Executive Summary

I. Introduction

II. Literature Review

III. Minimum Wages in APEC Economies

III. Minimum Wages in APEC Economies  16

IV. Data

V. Empirical Model

VI. Results
6.1. Results from the linear models
6.2. Main Results

VII. Conclusion54

References

This paper investigates the effects of an increase in minimum wages on wage inequality and gender pay gap in APEC economies using unbalanced economy-level panel data from 1990 to 2017. We estimate both linear and quadratic models of the effective minimum wage, while controlling for mac-roeconomic variables that could affect wage inequality as well as gender pay gap. The increase in the minimum wage has the effect of alleviating the wage inequality at the lower-tail of the wage distribution. The effect is much greater for women than for men, which contributes to reducing gender pay gap. On the other hand, the rise in the minimum wage does not affect the wage ine-quality at the upper-tail of the wage distribution for both women and men.
 

Executive Summary 

1. Introduction 

2. A Sectoral Analysis 
2-1. Legal Services
2.2. Health Services
2.3. Educational Services
2.4. Audio-Visual Services

3. Conclusion and Policy Implications 

References 

This paper seeks to analyze the major factors behind why each stakeholders in the legal, health, educational and audio-visual service sectors in Korea op-pose liberalization in a qualitative political economy context as well as to pro-vide alternative strategies for further liberalization in these four service sectors. In legal services, the foreign equity ceiling of 49 per cent for joint venture law firms may be lifted as long as the present regulation against the number of FLCs in a joint venture law firm exceeding the number of Korean lawyers is maintained. In health services, as a step-by-step approach, we can first con-sider a system where incorporated hospitals can be established and liquidated more freely by deregulating current limitations placed on the disposal of re-maining properties, while an overly distribution of dividends is restrained. In educational services, in order to deregulate limitations regarding the disposal of remaining properties, it will be necessary to enhance the transparency of management and operation of private schools. In this regard, allowing school foundations to take the form of a limited liability company could be considered, since they would then become subject to external financial audit. In audio-visual services, it will be necessary to improve monitoring and im-plementation of intellectual property rights as well as competition policy when considering further liberalization.
The major factors compelling each stakeholder in the legal, health, educational and audio-visual services to oppose further liberalization can be summarized as a general mindset towards uniform equity and control, cultural factors pre-venting discussion on rational alternatives, insufficient government budget for universal services, lack of administrative capacity in policy implementation and monitoring, absence of a proper system to evaluate the quality of ser-vices, asymmetry of information, and persistence of acquired rents.
In order to correctly identify and understand the nature of problems, the highest priority should be placed on reducing the mistrust among the con-stituents. This is because mistrust among the constituents acts as the most important impediment when attempting value-creating negotiation strategies among each of the stakeholders. Meanwhile, to build trust among all constit-uents, free flow of information works as an important factor.
Therefore, the problems of mistrust and lack of free flow of information are the most important impediments to improve those constraints that were analyzed in the selected service sectors. In addition, they are interlinked with each other, so that dealing with these problems simultaneously is a rational solution. In order to accomplish this, it is utmost important to develop the capability of each constituent to allow them to interpret specific pieces of information without distortion. In this regard, upgrading research and educa-tion of economics also becomes imperative.
 

Executive Summary

​

I. Introduction

II. Issues in S&T Policies towards MSMEs in Vietnam

III. Theoretical Framework: Technological Capability Approach

IV. Empirical Study
4.1. Data and Variable Construction
4.2. Estimation results

V. Conclusion

References

Promoting MSME innovation has been one of the priority work pro-grams of APEC. MSME innovation policy in the APEC and member econ-omies such as Vietnam, has focused on promoting venture capital and startup firms in the ICT industry. This study critically examines such a policy approach, and argues that deepening industrial production capability of MSMEs through the accumulation of technological capability is paramount. To do so, the study undertakes an empirical analysis of determinants of technological change among MSMEs in Vietnam based on the technological capability approach. The study finds that: sales revenue is the most powerful explanatory factor in a firm’s decision to innovate, investment in machines and equipment has a more significant impact on innovative activities than formal R&D, and size of the firm may matter for both quantity and quality of innovation. Further, different types of technological capability maybe more important for different types of innovative activity. Therefore, it is im-portant to 1) upscale private enterprises to bolster their technological capabil-ity; 2) to direct resources to medium enterprises that play an important role in coordinating smaller firms and diffusing technology transferred from larger firms or FDI firms; and 3) to provide tailor made technological consulting for MSMEs depending on their technological trajectory and S&T strategy, rather than focusing simply on subsidizing formal R&D.
 

