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Policy Analyses
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The Social and Economic Impact of the Spread of Populism in Latin America
Populist forces continue to emerge in Latin America, causing instability and uncertainty across the region. Populist forces in the region first rose to prominence during the beginning of the period of import substitution industria..
Seungho Lee et al. Date 2022.12.30
Economic cooperation, Political economy Latin AmericaDownloadContentSummaryPopulist forces continue to emerge in Latin America, causing instability and uncertainty across the region. Populist forces in the region first rose to prominence during the beginning of the period of import substitution industrialization in the 1930s. They emerged taking advantage of the growing demands of the rapidly expanding urban working class for mass politics and the expansion of social benefits. Populism was rampant in Latin America for more than 30 years following the 1930s, but fell into decline with the emergence of military regimes in the 1960s and 1970s. However, populist forces emerged yet again in the 1980s with the wave of democratization and the accumulation of public dissatisfaction due to a series of economic crises. The so-called neopopulist forces took power in Latin American countries in the 1980s and 1990s, combining neoliberal economic policies with the typical ‘us’ versus ‘them’ discourse that is typical of populists.While a rapid transition to neoliberal policies led to various social and economic problems, traditional parties and politicians were not able to respond effectively to those problems. In this context, a new populist wave, combined with what was called the 21st-century socialism, emerged in the 2000s. In the 2010s, new breeds of populism appeared one after another, and the spread of populism is not expected to disappear in Latin America in the near future. Social and economic inequality is worsening across the region in the aftermath of COVID-19, and public distrust of established party politics and existing democratic institutions is growing higher than ever. All in all, there is fertile ground for populist forces to spread even more, claiming that they are the only ones who can eliminate the ‘incompetent and corrupt’ establishment and truly represent the “virtuous” people.With the spread of populism expected to continue in Latin America, there is a growing need to investigate the social and economic impact of populism. Against this backdrop, this study examines the impact of populist forces in power on the inflow of foreign direct investment, the quality of democratic institutions, and the foreign policy directions of Latin American countries. Based on our empirical evidence and qualitative analysis, we provide several recommendations for the Korean government and corporations. The contents of our research are as follows.In Chapter 2, we examine how populism has been defined in the existing literature and provide an explanation about the definition of populism we adopt for this research. This study follows the ideational definition of populism, which conceptualizes populism as a ‘thin-centered’ ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the ‘people’ and the ‘elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people. At the core of diverse phenomena labeled ‘populist,’ ranging from classical populism from the 1930s to 1960s and neopopulism in the 1980s across Latin America to recent populism not only in the region but also around the world, there is this ‘thin-centered’ ideology. In addition, we provide in this chapter a literature review that can hint at how the core characteristics of populism may affect our variables of interest.Chapter 3 examines the impact of populist forces in power on the inflow of foreign direct investment, quality of democratic institutions, and foreign policy directions. We conduct empirical analysis using a panel dataset including 18 Latin American countries from 1999 to 2021, employing regression analysis and synthetic control methods. We then complement our empirical evidence with some case studies on populist rule. Our findings are as follows.First, our regression results show that the presence of a populist government or a stronger populist tendency of the ruling government do not necessarily lead to a decrease in foreign direct investment inflow. We find that the negative impact of the presence of a populist government or a stronger populist tendency of the ruling government is pronounced in left-wing regimes. A populist in power or a stronger populist tendency are associated with a larger inflow of foreign direct investment under centrist and right-wing governments. Our findings from synthetic control methods suggest that a populist in power on average leads to a decrease in foreign investment inflow regardless of its ideological orientation. In our case studies, we examine how a number of populist governments in Latin America have implemented their economic policies and how they have affected foreign direct investment inflow.Second, our findings from regression analysis and synthetic control methods suggest that a populist in power and a stronger populist tendency adversely affect the quality of democratic institutions regardless of the ruling government’s ideological orientation. Our case studies illustrate a typical populist strategy to attack democratic institutions, with examples of left-wing and right-wing populist governments from the early 2000s to recent times. They confirm how populism and democracy are inherently incompatible. Moreover, we suggest that the authoritarian tendency of populist governments has strengthened