국문요약

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 배경
2. 연구의 목적 및 구성

제2장 국영기업 관련 WTO협정 개정 논의
1. 배경
2. 현행 WTO협정의 국영기업 규율
3. 지역무역협정을 통한 국영기업 규범의 발전
4. WTO 개정 논의 전망 및 시사점

제3장 공급과잉을 유발하는 ‘유해보조금’ 관련 WTO협정 개정 논의
1. 논의의 배경
2. 상류보조금
3. 금지보조금 목록 확대 및 선별적 구제 신설
4. 유해보조금에 대한 심각한 손상 간주 규정 재도입
5. 혜택 산정기준의 구체화
6. 국영기업에 적용되는 특정성 판단기준 구체화

제4장 보조금 통보 관련 WTO협정 개정 논의
1. 논의의 배경
2. 미국·유럽연합·일본의 WTO협정 개정 논의
3. WTO회원국 제출 개정안 검토
4. 평가

제5장 결론
1. 향후 전망
2. WTO보조금협정 개정에 대한 한국의 대외적 입장 정립

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary

   The present study deals with the issue of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), industrial subsidies, and subsidy notifications in the context of “WTO Reform”; examines relevant provisions of WTO agreements in comparison with those under a select number of recent regional trade agreements; and predicts directions for future WTO amendment proposals to be made by the United States, European Union, and Japan (hereinafter referred to as “US-EU-Japan”). Further, in preparation for a situation where these three Members reach out to obtain Korea's support for the amendments, this study seeks to provide policy implications that the Korean government could take into account in defining its strategic positioning in WTO Reform negotiations.
   Chapter 2 discusses possible WTO amendments related to industrial subsidization “for” and/or “by” China’s SOEs. To this end the present study firstly sheds light on the current situation with China’s SOEs, its industrial subsidization policy, and possible market distortion arising therefrom. Secondly it discusses practical and normative limits of the current WTO agreements in addressing this trade issue. Article XVII of the GATT has long been criticized for a lack of a definition of “state-trading enterprises (STEs)” and for Members’ insufficient implementation of STEs transparency obligations under the same provision. Further, under the WTO Subsidies Agreement there has been a long-standing disagreement between the United States and China on whether China's SOEs can be viewed as a “public body”, i.e., the granting authorities of subsidies. The United States has consistently objected to the “government authority” and “significant control” standards and criticized that the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the term “public body” would place too much burden on the investigating authorities in proving China’s SOE under investigation constitute a public body. Against this background a few recent RTAs including the CPTPP and the USMCA contain more concrete definition of SOEs based on ownership and control. On a similar note it is probable that US-EU-Japan would propose under WTO agreements to (ⅰ) introduce detailed criteria in determining a public body in cases where SOE subsidization is concerned; (ⅱ) adopt a set of rules which apply to entities which are not public bodies but still under influence of the government; and (ⅲ) add additional obligations and rules which apply specifically to SOE subsidization. For a more detailed analysis, this study examines similarities and differences in relevant provisions of the current WTO Subsidies Agreement, the CPTPP, and the USMCA.
   Chapter 3 analyzes a possible WTO Subsidies Agreement revision with respect to industrial subsidies leading to overcapacity or “harmful subsidies.” A future proposal by US-EU-Japan is most likely to provide for (ⅰ) introduction of explicit rules on benefit pass-through, given that GATT/WTO jurisprudence has consistently required a high degree of burden of proof to the investigating authorities in establishing that benefits provided to upstream industries have “passed through” to downstream industries. Additionally the following elements may be proposed: (ⅱ) expansion of boundary of the “prohibited subsidies” beyond export subsidies and import substitution subsidies to include harmful subsidies; (ⅲ) reintroduction of rebuttable presumption of adverse effects (as in now-defunct Article 6.1 of the WTO Subsidies Agreement); (ⅳ) introduction of more detailed rules for out-of-country benchmark for countervailing duty calculation under Article 14 of the same Agreement ; and (ⅴ) adoption of additional fast-track rules specifically for disputed SOE subsidization between WTO Members.
   Chapter 4 discusses possible WTO amendments as regards subsidy notifications. While the compliance rate with notification obligations has generally been very low for most WTO Members, the main criticism has been directed at China. It has been repeatedly pointed out at the WTO that while China is actively involved in domestic subsidization both at the central and local government level, it still has not completed notification on all of its domestic subsidies. On this matter, primarily two proposals are being discussed: (ⅰ) introduction of “administrative measures” to be applied to WTO Members who failed to comply with their notification obligations, and (ⅱ) utilization of Trade Policy Reviews (TPRs) in monitoring such non-compliance.
   In Chapter 5 this study suggests that WTO Members should adopt a “stepped” approach by prioritizing among multiple revision elements. Further it draws policy implications for the Korean government to take into account in future WTO negotiations, with regard to introduction of (ⅰ) new definition of “public bodies” where SOEs are concerned; (ⅱ) additional obligations and rules for SOE subsidization; (ⅲ) explicit benefit pass-through provision for upstream subsidies, (ⅳ) prohibited industrial subsidies leading to overcapacity; (ⅴ) criteria for determining the Non-market-oriented conditions and/or Non-Market Economies (NMEs) under WTO agreements; and (ⅵ) rules to strengthen transparency and enhance Members’ subsidy notifications including administrative measures. Lastly, this study stresses that the Korean government closely monitor the ongoing discussion between US-EU-Japan for a thorough legal and economic analysis on any further developments, and prepare multiple scenarios for all possible outcomes in setting its positioning and negotiation strategies with respect to each revision element.
 

서언 

국문요약 

제1장  서론 
1. 보호무역주의 확산 추세
2. WTO 분쟁 회부 건수의 증가
3. DSU의 중요성에 대한 공감대 확산
4. DSU 개정 관련 최근 동향 반영 

제2장 DSU 개정 협상 현황 
1. 기존 DSU의 문제점 및 한계
2. 2006~11년 협상 주요 쟁점 
3. 기존 DSU 개정 논의에 대한 우리나라의 입장 
4. 미국의 주요 요구사항과 주요국 반응 
5. 미국 요구사항에 대한 주요국 반응 
6. 우리나라의 입장 

제3장 WTO 개혁 맥락 DSU 개정 검토 항목 
1. DSU 개정 문제 조망을 위한 전반적 골격 
2. 구체적 쟁점에 대한 검토

제4장 우리나라에 대한 함의 및 대응 방안 
1. WTO 개혁 논의에 대한 대응 방안 
2. 분쟁해결절차 개선 작업 향후 대응 방안 
3. 우리나라에 대한 파급효과와 이에 따른 고려사항 
4. 주요 이슈별 우리나라의 기본 입장  