Executive Summary

I. Introduction

II. Empirical Methodology and Data
2.1. Spillover Index
2.2. Dynamic Factor Model
2.3. Data and Latent Factor Estimation

III. Stock Return Connectedness
3.1. Connectedness of Individual Markets
3.2. Connectedness of MSCI-Classified Groups

IV. Market Volatility Connectedness
4.1. Connectedness of Individual Markets
4.2. Connectedness of MSCI-Classified Groups 
4.3. Dynamic Volatility Connectedness

V. Concluding Remarks

References
 

   This paper addresses network connectedness in stock returns and volatili-ties across the Asia-Pacific economies over the pre- and post-GFC periods. This study also uses the MSCI-classified group-specific latent factors to ex-amine their connectedness among the developed and emerging markets in different Asia-Pacific regions. We find that (i) based on the return connected-ness measures, global financial hubs - Singapore and Hong Kong - and Aus-tralia play an important role as efficient return information transmitters across stock markets, (ii) the United States is an overwhelming volatility transmitter as a net source of shocks during the global financial crisis, and subsequent volatility spillovers spread the crisis shock to each other in the region, (iii) comparing the results between the pre- and post-GFC periods, Canada was a net volatility transmitter before the GFC but has changed to a net volatility receiver after the GFC, and Korea has magnified the position of a net volatil-ity receiver after the GFC, and (iv) in terms of the degree of total spillovers in returns and volatilities at large, stock market connectedness in the Pacific Rim was reinforced after the GFC. These findings support the potential fea-sibility of financial cooperation and uphold a cause of regionally coordinated macro-financial policies against systemic risk vulnerability.

Keywords: APEC, Stock markets, MSCI, Spillovers, Networks  
JEL Classification: C32 G15 F36 F42

Executive Summary

I. Introduction

II. How Does Institutional Quality Matter for Trade Costs?

III. Empirical Model and Data
1. Country Level
2. Industry Level
3. Trade Costs Measure
4. Data

IV. Estimation Results
1. Country Level
2. Industry Level

V. Robustness Check 
1. Alternative Samples
2. Alternative Measure of Trade Costs

VI. Summary and Concluding Remarks

References

Appendix

Earlier works derive empirical implications that institutional quality is very influential as a source of comparative advantage in industries requiring relationship-specific investment from the supplier. However, as earlier studies focus on investigating the impact of institution on the efficiency of the producer, only the exporter’s institution is considered. In contrast, we attempt to identify the impacts of the quality of institution, of both exporters and importers, on trade costs, that are different across country-pairs. To check the problem of measuring trade costs, we use two alternative measures of trade costs, i.e. CIF/FOB ratio and the relative measure of trade costs proposed by Novy (2013). Using the Eora global supply chain database covering 187 countries for 11 primary and manufacturing industries and four years, 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015, we calculate a CIF/FOB ratio and the relative trade costs suggested by Novy (2013) which are used as a proxy variable for trade costs. At the country level, we find that the institutional quality of exporter and importer is negatively associated with trade costs and trade costs increase as disparity between two countries’ institutional quality increases. At the country-industry level, we find that a country-pair with better legal institution has lower trade costs in industries for which a hold-up problem is important. This result is robust to the alternative measure of trade costs suggested by Novy (2013). However, an analysis on the impact of institutional differences on trade costs yields mixed results. Therefore we do not conclude that the similarity of institutional quality between two countries is associated with lower bilateral trade costs. 

