

   Italy has traditionally been known for the excellence of its goods and the luxury brands, based on the SME-centered industry. There are many family-owned businesses which existed for hundreds of years in Italy with good reputation. However, as the competitiveness of Italy has been waning over the last few years, the Italian government has came up with and implemented structural reforms as well as a variety of supporting policies. Among them, the Italian government launched two programmes, “Made in Italy” and “Destination Italy.” The former is about the globalization of SMEs, and the latter concerns the institutional improvement to facilitate FDIs. In addition, in order to reduce the financial burden of SMEs and to support start-ups, the Italian government created a guarantee fund.

   The promotion of FDI inflows was one of the most critical policy in industrial policies of Central and Eastern European (CEE) transition countries. FDI inflows related to privatization in the early stages of transition had a direct impact on employment and economic growth in the high marginal productivity of capital. And at the same time, it showed greater economic growth through promotion of technology transfer effect. Although there were some differences in initial conditions, CEE countries, including Poland were actively taking advantage of the FDI inflow to perform such policy regime change and economic reform. After the EU accession process, FDI inflows have been the backbone of its industrial policy, along with competitiveness in CEE countries.

   We have selected the automobile, the ICT sector, the pharmaceutical sector and the energy sector for the sectoral policy analysis. In these sectors, the European firms either have comparative advantage or strategic importance. Particularly, the European firms are under pressure from the challenge posed by emerging economies, which have been narrowing the gap with advanced economies. The automobile sector is a key industry with far-reaching forward and backward linkage. Nevertheless, the European automobile industry has been facing a slump ever since the global financial crisis. Some German manufacturers have been successful in maintaining the export volume owing to the stable and robust demand from China. French and Italian manufacturers, however, have lost important market share and were not able to reach pre-crisis levels in their production and sales. The European Commission established a consultative organization, CARS21, in order to develop concrete strategies, action plans and future regulations related to the automobile industries. The European Commission has placed an emphasis on developing more environment-friendly vehicles and is working to maintain a leading position in this sector. Notably, they tend to use their trade policy to impose or export their regulations, standards and norms in order to create more advantageous conditions for the European manufacturers. Moreover, they have recognized that the European automobile industry has over-production capacity and is trying to pursue smooth restructuring that is much more employment-friendly.

    The EU's industrial policy in the ICT sector is focusing on solving the social challenges on avail of the ICT. It is true that the ICT industry of the EU is less competitive than that of the US or Asian countries. This comprehensive approach that surmounts societal difficulties through ICT, nonetheless, is more meaningful than developing the ICT industry individually, since this strategy will lead to greater contribution in the long-run for sustainable growth.

   EU is an important market as well as an important exporter of the pharmaceutical products, and the member states located in the western part of Europe are especially dominant in this sector. Although the EU has a long history in the pharmaceutical sector, it is only after 2000s were the issues regarding enhancement of the competitiveness in the pharmaceutical sector been discussed at the EU level. The European Commission has suggested the development of the sector by adopting a scheme of Public Private Partnership (PPP). Correspondingly, the ‘Innovative medicines for Europe (InnoMed)’ project commenced in 2005-2009. From 2008 to 2013, ‘Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI)’ has been organised and managed as EU's representative PPP project. Based on the positive assessment of the IMI results, ‘the 2nd Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI2)’ will be implemented in 2014-2024. The EU is utilizing PPP to maintain market dominance in the pharmaceutical sector. However, the European Commission is not acting alone. It is important to emphasize that these PPP projects are being carried out by spontaneous participation, including financial support for R&D, by the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) and the individual pharmaceutical companies.

    Existing EU energy policy has been focused on climate change and stable procurement of energy. But recently, the EU began to consider the problem from a consumer protection point of view related to energy costs. Costs caused by rising electricity prices, including support for renewable energy, had a significant impact on the energy consumption of industrial competitiveness. And also, the issue of energy prices and costs is unquestionably crucial for maintaining and developing a solid and competitive industrial base in the EU. Energy efficiency is rightly considered as the most effective way to respond to the increasing energy prices. The EU manufacturing sector still enjoys an considerable advantage in terms of energy intensity. In other words, the energy intensity improvements may have helped the EU industries to offset the price disadvantage. Therefore, improving energy intensity is expected to be the main axis of any future EU policy on industrial competitiveness.