제5장 결론 

참고문헌 

Executive Summary 

   Amid faltering multilateralism and growing frustration of trading states, “WTO Reform” has become a focal point of the global discussion. The future of the global trading regime seems to depend upon how this reform discussion unfolds for the next couple of years. The global leaders who gathered at the G-20 summit held in Osaka in June 2019 agreed that they should strive for early agreement on the WTO Reform. As of December 2019, efforts are being mobilized in many different forums to come up with tangible outcome, so that a final (or something near final) package for the reform can be attained at the upcoming 12th Ministerial Conference of June 2020.
   A variety of topics are being discussed in the context of the WTO Reform. One of such topics is an adjustment of the dispute settlement system of the WTO and attendant amendment of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). Discussion of this particular topic has been prompted by a specific demand of a particular state ? namely, the United States that has expressed continuing frustration of the current dispute settlement regime. Other states do not necessarily share the view of the United States, but they find it inevitable to accommodate U.S. demands given how strong U.S. opposition is.
   In that regard, there are elements in the proposals being discussed at the moment that would undermine the principle of ‘rule of law’ in the dispute settlement system ? something that has been praised as the most noteworthy achievement of the present WTO regime. And yet, there are also elements in the present discussions and related proposals that may help states put the dispute settlement system into perspective and contemplate a more practical and workable dispute settlement system under the circumstances. Topics being discussed in this regard include curtailment of the authority of the Appellate Body, confinement of the scope of review of panels and the Appellate Body, and enhancement of the Members’ control over panel and the Appellate Body proceedings, to name a few. As always, the question is how to strike a right balance in future negotiations.
   Korea is advised to participate in this process more actively. Korea is the 7th largest trading state and 10th most frequent user of the dispute settlement system among 164 Members of the WTO. As such, any change of the WTO’s dispute settlement system stands to affect Korea directly. While some issues offer very little ground for Korea to maneuver, others do provide opportunities for its meaningful participation and contribution. Korea should more actively take advantage of these opportunities, so that dispute settlement proceeding is amended in right direction and in a way that reflects interest of the global community including Korea.
   Even if general direction of the current negotiation is already fixed and hard to change, there are still details and fine-tunings that require further inputs and guidance from Members. This is the area where Korea can contribute. By way of example, facilitation of non-binding dispute settlement proceedings, strengthening of peer review through TPRM, specification of the interpretative authority of Members, and adoption of a remand can be contemplated in this respect. Korea is advised to prepare and submit specific proposals or join other states in such proposals in the next couple of years through various forums where this important topic is to be discussed.
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 배경과 필요성
2. 연구 목적과 주요 연구 내용
3. 기존 연구의 검토 및 본 연구의 기여

제2장 WTO 농업보조 규범과 우리나라의 농업보조 실적
1. WTO 농업보조 규범과 의미
2. 우리나라 농업보조 실적과 특징

제3장 우리나라 농업보조 검토
1. 2018년 농림축산식품부 예산사업 검토
2. 2018년 농림축산식품부 기금사업 검토

제4장 주요국의 농업보조 현황과 특징
1. 주요 선진국의 농업보조 현황 및 특징
2. 주요 개도국의 농업보조 현황 및 특징
3. 선진국과 개도국 농업보조 비교

제5장 WTO 개도국지위 문제와 개도국 세분화
1. WTO 개도국지위 논의 동향
2. 우리나라의 개도국지위 검토와 영향
3. 개도국 세분화 분석과 결과

제6장 정책 제언
1. WTO 농업보조 통보강화 대책
2. WTO 개도국지위 관련 대책

참고문헌

[부록] 선진국 포함 시 군집분석 결과

Executive Summary

   The global trading system - with the WTO at its heart - is facing a ‘make or break’ moment. All three of the WTO’s functions are under pressure and in need of reform: administering multilateral trade rules, serving as a forum for trade negotiations and providing a mechanism to settle trade disputes. But despite this gloomy outlook, there is reason to be cautiously optimistic. Among many important issues related to reforming the WTO trading system, this study focuses on following two issues; reinforcing WTO notifications and differentiating developing countries since the two issues are core and key interest of both developed and developing members.
   Agricultural support can divided into three types: (i) trade or border measures such as tariffs or quotas that provide market price support (MPS); (ii) coupled subsidies (CS) provided by governments as direct subsidies on output or as subsidies on inputs (such as fertilizers or seeds) that create incentives to increase output; and (iii) decoupled subsidies (DS) that avoid altering incentives to change output levels but provide direct income support to farmers.
   The traditional pattern of agricultural support involved substantial support to farmers in the rich countries, while poor countries, on balance, used to tax agriculture. This pattern has changed substantially over the past decades. In wealthy nations, average rates have fallen and there has been a move away from trade measures and towards decoupled protection that seeks to avoid pushing for higher agricultural production and reducing the market access opportunities of other countries. In developing countries, agricultural support has shifted from net taxation to net assistance on average.
   A key question is which interest groups might engage on reform of agricultural subsidies in the future. Reformers need to develop a reform narrative that frames the issues in a way that makes the benefits of reform clear and mobilizes a range of actors in support of a specific approach to reform. Discourse coalitions can help build such a shared understanding and identify narratives that will convey its essence to broader groups of stakeholders. While the road to such reform is likely to be long and hard there is, at last, a great deal of attention focused on how this might be done.
   The Trump administration, in another sign of its tough approach to trade, moved in March 2019 to exclude India and Turkey from a program that has long granted the two countries preferential duty-free access to US markets. The administration’s action came after Brazil and Australia lodged parallel claims that India’s sugar subsidy regime has depressed world prices. Earlier this year, the World Trade Organization (WTO) took a similar step, ruling against China’s rice and wheat subsidies.
   These actions underscore an important issue, bringing the role of larger developing countries in the trading system to the front burner. Developing countries’ exports have grown to represent almost half of total world exports, with the largest 15 developing economies accounting for some three-quarters of that share. When the players?advanced or emerging?are large, their actions can have sizeable economic effects in international markets. There is thus a strong rationale to have them play by the same rules.
   The central issue at hand is the long-standing practice in the WTO?and its predecessor, the GATT?that each country may “self-declare” as developing to benefit from special and differential treatment (S&DT). Least developed countries (LDCs) qualify automatically, however, once certain thresholds are met. While the exact meaning of S&DT is defined in the context of each negotiation?preferential market access, exceptions to commitments, technical assistance, etc.?the concept departs from the key principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination that underlie the multilateral trading system.
   One way to improve the system would be to limit the practice of developing-country self-declaration. The United States recently proposed that in current and future negotiations, members or acceding members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) may not invoke the self-declaration option. The same would apply to members of the Group of 20 (G-20), “high income” countries as per the World Bank definition, or countries that account for 0.5 percent or more of global merchandise trade. Over 30 countries would fall in at least one of these categories.
   Agreeing on a formal categorization of developing countries in the WTO context can become a byzantine negotiating exercise, with little likelihood of agreement because of the diverse nature of countries in this category. In reality, however, differentiation does occur. The WTO Trade Facilitation (TFA) allows countries to self-determine the timeline for implementation of commitments, in some cases linked to technical assistance. The “developed-developing” dichotomy does not serve the WTO membership well. Rather than debating definitional criteria, however, WTO members should consider the following steps to help integrate developing countries in global trade:
   Countries can decide to follow Taiwan’s example and not claim differentiated treatment, without the need to declare themselves “developed.”
   Countries could opt not to claim differentiated treatment in a specific negotiation, as with the implementation of TFA commitments. The ongoing negotiations on fisheries subsidies disciplines provide a good opportunity to put this measure into practice.
   Flexible negotiating formats, in particular plurilateral agreements open to participation by all countries, are a useful alternative for designing rules in areas of interest to groups of members. Finding a way to bring them to the WTO would benefit the broader WTO membership, increasing transparency. Countries not wanting to join a negotiation would not be required to do so or be allowed to block it.
   Active engagement by larger developing countries in trade negotiations could strengthen their bargaining position to set a balanced negotiating agenda, encompassing the interests of countries at different levels of development, including, for example, in agriculture.
   Negotiations should provide for differentiated treatment taking into account the policymaking challenges in developing countries without establishing permanent exemptions. These provisions should either be time-bound or have clear threshold and phase out criteria, as in the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
   Technical assistance and capacity-building support for development and reform in developing economies can be essential to success and are thus in the interest of both those that provide such assistance and those that receive it.