Keywords: Trade Cost, Institutions, Comparative Advantage
JEL Classification: F14, F20
 

  North Korea has been recently concentrating all its efforts into economic development, changing its economic strategies and appointing new personnel to key positions. The North convened the Party Conference of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea on April 21th, 2018 and proclaimed the completion of two long-time commitments (the parallel pursuit of both economy and nuclear armed forces), and proposed the intensive strategy of constructing an economically powerful socialist state. In 2019, Chairman Kim Jong-un stressed once again the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the construction of a socialist economy in his new year’s address for 2019. In addition, former Prime Minister Park Bong-ju, an official who served as prime minister for a lengthy period of time (June 2013 – April 2019) since Chairman Kim became leader of the country, has been found to be leading the “7.1 Improvement Measures for Economic Management” announced on July 1, 2001. Such a series of measures is raising hopes that North Korea is moving toward a transition of its economic system.
   Most people associate the transition of North Korea with the Vietnamese or Chinese experience of reform and opening. This is because not only was it reported how Kim Jong-Un has informally mentioned the Vietnamese reform and opening, but also an impression has been given that economic delegations of North Korea were learning about Chinese reform and opening by inspecting the special zones of China. However, there is no guarantee that North Korea will necessarily undertake either a Vietnamese or Chinese path of reform and opening, and therefore it will be difficult to claim the North will achieve the economic performance Vietnam and China have achieved. After all, many countries have faced socio-economic turmoil following such a major transition.
   The purpose of this study is to derive implications to North Korea from Myanmar's experiences of normalizing foreign relations and transition. The internal and external situations Myanmar have faced in the transition process share similar aspects with those currently in North Korea. After being sanctioned by the US and EU, Myanmar eventually lifted these sanctions by normalizing its relations with the US and actively introducing market economy systems. However, contrary to expectations that this measure would bring about Myanmar’s economic growth, Myanmar's GDP growth rate remains relatively low compared to that of China and Vietnam. The Myanmar experience may be a valuable lesson for North Korea.
   To explain the contents of this report in more detail, Chapter 2 compares the political and economic situation of Myanmar to those in North Korea and Southeast Asian countries. Myanmar is mentioned as a country which has peacefully established democracy in the international community, but at the same time it has been criticized that the introduction of democracy is only a formality that falls short of substantive democracy. Myanmar, along with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (CLMV), is classified as a Southeast Asian Transition Country and evaluated as having an economic environment similar to that of North Korea. Its GDP (2017) is 70 billion dollars – 0.3 times of Vietnam, 2.4 times of North Korea, 3.4 times of Cambodia and 4.3 times of Laos. The nation’s trade volume (2018) is 37.1 billion dollars, similar to Cambodia (31.7 billion dollars), but larger than Laos (12.8 billion dollars) and North Korea (5.7 billion dollars). Myanmar's business environment ranked 171 out of 190 countries in terms of Doing Business, receiving a lower evaluation than Vietnam in 69th place, Cambodia in 138th place and Laos in 154th place.
   Chapter 3 analyzes the contents of the US and EU bilateral sanctions imposed on Myanmar and the effects that economic sanctions have had on Myanmar's economy. Unlike North Korea, where multilateral and bilateral sanctions were imposed, only US and EU bilateral sanctions were imposed on Myanmar. When we look at US sanctions against Myanmar, there are sanctions on trade, finance, investment, aid, and visas. The trade sanctions began with the discontinuance of most- favored-nation treatment and eventually led to bans on imports of Myanmar products. Financial sanctions banned financial transactions with Myanmar and froze assets. Investment sanctions prohibited new investments in Myanmar, aid sanctions restricted bilateral assistance to Myanmar as well as multilateral assistance through international organizations, and visa sanctions took the form of restrictions on US visas for individuals and organizations. We can see that the EU's economic sanctions were carried out in a similar way with the United States.
   Although the sanctions did not affect Myanmar’s economy in quantitative terms, they had negative effects restricting the general process of industrialization in terms of quality. During the sanctions period, Myanmar recorded a positive GDP growth rate, and trade volume continued to expand. The first reason that the sanctions did not have a big impact on Myanmar's economy is that Myanmar has abundant energy and mineral resources, which could offset the US and EU trade restrictions by increasing their exports. In addition, the main economic sector of Myanmar is agriculture, so the economic scope in which economic sanctions on trade, finance, investment could influence the economy was limited. Second, the US and the EU tried to impose economic damages on Myanmar's military through economic sanctions, but it was the garment industry in the private sector that was mainly affected by the sanctions. During the sanctions period, the military halved the damage by developing the energy and mineral fields, which were given exceptions to the sanctions. Nonetheless, economic sanctions against Myanmar have resulted in Myanmar's macroeconomic economy remaining in primary industries such as energy and minerals, and hampered industrial advances in the manufacturing sector.