during the recent COVID-19 period, which provided a number of populist governments with an excuse to suppress civil liberties while strengthening executive power.Third, we suggest that a populist in power tends to politicize foreign policy. The role of the governing ideology becomes more important than pragmatism in foreign policy decision-making, which is personalized and has authority concentrated on the ruling populist’s inner circles. In order to secure support from their core constituencies, populist governments attempt to break away from traditional policy directions and follow their governing ideology in foreign policy decision-making. We complement our case studies with our findings from synthetic control methods. We employ a variable quantifying how close individual countries’ voting patterns in the UN General Assembly are to that of the United States as a proxy for their policy stance towards the United States. Our findings show that left-wing populist governments tend to design their foreign policy to decrease dependence on the United States.Chapter 4 presents the implications of our research for the Korean government and businesses. First, it is necessary to pay attention to the recent movement of resource nationalism led by left-wing populist governments across Latin America. One should note that resource nationalism, including nationalization measures, is an important variable to consider for investment and cooperation decisions by the government and companies interested in securing critical minerals and strengthening supply chains across the region. Most of the left-wing populist governments in Latin America seem to be expanding the role of the state in strategic industries such as oil, core minerals, and electricity through anti-neoliberal and nationalist rhetoric. The Korean government and businesses are required to respond actively to the changing political landscape.Second, the Korean government and businesses should keep in mind that once populist rule is consolidated through referendums and constitutional amendments, it can result in a rapid transition from a democratic regime to an authoritarian regime. Meanwhile, the authoritarian tendency of populist governments has strengthened with the spread of COVID-19, which makes the possibility of a regime change even greater in some countries across the region.Third, the foreign policy directions of Latin American countries in which populist forces are in power can be ideologicalized and personalized at any time, breaking away from their traditional policy directions. It is also being observed that like-minded populist governments in Latin America are strengthening their solidarity with other countries both within and outside the region based on ideological similarities. In this context, this study recommends the Korean government pursue its foreign policy based on values and norms while making additional efforts to cooperate with countries under populist rule employing instruments such as economic cooperation or high-level diplomacy. -
U.S. Medium- to Long-term Trade Strategies and Korea-U.S. Cooperation Plans
Recently, not only responses to various major economic and trade issues, but also discussions at the global level to prepare measures for cooperation in the international community for each issue are taking place, centering on the..
Gusang Kang et al. Date 2022.12.30
Economic cooperation, Trade policy United States of AmericaDownloadContentSummaryRecently, not only responses to various major economic and trade issues, but also discussions at the global level to prepare measures for cooperation in the international community for each issue are taking place, centering on the U.S. Due to external shocks at the global level, such as the hegemony competition between the U.S. and China and the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. and other major countries have begun to consider ways to change their existing supply chains based on cost-efficiency to resilient supply chains for major materials essential to their national security. In addition, the intensifying spread of the coronavirus has prompted the expansion of non-face-to-face economic activities such as telecommuting and online shopping. Accordingly, it has become more important to discuss standard digital trade norms to support a digital platform economy. Moreover, the Biden administration announced its 2050 carbon net-zero goal to respond to climate change while implementing related policies and leading discussions on climate change response in the global community. Lastly, as each country's policy measures are being used to recover from the economic damage caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, major countries including the U.S. and South Korea have paid more attention to development cooperation policies targeting developing countries. Therefore, this study tried to derive South Korea's future trade strategy and cooperation measures with the U.S. by identifying the U.S. position and response strategy for each of the major economic and trade issues previously mentioned.First, we present the U.S. policy responses related to the semiconductor and battery sectors and their implications in terms of the U.S.-centered supply chain reorganization policy. In particular, semiconductors and large-capacity batteries are important industries in which Korea holds an important position in the global supply chain. Based on the U.S.