국문요약 

제1장 서론

제2장 아세안 사회문화공동체 경과와 2025 분석
1. 아세안의 출범과 발전
2. 아세안 공동체(ASEAN Community)
3. 아세안 사회문화공동체(ASCC) 주요 협력 분야 제시

제3장 사회 인프라: 보건의료 및 교육을 중심으로
1. 아세안의 현황
2. 국제사회의 분야별 협력
3. 한국의 대아세안 협력과제

제4장 문화예술
1. 아세안의 현황
2. 국제사회의 대아세안 협력
3. 한국의 대아세안 협력과제

제5장 지속가능한 환경
1. 아세안의 현황
2. 국제사회의 분야별 협력
3. 한국의 대아세안 협력과제

제6장 한ㆍ아세안 협력방안
1. 기본방향
2. 분야별 정책과제

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary
 

   Since the inauguration of the new government in 2017, Korea has been striving to deepen its cooperative relationship with ASEAN to the level of the four traditional major partners to the Korean Peninsula through the New Southern Policy. This requires strengthening cooperation not only in the economy but also in various fields. In 2015, the ASEAN created three communities ? the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) ? also providing a blueprint for each community. In this context, this study aims to suggest our comprehensive strategies and sectoral policies to cooperate with ASEAN member countries, with a particular focus on the ASCC.
   In line with ASEAN’s people-oriented commitment to improve quality of life, the ASCC can play an important role in achieving ASEAN social integration and promoting sustainable development in the region. In this context, the ASCC includes a wide variety of social issues such as culture and arts, education, public health, environment and disaster management and these issues are closely related to the political and economic integration efforts of ASEAN. When considering ASEAN’s needs for cooperation, relevant global agenda and Korea’s recent policy toward ASEAN, the research areas in this report cover social infrastructure culture and arts and sustainable environment.
   In Chapter 3, we analyzed the current status of the social infrastructure in the ASEAN region and their cooperative activities with other countries, especially focusing on the area of health care, including water and sanitation and education. These issues are not only main agenda of governmental meetings under the ASCC, but also major areas of cooperation between Korea and ASEAN member countries. ASEAN is committed to building and improving its regional social infrastructure while seeking sustainable and inclusive growth according to the ASCC blueprint. However, we found that there are still development gaps in health care and education sectors among member countries, with each income group showing different weaknesses. These gaps and weaknesses are likely to coincide with demands in ASEAN to cooperate with other countries. With diverse experiences and expertise in the social infrastructure, developed countries and institutions such as Japan, the U.S., Germany and the EU have been working with ASEAN to align their national/regional interests and strengths with ASEAN’s needs. This includes various collaborative projects at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. For Korea, on the other hand, the health care and education sectors are key areas of cooperation with ASEAN member countries, but it is mainly promoting bilateral cooperation projects without much consideration for their income levels and development needs at the ASEAN level. We also need to pay attention to the issues that ASEAN is currently discussing, such as aging society, higher education cooperation between member countries, policies for vulnerable groups and so on.
   The main goals of Chapter 4 are to analyze ASEAN-level development strategies and basic conditions in the field of culture and arts, and to identify promising directions for future cooperation strategies through a comparison between Korea’s cooperation with other countries and with ASEAN. Detailed development plans of the ASEAN in the field of culture and art are presented through the Strategic Plan for Culture and Arts, the Strategic Plan for Information and Media, and the ASEAN ICT Master Plan. According to the main contents of these strategic plans, ASEAN seems to give high policy value to securing equal opportunities for cultural activities, supporting cultural diversity, preserving cultural heritage, and enhancing the competitiveness of the cultural industry.
   On the other hand, with the recent emphasis placed on the importance of public or cultural diplomacy in international relations, many countries are using the culture and arts sector as a major means of their foreign exchange and support policies. ASEAN is attracting attention as a regional cooperation partner in various aspects such as the economy, politics, and security. Therefore, in addition to Japan and China, Korea also has established overseas base organizations and promoted cultural cooperation policy to expand its influence. In the case of Europe, especially France and Germany, various cultural exchanges and language dissemination projects are carried out to increase their influence within the ASEAN region through cultural ODA and the establishment of cultural centers.
   The results of comparing Korea's ASEAN culture and art cooperation policy with main leading countries can be summarized as follows. First, overseas networks for cooperation in the field of culture and arts still remain insufficient in terms of quantity and quality compared to the major leading countries. Second, achievements in terms of establishing differentiated support channels and related policies in the field of culture and arts with ASEAN are still insufficient. Third, compared to various cooperation and support policies with individual ASEAN countries, efforts to develop multilateral cooperation agenda and projects for the ASEAN community are showing a relative lack of outcomes. Fourth, there are grounds for concerns about the lack of cohesion and inefficiency in cooperation channels, caused by the current situation in which exchange and cooperation projects in the field of culture and arts are conducted by various organizations.
   In Chapter 5, ASEAN’s intra- and inter-regional efforts to realize a sustainable environment through disaster management, emission mitigation, biodiversity conservation and plastic waste management are reviewed. When considering the rapid economic and population growth, urbanization and the geographical characteristics of the ASEAN region, the goals of realizing environmentally sustainable development and establishing a community which is resilient in the face of natural disasters can be seen as urgent priorities to further ASCC progress. Japan, Germany and EU, major aid donors for environment protection and climate change in ASEAN, regularly communicate with ASEAN to identify cooperation potentials and opportunities through policy dialogue specifically dedicated to environment issues. Also, these donors closely partner with various bilateral and multilateral donors in the field of culture and arts with the aim of enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of cooperation programs. Korea should develop strategic policy and priorities for cooperation with ASEAN in environment and climate change issues with an understanding of the environmental needs in ASEAN, recent global agenda and Korea’s competitive advantages.
   Chapter 6 presents the basic directions and strategies of ASEAN-Korea cooperation in connection with the ASCC initiative. Since the formal consultation channels of ASEAN-Korea so far have focused on the diplomatic and economic fields, a formal dialogue channel on the lines of an “ASEAN-Social and Cultural Policy Dialogue” (tentative name) needs to be established. Through these dialogue channels, it will be necessary to lead discussions on the development of cooperation fields, strategy and action plan establishment, and discussions at the ministry level to establish the goal of ASEAN-ROK joint prosperity by establishing working groups for each major field.
   Among the major sectors, cooperation strategies to achieve goals in the social infrastructure sector can be presented as follows. First, it is necessary to re-examine ASEAN’s cooperation needs by each income group based on research results on policy, project promotion process and obstacles in recipient countries. Second, we need to develop various cooperation models that reflect ASEAN policy needs. This could be explored by reviewing current policies such as the ASEAN Post-2015 Health Development Agenda and discussing our suggestions with ASEAN. Third, it is necessary to promote projects to improve ASEAN’s health care system and services including supporting ASEAN to manage and treat infectious diseases effectively, and also to pursue a collaborative response to the issue of aging societies. Fourth, there is a need to strengthen the mutual cooperation system to promote exchange of human resources among ASEAN member countries as well as between Korea and ASEAN in the field of higher education through linkages between current projects.
   Next, in the field of culture and arts, we derived the following cooperative strategies to utilize Korea’s comparative advantages and to effectively respond to ASEAN's support needs. First, it is necessary to revitalize mutual beneficial exchange and cooperation in the field of culture and arts between ASEAN and Korea such as supporting projects for enhancing the competitiveness of the ASEAN culture industry. Second, it will be necessary to develop exchange and cooperation projects at the ASEAN community level, not bilateral cooperation with individual countries, such as developing an online platform to record and share ASEAN cultural heritage information. Third, stronger support must be provided for preservation and restoration of cultural heritage in ASEAN through cultural ODA. Fourth, it will be necessary to prepare support policies to effectively utilize human resources such as overseas Korean networks within the ASEAN region. 
   Lastly, in the case of sustainable environment, we derived the following policy strategies to achieve specific goals within the sector. First, it will be necessary to establish higher strategies for environmental cooperation and to identify priority areas for cooperation with ASEAN. Since each ASEAN member country possesses different environmental and policy conditions, the target countries should be classified into different groups and projects developed by each agenda of environmental cooperation. Second, in order to strengthen environmental cooperation with ASEAN, it is necessary to understand international discussion trends and reflect them in cooperation strategy. Third, private participation should be encouraged to expand and mobilize financial resources related to ASEAN environmental cooperation. Fourth, it will be necessary to find various ways of cooperation aside from financial support, such as policy consulting, professional training and partnership in the green finance sector.
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구 목적
2. 연구 범위 및 구성
3. 선행연구 검토