   In Chapter 4, we analyzed the process of lifting the sanctions and the changes in Myanmar's economy around that time. Domestic factors that could be lifted quickly were the willingness to reform Myanmar's democracy and the diversification of foreign policy. Among the external factors involved, the change in US policy in Asia and its measures to check the expansion of Chinese influence played a major role. The reasons that the sanctions were lifted quickly were mainly due to the Myanmar military’s willingness to democratize its political system and diversify its foreign policy. The United States has changed its policy toward Asia, and its efforts to check the expansion of China has also played a major role. The lifting of US sanctions against Myanmar progressed in a phased manner, beginning with preemptive measures by Myanmar, followed by US’s suspension of its sanctions, additional measures carried out by Myanmar, and additional suspensions on the part of the US. Recently, the issue of human rights in ethnic minorities has been rekindled, and the EU is discussing the resumption of sanctions against Myanmar.
   Myanmar's economy has been steadily growing since the sanctions were lifted, but it has been confirmed that there has been no rapid growth in GDP. According to our findings, the major causes for this lack of growth include the following: (1) lack of skilled human resources, (2) inefficient resource allocation, (3) failure of reform policies (lack of government capacity), (4) poor infrastructure, and (5) the failure of balanced diplomacy between the US and China. Prices have stabilized since 2009, and the exchange rate has been rising rapidly since 2012. The country’s trade volume has been growing steadily, but its deficit in commodity balance has been gradually deteriorating. FDI has been growing in absolute terms, but FDI-to-GDP ratio has remained at a low level among the CLVM countries.
   In Chapter 5, we summarize the implications of Myanmar’s experience for North Korea. First, there are implications for North Korea that the Myanmar sanctions were lifted quickly over five years (2012–16). Myanmar has the desire to contain the excessive expansion of China's influence in its country, while the United States wishes to control the expansion of China's influence in the region at the same time. These common interests led to the sanctions against Myanmar being lifted in a short period of time. North Korea seems to have a geopolitical environment similar to Myanmar, and this environment is likely to be used in the process of denuclearization and lifting sanctions.
   Second, Myanmar and the United States were able to build mutual trust by adopting a step-by-step process of lifting sanctions. North Korea faces more complicated situations than Myanmar because there are multilateral, bilateral sanctions, secondary boycotts against the North and denuclearization and human rights issues are combined as justifications of the sanctions. However, considering the fact that the United States is leading the sanctions against North Korea and that the human rights issue can be settled relatively easily in comparison with the denuclearization problem, it seems that there is room for lifting sanctions against North Korea in a similar way to Myanmar.
   Third, economic sanctions on Myanmar seem to have had little impact on Myanmar's economy in terms of quantity, but they have adversely affected Myanmar's economy in qualitative terms in that they weakened Myanmar’s growth potential. Myanmar's economy continued to grow in quantitative terms during the period of sanctions, but the sanctions have made the industries of Myanmar lean too much towards the energy and minerals industries. If sanctions against North Korea are prolonged, the growth potential of North Korea will weaken and its industry structure will inevitably remain underdeveloped.
   Fourth, Myanmar has failed to show remarkable economic performance in the process of transition, because it could not sufficiently enact laws and institutions to support this momentum, nor have the laws enacted been implemented properly. There is a lack of trained skilled bureaucrats to lead the transition. North Korea also needs to develop sufficient human resources to prepare for reform, and it must improve and implement laws and systems that meet international standards.
   Finally, Myanmar has not effectively utilized the high expectations of major countries such as Japan and China, which have shown interest in investing in Myanmar during its economic opening process. As North Korea also focuses on the self-sufficiency of its economy in their policies, it is likely that the North will miss such opportunities from outside like the experience of Myanmar. Therefore, in the process of opening up the economy, North Korea needs to abolish its former practices and actively attract investment from major countries.