-centered supply chain policy, Korea needs to expand local investment and production within the U.S. in the semiconductor and battery sectors, and seek ways to maximize national interests through close cooperation between the government and companies. In addition, in the process of Korean companies entering the U.S., it is necessary to explore ways to cooperate in technology, such as promoting joint R&D with the U.S. Furthermore, it is essential to carefully review whether there are any trade legal problems in relation to the detailed regulations of the IRA implemented by the U.S., and consider the possibility of legal response as well as institutional arrangements to compensate for damages that may be suffered by companies within or connected with the domestic electric vehicle industry following the implementation of the IRA.Next, in the field of digital trade, as the trend of digital transformation continues to gain pace worldwide, we review major digital transformation and trade policies of the U.S. to strengthen cooperation in the digital field between Korea and the U.S. Moreover, we derive cooperation plans between the two countries based on each country’s policy measures. First of all, Korea needs to actively participate in international discussions led by the U.S. to establish advanced communication network standards such as 5G and 6G as essential infrastructure in the process of global digital transformation. In addition, to overcome the limitations of the digital trade rules stipulated in the KORUS FTA and to strengthen cooperation with the U.S., Korea should actively lead discussions on trade pillar working groups within the IPEF to prepare a roadmap for digital trade rules with participating countries.In the field of climate change response, we review the current status of major related policies being promoted in the U.S. and Korea and important technologies as targets for cooperation between the two countries. Furthermore, we present a plan for cooperation between Korea and the U.S. based on this. Carbon reduction and next-generation nuclear power technology were focused on as major technology fields for cooperation between Korea and the U.S. First, as carbon reduction technology is included in the 10 climate innovation technologies selected by the Biden administration, R&D on the technology to be used in various sectors such as buildings, energy storage systems, and vehicles is expected to be promoted. In addition, the Biden administration has allocated a large budget to the old nuclear power plant support program, citing nuclear power as a realistic alternative that can stabilize electricity rates while reducing fossil fuel use. Korea, like the U.S., plans to select carbon-neutral technologies such as secondary batteries and hydrogen as “national strategic technologies” and provide extensive R&D support. Thus, the Korean government will provide various programs and budget support for these sectors.Finally, in the field of development cooperation, we review policies promoted in Korea and the U.S., and provide measures for cooperation between the two countries. First, it is necessary to expand infrastructure investment in developing countries in the region and to share know-how and experiences of success in development through the IPEF, which is promoted by the U.S. to check China's influence in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, Korea, along with the U.S., needs to strengthen the joint support system for Pacific Island countries exposed to climate change and with small economies and low levels of economic development. Lastly, we need to clearly define what can be done in cooperation with the U.S. by expanding support through international development finance organizations such as the World Bank and IDB for Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, which are part of the Central American “Northern Triangle”, and by actively responding to the efforts of the U.S. -
Utilizing Paris Agreement Article 6 for Achieving Korea’s NDC towards 2030
At the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP26) held in Glasgow, the Parties finally agreed on the Article 6 rulebook for the Paris Agreement (PA). This was a long overdue task since the signing of the PA in 2015. The PA al..
Jione Jung et al. Date 2022.12.30
ODA, Foreign aidDownloadContentSummaryAt the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP26) held in Glasgow, the Parties finally agreed on the Article 6 rulebook for the Paris Agreement (PA). This was a long overdue task since the signing of the PA in 2015. The PA allowed the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) towards achieving nationally determined contributions (NDCs). Nevertheless, it was a challenge for the Parties to implement greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation projects under Article 6 without detailed guidelines. This development is especially significant for Korea as it plans to use voluntary cooperation under Article 6 as a complementary measure to its mitigation efforts. 11.5% of the 2030 GHG reduction target, amounting to 35 million tons, is expected to come from international mitigation activities. Thus, it has become an urgent task for Korea to develop an overarching plan as well as specific guidelines for the implementation of international mitigation activities.This research reviews Article 6 of the PA and its rulebook specifying ITMOs. The study also addresses the issue of improving Korea’s institutional arrangement for international mitigation activities in light of the rulebook. An example is to determine whether a company should use the emission reductions obtained from a project abroad for its compliance or the NDC target. Our study outlines the limitations associated with utilizing more flexible approaches under the Article 6.2, as the current legal and institutional arrangement is designed on small-scale Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)-typed projects.Developing