제2장 주요국의 혁신성장 패러다임
1. 미국: 디지털 이노베이션(Digital Innovation)
2. 독일: 인더스트리 4.0(Industrie 4.0)
3. 일본: 커넥티드 인더스트리즈(Connected Industries)
4. 소결

제3장 주요국의 제조업 혁신정책: 스마트팩토리를 중심으로
1. 독일
2. 일본
3. 소결

제4장 주요국의 스타트업 정책
1. 미국
2. 일본
3. 프랑스
4. 소결

제5장 주요국의 핀테크 정책
1. 미국
2. 일본
3. 영국
4. 소결

제6장 정책 시사점
1. 혁신성장 패러다임
2. 제조업 혁신정책: 스마트팩토리를 중심으로
3. 스타트업 정책
4. 핀테크 정책

참고문헌

Executive Summary

   The purpose of this study is to analyze innovation growth policies in the United States, Europe, and Japan, and to draw policy implications for Korea. Accordingly, the report analyzes the characteristics of innovation growth paradigms and three important sectors of the 4th Industrial Revolution (smart factories, start-up ecosystems, and fintech).
   Chapter 2 first analyzes the US government policies on advanced manufacturing, IoT, AI, and Big Data. In addition to support from the federal government, private companies and laboratories are cooperating actively through consortiums such as the Industrial Internet Consortium (IIC), which operates several testbeds. The results of our analysis indicate that the link between government policies and private companies’ strategies is the core of US innovation growth. Second, the innovative growth paradigm in Germany has been changed from the “High-Tech Strategy” to the concept of “Industrie 4.0” and “AI Strategy.” The key to innovative growth in Germany is government-industry-academia cooperation realized through the introduction of use cases and the provision of testbeds. Third, the Japanese government is pursuing the vision of “Society 5.0” for the future of its society, a vision of a society that collects data through IoT technology and utilizes this big data through AI and robots. Japan is also implementing a policy called “Connected Industries” to secure competitiveness in the manufacturing industry by utilizing industrial data. Above all, the Japanese government has been putting efforts into improving the environment for big data utilization by modifying laws and supporting related projects.
   Chapter 3 describes the current status and policies related to smart factories in Germany and Japan. We explain the connection mechanisms and standards applied to smart factories in Germany such as the Open Platform Communications Unified Architecture (OPC UA) and umati, or universal machine tool interface, and present the exemplary cases of Siemens, Bosch and SAP. Furthermore, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) of Germany is utilizing Mittelstand 4.0 Competency Centers to support the digital transformation underlying smart factory projects in Germany. Japan is not yet at the stage of operating virtual factories, and is instead focusing on innovations in manufacturing processes. This innovation of manufacturing processes in Japan is characterized by digitalization, standardization, visualization, and automation, and industrial IoT platforms such as Mitsubishi Electric's Edgecross and Fanuc's FIELD systems have emerged for inter-factory and sectoral connectivity. Meanwhile, the Japanese government provides customized support by implementing public relations activities, dispatching experts, providing IoT tools, IoT taxation, and funding for IoT investment.
   In Chapter 4, we review current startup ecosystems and related policies in the United States, Japan and France. The startup ecosystem in the United States is characterized by synergistic effects of human capital, technological innovation, and venture capital. In terms of policy, the Obama administration supported the development of innovative technologies through the Startup America Initiative and the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act. However, supporting policy has lost its momentum under the Trump administration, and regulations are expected to be tightened for companies in Silicon Valley. Recent features of the Japanese startup ecosystem can be summarized as the expansion of CVC investment and the increase of young entrepreneurs. Along with the J-Startup policy, the representative startup supporting policy in Japan to foster role model companies, the Japanese government is releasing data and guidelines to promote open innovation between large corporations, universities, research institutes and startups. In France, which is gaining recognition as a growing hub for tech startups, the government and the private sector are interacting actively through “La French Tech,” a government support plan, and Station F, a private startup campus. In 2019, the French government introduced a plan to enhance the competitiveness of the startup ecosystem by diversifying its policies, for instance by strengthening incentives and public relations support.
   Chapter 5 describes fintech trends and policies in the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom. The US government adopts a negative regulatory approach, and financial authorities examine legitimacy and provide guidelines to remove uncertainties in fintech services. Japan is encouraging the emergence of new fintech companies and services by introducing and amending relevant laws (the Banking Act, the Money Payment Act, and the Financial Instruments Transactions Act). The Financial Services Agency (FSA) is providing regulatory consultations through its Fintech Support Desk and Fintech Experimental Hub. Moreover, in terms of blockchain technology, Japan is strengthening its cooperation network by conducting joint research and round tables with overseas organizations. The UK, which is highly competitive in the financial industry, is actively supporting fintech by deferring regulations through a regulatory sandbox. The UK government is also establishing a fintech-friendly regulatory environment by hiring people with wide experience in the banking and fintech industries. Level 39, a fintech cluster, provides not only office space but also opportunities to network with investors and accelerators. In addition, the fact that successful fintech companies in the UK can easily enter overseas markets makes the UK more attractive for fintech companies.
   Following an analysis of the Korean government’s paradigm for innovative growth and policies related to smart factories, the startup ecosystem, and fintech, we compare these with major economies to draw the following policy implications. First, Korea should expand government R&D investment in 5G infrastructure and AI technology to build a hyper-connected intelligent society. It will also be critical to establish a whole-of-government agency to promote government-industry-academia cooperation and to provide test beds for innovative technologies. Second, we need to establish a clear and unified concept of smart factories and to build industrial IoT platforms. In addition, customized support that meets the needs of SMEs is required for SMEs to become smart factories. Third, with regard to the startup ecosystem, we could consider applying a comprehensive negative regulation system and promoting open innovation. Also, it is necessary to build an integrated support team for startups like the French Tech National Team in France. Fourth, deregulation should be carried out to foster the fintech industry in Korea. In addition, further efforts should be made to analyze successful overseas fintech business models and to review the adverse effects related to fintech. Meanwhile, it would be beneficial to review the legal system and pay more attention to strengthening domestic and international networks in order to revitalize fintech with a proper management system. Lastly, government authorities should adopt innovative approaches to improve financial regulation, as well as provide active and customized support including support for overseas expansion.
 