   Korea is experiencing a status change from a country ‘catching up’ to one to be ‘caught up with’. It is difficult to deny that Korea's growth potential is weakening and its superior position in technology vis-a-vis emerging economies is shrinking. Therefore, European cases have policy implications for Korea as following. First, it is necessary to have scientific and technological achievement reflected in industrial capacity in order to secure marketability of the technology. German and Swedish cases are noteworthy in that both countries have surplus in the technology balance of payment. This is due to the fact that the scientific achievements can easily find outlets to the market via patents and trademarks. Germany's Hightech Strategy 2020 and New Hightech Strategy have focused on creating a nexus between science and related industries which can utilize scientific research results. Second, it is important to improve competitiveness of Korea's service industries and create a structure where competitive service industries support the manufacturing sector. Labor productivity of Korea's service industries remains far behind Western Europe and is particularly weak in finance, IT services, architecture/engineering and business services. Given that more service inputs are being utilized in manufacturing production, it is important to improve competitiveness of related service industries. Third, it is necessary to develop more measures to support or stimulate activities of the SMEs. It is important that the EU has been developing various support measures for the SMEs from fiscal support for R&D to support in networking between the SMEs and the research institutes. There is also the case where the Italian government launched “Made in Italy” and “Destination Italy” to enhance brand image of the domestic products produced by Italian SMEs. Fourth, development of GVCs, focusing on high technology, is critical. For more than a decade, the share of domestic content in Korean exports has decreased precipitously, particularly in the main export products. Compared to Germany and Northern European countries, the fall in Korea's exports is more salient. If it is the case that foreign content in Korea's exports show an increasing percentage of technology intensive products, this represents a truly worrisome phenomenon. In order to take advantage of ever-extending GVCs, it will be important to maintain a stable and competitive industrial base - industry of high technology - at home. In addition, greater attention should be given to provide high technology domestic contents to a third country's exports.

 Mexico is emerging as a new center of growth in the global economy. Some have taken to calling the country the “Aztec Tiger,” an analogy reminiscent of the “Asian Tigers” that led the economic miracle of East Asia. Mexico can attribute its recent economic surge to two drivers. First would be the nation’s swift growth into a global production base, backed by the enhanced competitiveness of its manufacturing industry. Improved competitiveness thanks to moderate wage increases, enhanced manufacturing productivity, a stable exchange rate, China’s ongoing loss of competitiveness due to rising wages, the US manufacturing renaissance, an extensive FTA network with 45 countries, and better business environments; these are the foundations upon which Mexico has been able to make the swift transformation into a global production base targeting not only North America, but also the South American and EU markets. The second driver would be the successful reform measures rolled out by the Peña Nieto government. Seen as the largest reform in terms of scale since the launch of NAFTA in 1994, Peña Nieto’s reforms have an extremely broad scope, from industrial structure reform in the energy, telecommunications, and financial sectors to institutional reform in education, tax and labor. These structural reform policies have been garnering special attention due to hopes that they may serve as a tipping point in the development of the Mexican economy. As it is, the reform measures are expected to propel the Mexican economy toward additional growth by up to 2 percentage points, maximum. Another reason Nieto’s policies are in the spotlight is because the formerly closed energy and telecommunications markets have opened up, possibly revealing huge business opportunities. There are even some observations that say the direct and indirect investment effect of opening up Mexico’s oil market will reach USD 1 trillion, and that it will have a more powerful economic impact than the US shale gas revolution.
Against this backdrop, the main purpose of this study is to provide comprehensive and strategic suggestions in order to enhance economic cooperation with Mexico given the recent dynamic changes in Mexico, including its emergence as a manufacturing powerhouse and successful structural reforms of the Peña Nieto government.
To this end, this study consists of six chapters. First chapter contains the purpose of this study, methodology, and literature review. The second chapter concerns Mexico's recent manufacturing surge, how it was possible and how it can be taken further. Also, in order to see whether Mexico's recent changes in manufacturing sector is sustainable or not, total factor productivity was measured at the industry level. Lastly, based on all these analysis, this study evaluates the substantiality of the manufacturing sector growth and the probability of economic development of Mexico.