President’s Message

KIEP in 2018

Top 5 developments of 2018

Achievements in 2018

   Summary of Major Achievements

   Most Excellent Research Project in 2018

   Bright 2018

   Research Oriented Projects

   General Projects

   Major Research Projects for 2019

Appendix

   History

   Organization

   Major Events and Seminars in 2018

   Settlement of Accounts for 2018

    With protectionism taking a stronger hold over the global economy, 2018 was a mixed year of external risks and opportunities: higher global risk, shifting Northeast Asian geopolitics following the inter-Korean summits and historical U.S.-North Korea summit.

    At the start of 2018, the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) set the six key research directions of: 1) responses to trade protectionism, 2) the New Southern and New Northern Policies, 3) innovative growth, 4) the New Economic Map of the Korean Peninsula, 5) the 4th industrial revolution, and 6) external risk management.

   This annual report is an extensive summary of the timely research projects conducted at KIEP in 2018. KIEP’s goals were to: provide policy measures responding to protectionism; devise sustainable cooperation strategies to support the government’s New Southern and New Northern policies; implement the New Economic Map of the Korean Peninsula based on the inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation; identify international economic and trade policies that can support inclusive growth; and discover the next growth engines for the Industry 4.0 era.

   With Korea’s economic growth slowing down, the economic environment around the country is full of uncertainties. It is no easy task to earn cooperation and support from neighboring countries, a prerequisite to solidify peace on the Korean Peninsula while achieving shared prosperity. KIEP will continue to support policy development that will help the Korean economy navigate such a tough global environment with its research activities in the areas of international macro-finance, trade, and regional studies. By doing so, we will fulfill our mission to serve as a trustworthy and responsible research institute, a driver of  sustainable growth and innovation.

President’s Message

KIEP in 2018

Top 5 developments of 2018

Achievements in 2018

   Summary of Major Achievements

   Most Excellent Research Project in 2018

   Bright 2018

   Research Oriented Projects

   General Projects

   Major Research Projects for 2019

Appendix

   History

   Organization

   Major Events and Seminars in 2018

   Settlement of Accounts for 2018

    With protectionism taking a stronger hold over the global economy, 2018 was a mixed year of external risks and opportunities: higher global risk, shifting Northeast Asian geopolitics following the inter-Korean summits and historical U.S.-North Korea summit.

    At the start of 2018, the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) set the six key research directions of: 1) responses to trade protectionism, 2) the New Southern and New Northern Policies, 3) innovative growth, 4) the New Economic Map of the Korean Peninsula, 5) the 4th industrial revolution, and 6) external risk management.

   This annual report is an extensive summary of the timely research projects conducted at KIEP in 2018. KIEP’s goals were to: provide policy measures responding to protectionism; devise sustainable cooperation strategies to support the government’s New Southern and New Northern policies; implement the New Economic Map of the Korean Peninsula based on the inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation; identify international economic and trade policies that can support inclusive growth; and discover the next growth engines for the Industry 4.0 era.

   With Korea’s economic growth slowing down, the economic environment around the country is full of uncertainties. It is no easy task to earn cooperation and support from neighboring countries, a prerequisite to solidify peace on the Korean Peninsula while achieving shared prosperity. KIEP will continue to support policy development that will help the Korean economy navigate such a tough global environment with its research activities in the areas of international macro-finance, trade, and regional studies. By doing so, we will fulfill our mission to serve as a trustworthy and responsible research institute, a driver of  sustainable growth and innovation.                           