국문요약

제1장 서론
1. 연구목적
2. 연구의 내용과 차별성

제2장 혁신성장 관련 데이터 법ㆍ제도
1. 혁신성장과 데이터
2. 혁신성장 관련 개인정보 보호와 활용
3. 데이터세트의 확보
4. 데이터와 경쟁법
5. 국경간 데이터 이전과 조화

제3장 혁신성장 관련 지식재산권
1. 혁신성장과 지식재산권
2. 인공지능 관련 지식재산권 쟁점
3. 우리나라 혁신성장 관련 지식재산권 보호

제4장 혁신성장과 표준
1. 혁신성장과 표준전략
2. 4차 산업혁명 시대와 시스템ㆍ플랫폼 표준의 역할 부상
3. 국가표준 거버넌스 및 주요국의 표준정책과 제도
4. 우리나라의 표준화 현황
5. APEC의 표준 관련 논의 동향

제5장 결론 및 시사점
1. 혁신성장과 데이터 관련 법ㆍ제도
2. 혁신성장과 지식재산권
3. 혁신성장과 표준

참고문헌

Executive Summary

   The purpose of this study is to analyze institutional changes implemented by the regulatory bodies in developed countries-such as the US, the European Union (EU), and Japan-in response to the 4th Industrial Revolution, and draw policy implications for Korea. More specifically, this research examines the institutional and legal changes taken by major countries and Korea on the three major topics of Big Data, intellectual property rights (IPRs), and standards.
   Chapter 2 deals with major issues in the field of data regulation, and examines institutional and legal changes implemented by major countries. In the first section, this chapter first identifies the key challenges in today’s “data era” as: 1) finding the right balance between data protection and data usage, 2) securing access to datasets, 3) regulating data monopoly, and 4) regulating cross-border data transfer and achieving global harmonization. Section 2 analyzes data regulations in the US, the EU, Japan, and Korea, focusing on each country’s regulations on opt-in (requiring express consent from the individual in order to process their data) or opt-out methods, data purpose limitation, data minimization, and the pseudonymization/anonymization of data. Section 3 examines regulations related to Midata and public data-both of which can help secure datasets available to data utilizers-in major countries. In Section 4, we examine the relations between Big Data and competition law, which is a relatively new issue in the field. Section 5 wraps up the chapter with a discussion on regulating cross-border data transfer and achieving global harmonization. 
   Chapter 3 examines IPR issues in relation to the development of Artificial Intelligence (AI). After reviewing the status and development trends of AI in this era of innovative growth, this chapter outlines two major issues in the IPR area that have emerged with the advancement of AI technology. The first is the issue of IP protection for AI systems. Many countries recognize that the development of algorithms or software is a crucial driving force for AI development, and thus endeavor to encourage development of algorithms and software by enhancing their legal protection framework. Some countries-like the US, the EU and Japan-are considering not only copyright but also patent and trade secret protection, in protecting AI-related IP. This study looks into the cases of the US, the EU, and Japan to identify trends in legal protection for AI-related technology. The second issue regards the patentability of inventions created by AIs, and whether AI innovations (in which AI holds the patent) necessitate legal protection. The US and Japan so far have taken negative stands on granting patents to AI systems, but at the same time their governments are keeping an eye on changes in trend.
   Chapter 4 observes the growing importance of standards, and how major countries including the US, China, Germany, and Japan are responding to the trend. As the society advances into the 4th Industrial Revolution era characterized by “hyper-connectivity,” the importance of standards-as a key instrument in connecting different devices together-is all the more emphasized. This chapter focuses on major countries’ development of standards systems, standards policy, and the recent trends in standards R&D. In particular, it focuses on the problem of linkage between R&D and standards, and between standards and regulations, and each country’s efforts in harmonization. It also introduces the recent discussions on standards policy and conformity assessment in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Sub-Committee on Standards and Conformance (SCSC) and Telecommunications and Information Working Group (TEL WG).
   Lastly, Chapter 5 analyzes the measures to improve Korea’s institution and legal system in relation to data regulation, IPRs, and standards. In the data regulation sphere, it is necessary to revise the current data law in order to allow for more data utilization, while providing a practical level of protection. The revision should also be in line with the level of protection required by the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), in order to pass the adequacy test. To expand the dataset and prohibit data monopoly, it is also necessary to establish legal grounds for data transfer. Regarding IPRs, the discussion on computer-related inventions should focus on determining the criteria for “creative concepts” or technical features. Also, regulations that address the problem of repeatability, which is common in AI-related inventions, should be newly established. It will also be advisable to apply more limited protection to creations by AI. Finally, in the area of standards, the government must strive for the adoption of Korea’s national standards by international standards bodies. It should also make efforts to reduce costs by: 1) shortening the standard-setting period, and 2) utilizing government-funded R&D projects by extracting national standards from the projects and promoting these to become international standards. In addition, it will be necessary to minimize the time and cost required to establish technical regulations by harmonizing technical regulations with national standards.

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 배경 및 목적
2. 연구 내용
3. 연구 방법
4. 연구의 기대효과 및 한계

제2장 선행연구 검토 및 분석의 틀
1. 선행연구 검토
2. 분석의 틀

제3장 국별 여성연맹 분석 및 비교
1. 베트남 여성연맹
2. 라오스 여성연맹
3. 미얀마 여성연맹
4. 소결: 국별 비교 분석

제4장 조선사회주의여성동맹
1. 활동
2. 업무 운영 체계
3. 소결: 동남아 3개국 여성연맹 비교 결과와 조선사회주의여성동맹과의 비교

제5장 결론
1. 연구요약: 동남아 여성연맹 분석을 통한 조선여맹의 활동 예측
2. 향후 북한 개발협력 사업을 위한 조력 기구로서의 조선사회주의여성동맹 역할 검토

참고문헌

Executive Summary

   This study aims at finding possible partnership mechanism and modality for external development partners with Chosun Socialist Women’s Union(CSWU) in North Korea when carrying out development programs on women’s issues in the future. The analysis will be done by comparing CSWU with three women’s unions with socialist backgrounds in Southeast Asia(i.e., Vietnam Women’s Union(VWU), Lao Women’s Union(LWU) and Myanmar Women’s Affairs Federation(MWAF)) by comparing their history, mission and operation. Currently, VWU, LWU and MWAF are actively cooperating with international actors on women’s development projects in their own respective countries, and the author tries to find implications for future cooperation with North Korea from their experiences.  
   Chapter 2 reviews existing literature on women in socialist states and on the evolution and status of the three women’s unions(VWU, LWU and MWAF). It also lays out analytical framework to be used throughout this study. Chapter 3 reviews history, organizational evolution, missions and activities of VWU, LWU and MWAF. In order to analyze each women’s union, their 1)activities in three sectors (politics, economy and welfare) and 2)operational mechanism were examined. The internal and external operational mechanisms of these women’s unions and their location in each country’s gender governance were also reviewed. In addition, the location of each women’s union within their country’s gender governance system were identified. Development partners’ current cooperation programs with women’s unions were also examined, by identifying the partnership method and modalities.
   VWU, LWU and MWAF have all in common its top-down operational mechanism which reaches to the grass-root level in society. However, VWU and LWU shares much similar history of being mass mobilized for socialist state-building and later fighting against American imperialism. Over the course of history, their original mission and activities changed and with the reform and opening, these two unions now work for gender equality and women’s empowerment in their respective countries. MWAF however shows different nature, in that it was established rather recently with a direct aim of empowering women in Myanmar.
   Chapter 4 analyzes history and evolution of CSWU. Similar with VWU and LWU, CSWU shares the history of being mass mobilized for state-building, disseminating socialist propaganda and providing  women’s labor force for socialist economic development. CSWU also shares the top-down organizational operational structure. However, different from VWU and LWU, CSWU is under much heavier control of the People’s Party and lacks autonomy.
   The top-down organizational structure, its reach over the grassroot(commune) and the information these unions acquire on community can be a strength when working with international development partners. However, in the case of North Korea and for the CSWU, the one-man dictatorship system, strong control of Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) over CSWU and the unshakable patriarchal culture of North Korea all comprise a distinctive feature of CSWU, which in turn can contribute to the difficulty and restriction for development partners’ cooperation with CSWU in the future.
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구 배경 및 목적
2. 연구의 주요 내용 및 한계
3. 선행연구 검토 및 차별성
4. 연구의 수행방법