In chapter three, major reforms that the Peña Nieto government has pushed forward are analyzed and evaluated in depth for policy implications: the background of these reforms and how these reforms were planned and implemented were considered in the first part. This study categorized all eleven reforms that the Mexican government is implementing, into two main ‘pillars’: structural reforms in industrial sectors and institutional reforms. For the structural reforms in the industrial sector, reforms in telecommunications, energy, and finance are discussed in depth; while for the institutional reforms, education, tax and labor reforms are scrutinized. On the basis of this analysis, implications of these reforms and how they could affect the Mexican economy in the near future are introduced.
In chapter four, the current state of economic cooperation between Mexico and Korea is evaluated. Divided into three sub categories, i.e. trade, investment, and institutions; economic cooperation is assessed comprehensively. In addition, the difficulties and obstacles facing Korean enterprises investing in Mexico were surveyed in order to elicit measures for improvement.
In chapter five, policy suggestions are specified to enhance economic cooperation with Mexico. Along with the surveys conducted on the difficulties experienced by Korean companies investing in Mexico, SWOT analysis is used in order to analyze the economic cooperation environment between Korea and Mexico. On the basis of the analysis, this study suggests four strategies for the Korean government i.e. converged cooperation strategy, win-win cooperation strategy, SME cooperation strategy and institutional cooperation strategy.
The four strategies to enhance economic cooperation with Mexico are listed below. The first would be a “converged cooperation strategy,” which creates the most powerful model for cooperation by merging the strengths that each country possesses in different areas. From the perspective of Korean companies, Mexico offers the advantage of being a forwarding base for manufacturing, and having a broad FTA network, that would serve as the basis for strategies targeting not only the North American but also the South American market. On the opposite side, Mexican companies can devise strategies to enter Asian markets, for instance China, by using Korea’s strength as a “gateway to Asia” on account of it being a logistics and FTA hub. The two countries could also draw from Mexico’s powerful political and economic influence over the Central American and Caribbean region and its experiences in development cooperation, and combine this with Korea’s experiences and know-how in successful economic development to formulate a triangular cooperation strategy providing joint assistance to neighboring countries.
Next would be a “win-win cooperation strategy” that utilizes Korea’s comparative advantage in technology and successful industrialization experiences to help solve the problems in the Mexican economy. Policies and projects that support insertion of Mexican components and materials industries into the global supply chain by transferring Korea’s economic development experiences and technologies will simultaneously resolve challenges facing Mexico’s manufacturing sector and create a friendly environment for Korean businesses seeking to enter the market. There should also be a cooperation program in education, along with science and technology sectors, which calls for swift improvements in order to support Mexico’s economic development. To this end, it will be necessary to host a “Korea-Mexico Education and Innovation Summit” attended by presidents of prestigious universities and research institute CEOs from both countries, as a channel to enhance mutual understanding and identify cooperation demand in the education and science and technology sectors. Another measure that may be necessary is the establishment of a joint job training institute run by the Korean government and companies in collaboration with the Mexican government, to help solve labor shortages in Korean companies operating in Mexico and to support the Mexican government in education of skilled manpower.
Third is an SME cooperation strategy. Enterprises will play a key role as an agent of cooperation in the expansion of economic cooperation between Korea and Mexico. SMEs, in particular, will play as much an important role as large conglomerates. This is because Mexico is a Latin American country with the highest number of Korean SMEs operating within its borders. As a demonstration of its strong interest in fostering SMEs, in 2014 the Mexican government founded INADEM (National Entrepreneur’s Institute). Priority measures to consider in expanding cooperation between Korean and Mexican SMEs are the establishment of a Korea-Mexico Technology Innovation Center, to support SME technology cooperation and exports, and the creation of a Korea-Mexico SME Forum to serve as a network for SME cooperation.
The fourth and final strategy would be to form a basis for institutional cooperation. The best institutional infrastructure for expanding economic cooperation with Mexico is an FTA. Since 2008, Korea-Mexico FTA negotiations have been stalled following Mexico’s decision to halt discussions, and have yet to be resumed. The grounds for this decision were that an FTA with Korea would bring more harm than good, due to the unfavorable balance in trade from Mexico’s viewpoint. Fortunately, the Korean government’s announcement to join the TPP (Trans Pacific Partnership) has rekindled the possibility of concluding an FTA with Mexico. As important as an FTA is, so is opening a direct flight route between the two nations. Not only would this save travel time and airfare, but it would also be a meaningful step that narrows the psychological distance between the people of Korea and Mexico.