countries indicates their interest in Article 6.2 activities involving low-carbon investment. To utilize the Article 6.2 cooperative approach, both transferring and transferred parties of mitigation outcomes need to comply with the reporting requirement of the enhanced transparency framework of the PA Article 13 and corresponding adjustment. Multilateral development banks and bilateral development agencies support various activities to enhance readiness, enabling environments and infrastructure within developing countries to participate in Article 6 activities. Those activities are reviewed in this study to provide insights for the Korean government as it intends to create synergies between international mitigation activities and its international development cooperation.This research proposes two approaches to utilize the PA Article 6 activities towards Korea’s NDC achievement: i) transferring the mitigation outcomes acquired from the activities conducted under Article 6.2 and Article 6.4 in a host country, ii) purchasing mitigation outcomes from the host country or private companies. For the former approach, this study presents an implementation process and explains several issues to be considered under the PA and its rulebook. In the latter, we highlight that the corresponding adjustment of ITMOs might be adapted differently, depending on whether the partner is a government or companies within the boundaries of the PA.Under the Paris Agreement, all Parties have obligations to reduce GHG emissions, regardless of their stage of national development, in contrast to the Kyoto Protocol. Accordingly, it is necessary to focus not only on cost-effective aspects but also pursuing sustainable development and global environmental integrity when mitigation outcomes are internationally transferred. Based on a clear understanding of the PA Article 6, Korea needs to implement its international mitigation activities. The Article 6.2 approach will require selecting partner countries and government funding. In particular, there is a need to explore ways to link with international mitigation activities as the volume of climate change related-ODA expands. Above all, there is an urgent need to resolve legal and institutional uncertainty related to the private sector’s utilization of mitigation outcomes obtained internationally. -
Impacts of Climate Change and Policy Implications on Food Security in Africa and the Middle East
As a result of the recent outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, the global agri-food supply chain has collapsed, thereby raising concerns about food security in Africa and the Middle East. The international community is paying great..
Munsu Kang et al. Date 2022.12.30
ODA, Agricultural policy Africa Middle EastDownloadContentSummary정책연구브리핑As a result of the recent outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, the global agri-food supply chain has collapsed, thereby raising concerns about food security in Africa and the Middle East. The international community is paying greater attention to the issue of food security caused by climate change, which is actually affecting food supply and demand in Africa and the Middle East as a result of frequent weather conditions, such as droughts, flooding, and heat waves. As a result of an intensifying drought, North Africa increased its imports of external grain in January 2022, and East Africa has experienced droughts that have adversely affected its crops in recent years. It is therefore increasingly important for the international community to cooperate to respond to the food security crisis resulting from climate change, and Korea should expand its cooperation to address climate change, food security, and agriculture in Africa and the Middle East.Climate change has both a global and a national impact, and African and Middle Eastern developing countries, especially those with insufficient climate resilience, are particularly vulnerable to the impact of climate change on agriculture and food production. It is therefore necessary to develop policies that can help lead the discussion of climate change in the international community while also increasing support for the agri-food sector through official development assistance (ODA) funded by Korea.Accordingly, the purpose of this study was to analyze the food security crisis in Africa and the Middle East caused by climate change from the perspective of supply and demand, and to identify potential areas of cooperation. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) defines food security as “a situation in which everyone is always physically, socially and economically accessible to a sufficient amount of safe and nutritious food, while meeting individual dietary needs and preferences for a healthy and active life.” Therefore, food security should be considered throughout the entire food production and consumption process, toward which this study also examined the current state of the African and Middle Eastern food security crisis, causes of food insecurity, and policies to address it.This study can be summarized as follows. A first observation is that the average temperature is increasing across Africa and the Middle East, and this represents a higher increase than in previous years, particularly in East and North Africa. Additionally, droughts and floods have become more frequent in recent years, which can pose a threat to agricultural production in the future. The impact of climate change on agricultural production is increasing, but the FAO and the World Food Program have already warned of the increase in hunger and undernutrition caused by climate change, which means that rising temperatures and frequent