   This report looks at the current state of foreign currency deposits (FCDs) in Korea and identifies determinants of the foreign currency deposits and the relationship between foreign currency deposit and exchange rate stability. Based on empirical analysis and surveys of experts, this paper proposes a scheme to activate foreign currency deposits.
   Korea's foreign currency deposits have increased significantly since the global financial crisis, thanks to the continuation of the current account surplus. At the end of 2010, FCDs were $24 billion, and as of the end of 2017, FCDs increased to $87 billion. Accordingly, the role of FCDs as a source of foreign currency funds for domestic banks has increased significantly. In 2010–18, when looking at changes in the composition of foreign currency liabilities of domestic banks, the share of foreign borrowing decreased from 40.7% to 24.8%, while the reliance on FCDs rose from 20.1% to 35.3%. However, as corporations’ share of FCDs account for about 80%, Korea's FCDs are highly volatile depending on the size of imports and exports, exchange rate fluctuations, etc. In fact, during March–April 2019, the size of FCDs decreased sharply due to an increase in the exchange rate.
   In order to identify the determining factors of Korea’s FCDs, a structural VAR (vector autoregressive) model was used. When analyzed for the entire period, FCDs were found to respond significantly to the exchange rate shock, but were not significantly affected by the current account shocks. However, the impact of the two variables on FCDs varied significantly before and after the global financial crisis. Before the global financial crisis, while the effect of currency shocks on FCDs was not statistically significant, the impact of the current account balance on FCDs was significant. However, since the global financial crisis, the effect of commercial accounts on FCDs has been greatly weakened, while exchange rates have played an important role as a variable affecting FCDs.
   In addition, the report found that increased FCDs have a positive effect on exchange rate stability, thus increasing the legitimacy of policy efforts to expand FCDs. Using panel data from 21 countries, the impact of foreign exchange reserves and foreign currency deposits on exchange rate stability was demonstrated. It was confirmed that an increase in foreign currency deposits in countries or periods where foreign exchange reserves are relatively low reduces exchange rate volatility.
   Based on empirical findings and interviews with commercial bank officials and experts, the report provides several suggestions on how to raise FCDs. In order for FCDs to function as a stable source of foreign currency liquidity, banks must be given incentives in their management and procurement of FCDs.
   First of all, the current system where sell and buy transactions in the swap market lead to a reduction in foreign currency liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) should be improved. We suggest measures such as regarding foreign currencies that will be returned to the bank within a few days after a sell and buy transaction as cash inflows when conducting 3-month stress test calculations. In regard to the foreign currency LCR and three-month stress test, it will be necessary to check whether regulatory effects are overlapping with existing measures such as the foreign exchange stability levy or regulations on foreign exchange derivatives position, etc.
   In terms of foreign currency funding, we propose an improvement of the return on foreign currency deposits and the strengthening of global money management services.
   Should the current account surplus flow be disrupted, it will be difficult for the authorities to pursue the expansion of foreign currency deposits. However, based on the understanding of the incentive structure of the FCDs stakeholders analyzed in this report, it is necessary to promote the expansion of FCDs in a way that increases the attractiveness of FCDs as a financial product.

Executive Summary

1. Introduction

2. Short-term Export Insurance and Export Credit Guarantees
2-1. Overview of K-SURE’s Service
2-2. Data Description

3. Empirical Evidence
3-1. Empirical Model
3-2. Effect of Short-term Export Insurance on Export
3-3. Effect of Export Credit Guarantee on Export
3-4. Robustness Check

4. Conclusion

References 

   There is a series of empirical papers (Kim and Lee 2004; Egger and Url, 2006; Moser, Nestmann, and Wedow, 2008; Baltensperger and Herger, 2009; Auboin and Engemann, 2014; Van der Veer. 2015) which show that trade finance is positively associated with export. Despite its positive impact on export, trade finance has been a contentious issue in international organizations such as the WTO and OECD in terms of implementing related policy measures. This is based on the argument that trade finance hurts fair international trade because it ultimately plays a role just like a subsidy.
   Regarding this contentious issue, in this paper we examine whether there is evidence supporting that trade finance is associated with an increase in export. We also investigate the channel through which the effect of the trade finance on export is working. To this end, we focus on a specific part of trade finance: short-term export insurance and export credit guarantee. This is because noble and ample data on these types of trade insurance are available. This confidential data is provided by the Korea Insurance Trade Corporation (henceforth K-SURE) exclusively.
   We conduct a panel regression using Korean sector-level export data covering from 2010Q1 to 2017Q4. This dataset enables us to control for destination country-, sector-, and time-fixed effects. Our empirical results show that the short-term export insurance and export credit guarantee have a positive impact on exports, and the main channel behind this is related to mitigating financial constraints of exporting firms. The trade finance effectively eliminates the risk of importers' payment, which helps export firms reduce the financial frictions. This ultimately leads to an increase in export.
   Since the main mechanism in which the trade insurance affects export is related to alleviating financial frictions, it becomes more definite that the way how trade insurance contributes to an increase in export is somewhat different from that of a subsidy. When we consider the fact that financial friction is an important factor for restraining international trade, which can partly explain the great collapse in international trade during the global financial crisis, the trade insurance policies would rather be a useful policy measure which can dampen negative impact on export during recession.