In the concluding chapter, the summary of the results, limitations of this study and possible future research are proposed.

This study aims at analysing the current status of the Iniciativa para la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana(IIRSA) and eliciting implications for Korean policy toward such initiatives.
IIRSA is an infrastructure construction project of massive scale originally organized by 12 South American countries at the First Summit Meeting of South American Presidents at Brasilia in August of 2000. Enrique Cardoso, then president of Brazil, was the lead proponent of such a project. Later, at the third summit of 12 countries, 335 projects were selected to be included in the IIRSA portfolio and 31 among them became priority projects, which were later called AIC(Agenda de Implementación Consensual). AIC contains 28 projects in transportation, 1 energy development project and 2 communications projects. By 2010, the number of projects that IIRSA planned to pursue reached 524 and the amount of investment earmarked for these projects was estimated to be more than 96 billion dollars. The priority projects comprising the AIC showed good level of completion by 2014.
In 2008, with the launch of UNASUR(Unión de Naciones Suramericanas), IIRSA experienced changes in its system and organization. The third summit of UNASUR in 2009 decided to organize COSIPLAN(Consejo Suramericano de Infraestructura y Planeamiento) and incorporate the IIRSA. COSIPLAN, which absorbed IIRSA as an important element in its development strategy, maintained the basic structure of IIRSA such as AICs and its main goals. In October 2012, COSIPLAN covered 583 projects in transportation, energy, and communications. Its total investment is estimated to reach 157.7 billion US dollars. In addition, COSIPLAN selected its priority projects, called APIs (Agenda de Proyectos Prioritarios de Integración). In 2013, COSIPLAN selected 31 structural APIs and 101 individual APIs, whose investment was over 16.7 billion US dollars.
According to this study, the purposes of the IIRSA are as follows. First of all, the purpose of IIRSA is to improve competitiveness of South American countries by reducing the transportation cost, as evidenced by the concentration of projects in the field of transportation. Especially, it is a move taken in South America as a response to the growing importance of East Asia, especially China, in the global trade. The other purpose of IIRSA is to contribute to the integration of South America in line with the globalization of the world economy. By doing so, South American countries seek to expand intraregional trade, which is rather smaller in comparison to that of other continents.
The political background of the inauguration of IIRSA turns out to be important. One element which made IIRSA possible was the fact that most South American countries had established a stable democratic system. Every country which currently participates in IIRSA agreed on the principle of democratic governance and maintenance of the system. Such political agreement facilitates negotiation and cooperation among member countries. Peaceful and harmonious regional atmosphere also serves as fertile soil for successful inauguration and development of IIRSA. In the 1990s, conflicts among countries in South America occurred rarely and, if it did occur, was resolved within an institutional framework. In sum, common economic goals and political setting shared by South American Countries became important elements to achieving a bigger goal: integration of South America.
IIRSA is organized into 10 Integration and Development Hubs, which play an important role in improving infrastructure of South America, both in IIRSA and COSIPLAN. According to this research, Amazon Hub, Mercosur-Chile Hub, Andes Hub, Peru-Brazil–Bolivia Hub receive relatively large amounts of investment. Among three major areas of IIRSA, transportation turns out to be the most salient area, especially port and road construction. Some hubs are more active than others because of its necessity for investment yet, considering the dominant influence of Brazil in South America, the presence of Brazil in the projects is often closely related to their success or failure. In other words, IIRSA projects which include Brazil or its neighboring countries tend to receive more investment and make better progress. Therefore, Brazil’s efforts to participate and maintain the IIRSA often determines the substantiality of the projects.
IIRSA presents us with various lessons regarding regional integration efforts of South America. First of all, IIRSA certainly contributes to economic development of the region by improving its competitiveness. It is also expected to reduce regional inequality. In other words, by incorporating relatively isolated areas to the center of economic development with improvement of infrastructure, IIRSA lessens inequality, which has been noted as one of the major features which characterize South America.
Furthermore, IIRSA will be a basis for regional integration of South America with the expansion of Mercosur, strengthening of CAN, integration of CAN and Mercosur, and integration of Guiana and Suriname to the regional institutions, which lead to increased regional flow of products, labor, culture and tourism. The integration of geographical and economic integration will lead to political integration of the region.