제2장 베트남 교통분야 개발 현황과 개발수요
1. 베트남 국가개발전략 및 교통분야 추진체계
2. 베트남 교통분야 개발 현황 및 정책
3. 교통분야 개발협력에의 시사점

제3장 국제사회의 베트남 교통분야 개발협력 현황과 분석
1. 베트남 ODA 수원체계
2. 국제사회의 베트남 교통분야 개발협력 현황
3. 국제기구 및 주요 공여국의 교통분야 개발협력 비교 분석

제4장 한국과 베트남의 교통분야 협력 현황과 과제
1. 경제협력 현황
2. 개발협력 현황 및 협력방안
3. 교통분야 개발협력 종합검토

제5장 한국의 베트남 교통분야에 대한 개발협력 방안
1. 교통분야 개발협력 전략 및 방향
2. 교통분야 개발협력 부문별 협력방안

제6장 요약 및 정책제언
1. 요약
2. 정책제언

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary

   The purpose of this study is to establish a development cooperation plan that meets the development needs of Vietnam's transportation infrastructure.
   The current status and demands of development in Vietnam's transportation infrastructure were analyzed in consideration of development cooperation trends between Korea and Vietnam, and the direction of cooperation in transportation sector development are proposed as well. Our proposals are based on an analysis of assistance from international organizations and major donor countries. To this end, local data on policies and future plans related to the transportation sector were collected from visiting various related agencies located in Vietnam, such as the Ministry of Transport in Vietnam, Department of Transport in Hanoi, and Hanoi office of KOICA located in Vietnam. Also, field research was performed by holding workshops and invitational workshops to identify the needs of Vietnam government in terms of developing the transportation sector, and to collect the latest data in Vietnam. During our field research, interviews were conducted with government officials at the Ministry of Transport.
   In the first Chapter, the purpose of this study, its background, review of pre-research and research method are presented.
   Chapter 2 identifies the development status and development demand of transportation infrastructure in Vietnam based on an analysis of the overall national development strategy in Vietnam, economic trends and prospects, sustainable development goals of UN, and the status of the promotion system by transportation sector, and also focuses on presenting implications for development cooperation between Korea and Vietnam. In order to develop the plan, it is necessary to identify various transportation infrastructure development goals such as socio-economic development goals based on the national development strategy of Vietnam, factors favorable and unfavorable to Korea according to economic trends, and the sustainable development goals of the UN. Following this, the status of development and related policies by transportation sector such as roads, railways, airports, ports, urban transport and logistics were reviewed and analyzed based on various statistical data collected by Korean and Vietnamese experts. As a result, the following three implications were identified: an absolute shortage in transportation infrastructure corresponding to economic growth, insufficiency of mid- and short-term plans and delayed implementation of transportation infrastructure projects, and the lack of related laws and planning capacity to establish efficient transportation systems.
   The third Chapter surveyed the current status of cooperation in transportation development as they relate to the international community in Vietnam, and reviewed the case of development cooperation projects conducted at six banks, which serve as the major donors in Vietnam, and the ODA system of Vietnam. Our analysis showed that currently the Vietnamese government is promoting development cooperation in the transportation sector with the introduction of preferential loans and the establishment of ODA-related laws such as PPP projects. In addition, the status of support by major international organizations and donor countries(World Bank, ADB, Korea, Japan, France, and Germany), currently supporting about 95%(12.89 billion US dollars) of the total ODA in Vietnam’s transportation sector, were analyzed. Furthermore, the case of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which is not included in major donor countries but closely linked to Vietnam’s Two Corridors and One Economic Circle, was investigated. By comparing and analyzing the data of international cooperation, it became clear that not only the demand in Vietnam but also the assistance plans of developing cooperation partners should be carefully considered when promoting international cooperation for transportation development in Vietnam.
   Chapter 4 analyzed the implementation of the Korea-Vietnam Financial Cooperation Agreement (2014) and the Development Experience Exchange Partnership Program (DEEP) projects in the transportation sector, also identifying the status of support for transport projects and cooperation in the sector. In particular, we follow the progress of transport logistics infrastructure projects in Vietnam coordinated through the cooperation center jointly operated by the Korea Transport Institute after the 2018 Hanoi summit in Vietnam. Based on the results of our analysis of the country partnership strategy for Vietnam, annual implementation plans, and cooperation status and strategies by institutions, we propose a strategy to support an Intelligent Traffic System(ITS) and road transport system using Korea’s advanced IT technology. Our analysis of the status of cooperation by institutions showed that links to follow-up projects are needed to effectively support regional development by cooperating in the transportation sector. These results, therefore, suggest the need to share experiences and knowledge in the Korean land and transport sector and to pursue government programs and promotion plans based on solid field research.
   Finally, based on the findings of the preceding chapters, Chapter 5 presents the strategies and directions for development cooperation in Vietnam’s transportation sector and cooperation plans by sector. The strategies were proposed in response to the Korean government’s country partnership strategy for Vietnam, Vietnam's current direction in international cooperation and investment policy, differentiation of international cooperation strategies for Vietnam, and the demands of Vietnam's transport infrastructure development policy.
   The mid-to long-term strategies for international cooperation between Korea and Vietnam proposed in this study by the area of cooperation are as follows: first, in terms of establishing an effective system, strengthening the cooperation system and establishing a framework for cooperation should be considered a critical principle; second, the types of cooperation should be diversified, converged, integrated, and specialized; third, cooperative methods should be diversified, through collaboration by agencies; fourth, the contents of cooperation should be diversified, internalized, and modularized; and fifth, the agents of cooperation should pursue strengthening the sustainability of the cooperative system.