However, according this study, IIRSA is not entirely rosy in terms of its future picture. First concern is related to the environmental issues. Most of the projects involve transcontinental construction, especially that of bi-oceanic projects, which ultimately alter or contaminate the environment of relatively undeveloped and undisturbed areas such as the Amazon basin. Such massive construction projects highlight the importance and also difficulty of achieving cooperation among civil society, local community, and development agencies. EASE methodology of COSIPLAN represents such efforts. Secondly, the major role played by Brazil in IIRSA could be a risk factor. The active participation of Brazilian companies and financial institutions in IIRSA could be interpreted as an act of new imperialism, which make other countries of South America dependent on Brazil.
IIRSA gives us various lessons regarding policy implications. First, IIRSA and COSIPLAN offer us an opportunity for the Korean construction industry to make advances in the South American infrastructure market. Secondly, participating in infrastructure construction projects in South America will enhance Korea’s chance to become a part of energy infrastructure projects, which would work positively toward resource diplomacy. Third, IIRSA and COSIPLAN projects serve to diversify Korea’s infrastructure construction business. Currently, Korea’s infrastructure projects in South America focuses on plant construction. By participating in IIRSA and COSIPLAN, Korean companies would be able to enter the field of transportation construction including roads, ports, and airports.
On the other hand, various difficulties mentioned above regarding IIRSA demand that we diversify our strategy. This study suggests three strategies: Governmental investment in the infrastructure projects by using ODA, Formation of consortiums with local companies, and Cooperation with international development agencies. First, ODA should be considered as a valid way to provide support at a governmental level for Korean companies in making entry into the South American infrastructure sector. Considering the investment structure of IIRSA/COSIPLAN that 74.5% of its projects and 54.1% of its investment come from public sources, ODA allows Korean government to have better access to the infrastructure construction projects.  The second strategy in entering the infrastructure construction market is to form a consortium with local companies. This is particularly important because the majority of IIRSA projects, despite being transcontinental, consists of individual projects. For example, 82.5% of COSIPLAN projects and 82.7% of its investments is concentrated on individual projects, which is executed by an individual country. Under such circumstances, to minimize mistakes and maximize efficiency, close cooperation with local companies would be indispensable. Third, strengthening cooperation with international development agencies that provide financial and technological support to IIRSA is crucial. Especially, working closely with IDB, CAF, and FONPLATA, would allow us not only to financially participate in IIRSA projects but also acquire the network which plays a vital role in boosting our status in the South American infrastructure sector.
Finally, this study suggests that Korea needs to make more decisive and prompt efforts to enter the infrastructure market in South America. Also it informs us of the strong FDI attractiveness of the South American infrastructure industry.

This research examines Japan’s FTA strategies, focusing on Japan’s 13 effective bilateral FTAs, and ongoing negotiations on the TPP and the EU-Japan FTA. Especially, this research sheds light on the differences between the ongoing two FTA negotiations and Japan’s 13 existing bilateral FTAs in terms of Japan’s FTA strategy.
Chapter two analyzes the GVCs of Japanese companies from 1995 to 2011 based on EU World Input-output Tables (EU-WIOT). The results are as follows.
Firstly, RCEP including China is the most important economic cooperation partner for Japan, as it is for Korea. In 2011, out of Japan’s total value-added export, the RCEP-5(South Korea, China, Australia, Indonesia and India) accounted for 27.7% which is larger than the 21.7% forTPP-4(the US, Australia, Mexico, and Canada). The result implies that in terms of GVCs, concluding a regional FTA in East Asia involving China is advantageous for both Japan and Korea.
Second, most of Japan’s exports of final goods contribute to producing domestic intermediate goods. In 2011, 291.8 billion dollars of Japan’s final goods exports led to 485.9 billion dollars of intermediate goods production at the global level. However, out of the total amount, production of foreign intermediate goods represented only 22.1% while the share of Japanese goods was 77.9%. In value added terms, out of the total amount, 297.6 billion dollars or 85.7% are returned to Japan compared to 61.9% for Korea. This result shows that Japan’s intermediate goods production network is better developed than that of Korea. Japan has highlighted tariff elimination and cumulative rules of origin to maximize export enlargement effects following the FTA expansions.
Third, Japanese manufacturers have maintained its competitiveness even in the late 2000s. Japanese RCA in value added had remained around 0.76 to 0.79. Also, even though Japan’s total exports is only 1.48 times larger than that of Korea, Japan’s value-added exports is 2.22 times larger than Korea’s. It shows that Japanese exports has created a high rate of domestic value added, and implies the Japan’s FTA could shortly bring more value-added into the domestic production and employment effects.
Chapter three outlines how the Japanese government exploits FTAs in major negotiating chapters including tariff, rules of origin, service trade, intellectual property rights, etc., so as to expand GVCs of domestic enterprises. Also, this chapter examines the utilization of signed FTAs. The results can be summarized as:
First, although the Japanese government emphasizes comprehensiveness and high level of liberalization in the 13 effective FTAs, their actual level of liberalization is low since they have chosen the FTA partners so as to protect their agriculture, fisheries and livestock markets.
Second, 72 types of complex rules of origin in FTAs by Japan lower the utilization of FTAs by increasing burdens on Japanese companies to achieve the certificate of origin. To lighten the burden, the government introduced ‘autonomous certificate system for Customs Approved Registered Exporter’ to the Japan-Switzerland FTA and applied the system both to Japan-Peru and Japan-Mexico FTAs. However, challenges remain for the government to unify rules of origin and seek an effective way to utilize cumulative rules of origin.
Third, despite the dramatic increase in the number of certificates of origin issued by the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the growth of Japanese companies’ FTA utilization rate from 36.2% in 2009 to 42.9% in 2013 according to the JETRO survey, the FTA utilization rate of Japanese companies is still low. It is mainly caused by low liberalization level of signed FTAs. In fact, even goods receiving preferential tariff often could not benefit due to the rules of origin, high cost and complex process for a certificate of origin, and lack of information on the FTA procedure system.
Chapter four divides major issues of the TPP-12 negotiations into market access for goods and rules, then examines Japanese strategy in the TPP-12 negotiations. The results are as follows:
Firstly, it is hardly possible to sign the TPP by the targeted deadline at the end of 2014, but still the US-Japan negotiations are critical to concluding the agreement. The TPP, a multilateral FTA, could also be considered a bilateral FTA between the US and Japan. It is because with respect to negotiations on tariff and intellectual property rights, Japan’s acceptance of American demands would determine the results. Also, concluding the bilateral negotiation on market access on agriculture and livestock is a prerequisite, even though it is uncertain whether other participants would accept the settlement.
Second, Japan’s TPP strategy can be summarized as mutual protection allowance for the US Automobile market and Japan’s agricultural market. This Japanese exchange strategy had been effective until Japan’s official declaration of participation in the TPP, in February of 2013. However, at the moment, the end of 2014, the strategy seems to be losing strength. For instance, the TPP negotiations for tariffs and safeguards on pork, beef, and dairy products included in the main 5 items of agriculture and livestock industry are facing difficulties even at the working level consultation with the US.
Chapter five analyzes the main issues of the ongoing FTA negotiation between Japan and the EU and countermeasures of the Japanese government. Two results are revealed as below:
Firstly, the EU-Japan FTA is expected to be more comprehensive than recently concluded FTAs such as the EU-Korea, and the EU-Singapore. Negotiations for the EU-Japan FTA handled various issues; overall commodity trade including tariffs, technical barriers to trade(TBT), sanitary and phytosanitary measures(SPS), service trade, e-commerce, investment, government procurement, intellectual property rights, competition, trade and sustainable development, conflict resolution, non-tariff measures, rules of origin, customs clearance facilitation, geographical indications, animal welfare, corporate governance, business environment, and so on.
Second, the biggest issue in the EU-Japan FTA negotiation is the reduction or elimination of non-tariff barriers. For the EU to balance benefits against Japan which has low tariffs, it would need an effective strategy in demanding that Japan remove its non-tariff barriers. However, regulatory reforms of the Japanese government are limited to regulatory harmonization, trade facilitation and streamlining customs procedures. Ultimately, the pace of the FTA would be dependent on Japan’s reduction of non-tariff barriers and the EU’s acceptance of that level. Therefore, Japan should especially promote regulatory reforms among structural reforms known as the ‘third arrow’ of Abenomics. At the same time, the government needs to deal with harsh demands from Mega FTAs regarding non-tariff barriers.