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구 배경 및 목적
2. 연구의 구성과 내용

제2장 산업클러스터에 대한 이론적 검토
1. 산업클러스터의 개념과 범위
2. 소결

제3장 인도의 산업클러스터 현황 및 정책
1. 인도의 산업클러스터 발전 현황
2. 마하라슈트라 주 산업클러스터정책
3. 소결

제4장 마하라슈트라 산업클러스터 경쟁력 분석
1. 분석방법
2. 분석대상
3. 분석결과
4. 클러스터별 경쟁력 비교분석

제5장 결론 및 시사점
1. 결론
2. 시사점 및 과제

참고문헌

Executive Summary

   Industrial clusters in India have been developed for decades and are currently taking the form of competitive and innovative clusters where related government organizations, research centers, and universities are located together. These clusters are designed to facilitate interactions between firms and institutions as well as promoting efficient distribution of information, skills, and labor across industries. As a result, a large share of multinational firms are located in existing Indian clusters or create their own clusters with local government support. Korean firms planning to start new businesses in India are also likely to consider these clusters for their potential business location. However, despite the importance of these clusters, there has been a lack of studies that quantitatively or qualitatively examine the characteristics of such clusters.
   This study compares the competitiveness of industrial clusters in Maharashtra, India, in four major dimensions: firm density, industry specialization, sustainability and innovation. While previous studies largely focused on efficient or precise definitions of clusters, we compare the characteristics of existing industrial clusters because these provide important reference points to be considered by Korean firms planning to set up a new business (or expand an existing one) in the Indian market, as well as the Korean government when promoting Korean investments in India.
   In Chapter 1, we briefly provide the background and motivation for the study and introduce methodologies used to measure the competitiveness of clusters. Also, we discuss how we address a few of the methodological challenges. The current study employs both qualitative and quantitative approaches to overcome the limitations of a quantitative approach alone when it comes to assessing overall competitiveness of clusters. Although we measure the competitiveness of clusters using information on firms’ finances and location, there are still other important factors to consider, like land price or quality of infrastructure. Therefore, we add qualitative analysis to complement our quantitative approach. In addition, we occasionally extend the boundary of industrial clusters to take account of the distributions of firms that are naturally created near the clusters.
   The second chapter introduces theoretical and political views related to clusters. Since the pioneering work of Michael E. Porter, there have been numerous studies seeking for an efficient and precise definition of clusters. We explore the different approaches to defining clusters and introduce other terminologies used interchangeably. We also examine how international organizations or local government entities in India define clusters differently. The industrial clusters in our study follow definitions used by the Maharashtra Industry Development Corporation (MIDC).
   The third chapter examines the development stages of Indian clusters as well as the cluster policies implemented in the state of Maharashtra. Since the first official development policy was initiated in 1997 by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the Ministry of Small & Medium Enterprises (MSE), state governments, and local government agencies have implemented numerous programs to enhance firms’ productivity in clusters. As a result, India appears to have thousands of industrial clusters in recent periods. The state of Maharashtra also has several cluster projects led by the state government and Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC). In addition, there are multiple special economic zones, IT parks, and cooperative industrial estate zones in Maharashtra to develop its economy.   
   In Chapter 4, we measure the competitiveness of the industrial clusters in Maharashtra. We use kernel density estimation and nearest neighborhood analysis to measure the density of firms. Industry specialization is measured by Location Quotients (LQ). Given that LQ coefficients do not consider the externalities between firms’ interactions, we identify the top 10% closely related industries using a similarity matrix, and then generate LQ coefficients within these industries. For sustainability, we use weighted kernel density estimation, which assigns weights based on the number of employees and the profit levels to take account of the firms of different sizes. Lastly, to measure innovation we count the number of universities, research centers, and other government organizations located in the cluster and estimate the relative importance.
   Our results indicate that the density of firms is the highest in Pimpri-Chinchiwad (east & west) in Pune region and relatively higher in several districts in Tane region. This is due to the high density of firms within individual clusters or across clusters. The level of sustainability is higher in Gansoli-Mahape and Airloi clusters in TTC region, and Pimpri-Chinchiwad, Chakan III, and Taloje clusters given that the firms with a large number of employment and profit level are present in the districts. Innovation level appears to be higher in most of the districts in Tane and Pune regions. Lastly, capital-intensive industries such as automobiles, electronics, or chemicals are more developed in TTC, Pimpri-Chinchiwad, and Chakan regions while other clusters tend to be more specialized in labor intensive industries such as food, textiles or plastics.
   Chapter 5 suggests the implications of our study for Korean firms and government and the directions for future research. India is a key partner in Korea’s New Southern Policy, and its sustainable economic growth and large domestic market have attracted the investment of many Korean firms. The variations of characteristics across industrial clusters in Maharashtra, which we quantitatively demonstrate, can be important information to be considered based on firms’ needs or purposes of investing in Indian market. Also, the Korean government could potentially build a better policy for Korean firms with the information provided by this study. Future research can benefit from extending the analysis to all Indian regions as well as creating a single indicator by incorporating other important information.

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구 배경 및 목적
2. 연구의 구성과 내용 및 범위
3. 선행연구 검토 및 차별성
4. 본 연구의 수행 방법

제2장 메콩 개발과 지역 협력체 현황 및 시사점
1. 메콩 개발의 의의
2. 메콩의 주요 지역 협력체 현황
3. 시사점

제3장 역외 국가의 협력 현황과 전략 및 시사점
1. 일본의 메콩 지역 참여전략
2. 중국의 메콩 지역 참여전략
3. 미국의 메콩 지역 참여전략
4. 비교 및 시사점

제4장 한국의 메콩 지역 협력 현황과 시사점
1. 한-메콩 다자 간 협력 현황
2. 한국의 메콩 지역 개별 국가의 협력 현황
3. 시사점

제5장 한국과 메콩 지역의 중장기 상생전략
1. 중장기 상생협력의 방향과 전략
2. 메콩 지역과의 상생협력 방안

제6장 요약 및 결론

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary

   Considering the meaning of Korea’s full participation in Mekong development, this study provides the current status and strategies of Mekong regional partners by reviewing the Mekong development strategies from Japan, China, and the United States. In this process, the multilateral cooperation through the Mekong Regional Cooperation Organizations was sought. The interviews with policy authorities and experts through on-site surveys suggest desirable directions and specific measures for cooperation between Korea and Mekong regional cooperation organizations. This study includes ① analysis of economic growth, trade and investment status by using statistical data of the Mekong countries, ② comparison with previous research results, and ③ interviews with experts, government officials, non-profit organizations in the Mekong region.
   Previous research includes the historical context of Mekong development, the strategic support in response to the expansion of communism with UN’s support in the 1950s, and discourse on the background and limitations of the cooperation in the Mekong region mainly from Thailand’s perspective. The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Program initiated by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) created discussions on the political side of Japan, China, and India in the late 1990s. The CLMV countries’ accession to ASEAN and subsequent regional development gaps were the essential issue for the further development of the Mekong region.
   The Mekong River Committee (MRC) is one of the leading regional multilateral cooperation and serves as a primary platform for Mekong regional water resource development cooperation. Korea has little collaboration with MRC, but it is necessary to develop a cooperation strategy focusing on poverty reduction by considering a regional water resource management and development to take advantage of Korea’s water resources development and irrigation experiences through science and technology-based joint research.
   The Mekong Institute (MI) has education and training programs in the Mekong area, which has a significant advantage in establishing a local network. A strategy is needed to promote education programs using specific cooperation areas and link them to business forums. It is also essential to check the effectiveness of the Korea-Mekong Cooperation Fund and to set a better direction.
   Thailand’s Mekong Economic Cooperation (ACMECS) is looking forward to Korea’s involvement in funding and will use these resources to promote the development of infrastructure and energy in the country. In particular, it seeks to develop the road, railway, telecommunication, and energy sectors of the East-West Economic Corridor and the Southern Economic Corridor. Korea can consider triangular strategic cooperation with ACMECS.
   As ASEAN’s connectivity strategy has a great impact on the development of the Mekong region, Korea should devise a strategy to participate in projects that enhance linkage with the Mekong region by actively utilizing the six implementation strategies presented in the Master Plan of ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC 2025). The government needs to establish a framework for Korean private companies and NGOs to make full use of the Korea-Mekong alliance. For example, policy research institutes such as Japan’s influential ASEAN Institute (ERIA) and China’s Influential Mekong Development Research Center (GCMS) can be referred to.
   Besides, ADB’s GMS program emphasizes the spatial strategy to operate the existing physical infrastructure so that the government and the private sector can consider participating in various areas such as city networks, industrial clusters, business partnerships, cross-border cooperation platforms, etc.
   Since 2009, Japan has promoted the Japan-Mekong Summit and expanded investments in infrastructure to strengthen its connectivity to support its companies’ entry into the Mekong area and to respond to climate change in the framework of ‘Green Mekong’. The positive image was solidified by increasing the sustainable use of resources. Japan’s Asian development strategy has established a think tank, ERIA, in 2006, which has a significant impact on ASEAN’s policy-making process, including the Mekong region.
   In 2009, the United States established the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) with the Mekong downstream nations through its ‘Return to Asia’ policy, and has been slow for a while, and recently strengthened the India-Pacific cooperation to highlight LMI’s activities to cope with China’s influence in the region. Emphasis is placed on a partnership with other counties such as Japan, Korea, Australia, etc.
   China is pursuing practical cooperation for the effective implementation of the “one-belt-one-road” policy through the 1st Lancang Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Summit in 2016 by responding to the US-led India-Pacific strategy. In 2016, the Global Mekong Research Center (GCMS), a policy research organization similar to the Japanese-led ERIA, was launched differently.
   ROK-Mekong cooperation means multilateral cooperation. The promotion of the 1st Korea-Mekong Summit in 2019 will be the government’s active support for such multilateral cooperation and development with ASEAN. However, until now, only the Mekong Institute (MI) has been carrying out the Korea-Mekong Cooperation Fund as a project. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a plan to utilize various Mekong regional cooperation bodies, and at the same time, to establish a mid- to long-term cooperation agenda to promote multilateral cooperation.
   Thailand has relatively little trade and investment with Korea in comparison to its geographical advantage and scale. Most of the trade is in industrial and some consumer goods such as steel, memory, petrochemical, machinery, electronic device parts, and cosmetics. As human exchanges continue to increase, on the other hand, cooperation activities have been active in the area of ​​human capacity.
   The annual trade with Vietnam is about $ 68 billion in 2018, making it the first trade partner among ASEAN countries. TV (OLEDs), LED displays, and memory semi-conductors used in mobile phones and digital cameras account for a large portion. Korea’s investment and human exchanges have increased rapidly.
   In Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, trade has generally been focused on clothing, sewing, construction equipment, and agri-food. Development cooperation projects focusing on primary industries and regional development, such as Myanmar’s natural resource development and mining investment, Laos rural community development project, and Cambodia’s construction industry, are in progress. The ROK introduced a new employment permit system in Laos in 2018.
   Vietnam can be a major partner in the global value chain focusing on mobile phones and electronic products. In Thailand, there is a high possibility of cooperation in convergence and innovative sectors such as policy 4.0, ICT, and creative economy. In Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, there is a continual increase in human exchanges, so that is necessary to focus on improving the quality of human capacity by linking with higher education.
   Overall, it is vital to contribute to the development of Mekong by sharing Korea’s experiences in agricultural and rural development. Identifying potential projects that will help build a peaceful economy on the Korean peninsula, reflecting the experiences of the economic and social development of transitional countries are important in the near future. When establishing the Regional Partnership Strategy (RPS), It is necessary to think strategically, such as avoid the overlapping projects with each country and use the Mekong Regional Cooperation, but also cooperate with other donors or triangular cooperation with the Mekong country.
   This study concludes by suggesting the direction and promotion strategies of the long-term win-win cooperation of Korea-Mekong cooperation and three win-win measures. The direction of cooperation should contribute to narrowing the development gap of ASEAN and to verifying the effectiveness of Korea’s new southern policy. In other words, after understanding the development demand of the Mekong region and the capacity for win-win cooperation in Korea, the Korea-Mekong Summit will continue to create conditions to harmonize the development demand of the region with our supply capacity. When looking at the strategies for cooperation in the short, medium, and long term, it is important to start a full-fledged collaboration by establishing a branding strategy for the Korea-Mekong Summit Cooperation and establishing various ways that can be linked with the Mekong Regional Partners. Based on this, it is desirable to seek strategic linkages in major countries such as the United States, Japan, and China, and at the same time, Korea’s Mekong cooperation should meet ASEAN’s need to bridge the development gap, leading to common prosperity. In the medium to long term, it should lead to raising Korea’s influential in Asia and strengthening the capacity of multilateral development cooperation with the private sectors.
   As a concrete plan for win-win cooperation with the Mekong region, it is proposed to have three win-win cooperation platforms. First, we suggest the “Grow Mekong” platform, which is a platform for policy research and pilot projects based on science and technology. It has a framework for continuously developing joint research and policies such as economics, society, culture, and science and technology in the Mekong area and verifying its effectiveness as a pilot project. In the short term, Korean and Mekong regional experts will jointly conduct long-term research in each sector, contributing to the agenda of the Korea-Mekong Summit. In the medium and long term, scientific and objective research and the rigorous verification of its effectiveness contribute to the establishment of policies necessary for Mekong development. You can refer to Australia’s Center for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR). In terms of verifying the effectiveness of the project, Banerjee, Duflo, and Kremer, who won the 2019 Nobel Prize in Economics, can be considered.
   Second, we propose the term “Finance and Invest the Mekong”, a platform for financial and investment cooperation, which is a government-level support platform that can facilitate the activities of SMEs seeking to enter the Mekong region. This platform should allow for a preliminary survey of the infrastructure in the Mekong and the potential for investment. It should facilitate investment in appropriate technology developed locally linked with various start-up support funds in Korea. The primary product produced in the Mekong region may be considered as a way to be connected to exports by commercializing Korean companies with technical support (e.g., packaging, processing, branding, etc.). In the financial investment sector, understanding of the system and mutual cooperation are important such as Japan’s Global Financial Cooperation Center, which supports capacity building for financial officials in Mekong region.
   Third, we also propose a platform for economic cooperation, the “Mekong-Korea Peace Economy”. In the short term, it is important to find ways to contribute to the development of Mekong and to use this result to link the cooperation platform where Mekong, South Korea, and North Korea might jointly participate. For example, by incorporating North Korea into global value chains of major industries such as agri-food, clothing and sewing industries, and electronics industries, it can serve as an opportunity to lay the foundation for a peaceful economy in Asia.
   Based on this basic cooperation platform, we propose the following directions for overall cooperation with the Mekong Regional Partners. We look forward to enhancing Korea’s status in Asia by contributing to reducing the regional development gap and achieving the UN’s SDGs by establishing and implementing roadmaps and specific implementation strategies with Mekong regional partners.
   First of all, the MRC’s water resource cooperation platform and Korea’s ICT and big data should be considered. If scientific research and data on local topography and water resources are accumulated in both society, the private sectors’ activities will be increased. The Mekong Institute (MI) should be used to strengthen the human network by expanding exchanges with Korea experts through training programs and business forums in areas that enhance food safety and processing technology for various agricultural products. A strategy should be devised to maximize the leverage of triangular cooperation through ACMECS, Thailand’s Mekong Economic Cooperation. For example, the government will be able to engage in people-centered human exchange and cultural funds in the ACMECS project, while at the same time linking our private companies to work in the Mekong region. It is also necessary to establish a strategy to actively participate in ASEAN’s connectivity and a roadmap that can be linked to the spatial strategy in    ADB’s GMS program. For example, building a city network, activating industrial clusters, fostering cross-border cooperation, and solidifying strategic business partnerships could contribute to the promotion of established economic corridors.