droughts could pose a greater external shock than normal.Second, when droughts occur frequently and intensify in Africa and the Middle East, agricultural prices generally rise, especially for corn and rice. The agricultural production of developing countries in Africa and the Middle East is largely dependent on natural water rather than irrigation and shows various structural characteristics susceptible to weather changes. Moreover, most countries except North Africa have high rates of self-sufficiency in corn, rice, sorghum, and millet, whereas Africa and the Middle East lack adequate stockpiling capacity to buffer drought. As soaring food prices in Africa and the Middle East between 2007 and 2011 caused instability, and the recent prolonged Russian-Ukraine war caused public discontent, climate change and long-term increases in food prices could also contribute to instability.Thirdly, as natural disasters such as droughts and floods become more frequent, problems related to consumption such as nutritional disorders and slow development are exacerbated. In Africa and the Middle East, malnutrition has generally declined, with the exception of conflict-affected countries such as Yemen and Iraq. Consequently, indicators also improved in terms of strengthening food security and sustainable agriculture, which are the second goal of the Sustainable Development Goals. There has been a rise in both absolute and proportional food crisis populations in recent years, especially in Africa. In West Africa, in particular, the proportion of the population experiencing serious levels of food insecurity has doubled to 20.7% in 2021, compared to 10.2% in 2014. There is a higher incidence of children’s poor development and nutritional disorders in countries with more droughts or floods, indicating that climate change impacts both agricultural production and consumption.Fourth, the international community and major African and Middle Eastern countries are taking a variety of measures to combat climate change. Several countries, including Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Senegal, and Tanzania, have developed comprehensive policies aimed at addressing climate change and protecting water resources, as well as establishing support systems for the vulnerable. Despite this, few countries have developed production and reserve policies to ensure food security, and technological capabilities are lacking, necessitating international cooperation. Climate change response strategies and social protection strategies have been developed by international organizations. The African Climate Innovation Mission (AIM for Africa), the African Agricultural Climate Change Adaptation Plan (AAAI), the African Green Revolution Alliance (AGRA), the World Bank, the International Agricultural Development Fund (IFAD), and the International Agricultural GIAR Group are representative organizations addressing climate change and food security in Africa and the Middle East. Likewise, international cooperation on food security is on the rise, and is on the agenda of both the 2021 Foreign Ministers' Meeting and the 2022 United Nations Climate Change Convention (COP27).Using the results of the analysis, this report proposes policies in the areas of climate change and water resources, agricultural production and stockpiling, crop consumption, and assistance for the vulnerable. First, it is important to cooperate to introduce an early warning system during times of drought or flooding throughout Africa and the Middle East, as weather events such as these are becoming more frequent. Climate risk and early warning systems have been established by the World Bank and the World Meteorological Organization in 60 countries, including most of the countries in West and Central Africa. As Korea expands its disaster warning system domestically, it may be possible to extend its cooperation with vulnerable countries in Africa and the Middle East. Furthermore, cooperation for the application of low-carbon agricultural technology should be expanded. Low-carbon farming methods include mixed farming, forestry, and cultivation, and agriculture is considered one of the major greenhouse gas emission factors in Africa and the Middle East, so cooperation in introducing agricultural technologies to combat climate change should be conducted as well. In areas where Korea can cooperate with either Africa or Middle East in agricultural production, heat-resistant and resistant varieties can be developed, as well as pilot projects for smart farming in low- and medium-sized countries.Secondly, it is necessary to increase cooperation in order to ensure the security of water resources and prevent flooding. The expansion of irrigation water facilities is the first factor to ensure the security of water resources in Africa and the Middle East. The Korean government has provided support for the modernization of irrigation facilities in Ghana as well as the construction of irrigation facilities in Ethiopia coordinated by KOICA, as securing agricultural water during the sowing season becomes increasingly important. The scale of Korea’s development cooperation with Africa and the Middle East is expected to increase in the future, and Korea should also expand its support for irrigation channels to improve access to water resources. It is also becoming increasingly important to ensure fresh water through wastewater recycling and desalination.The third recommendation is to expand support for the vulnerable in Africa and the Middle East in terms of consumption. Approximately 50,000 tons of rice were provided to six countries by Korea’s Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs in 2021. Due to a lack of stockpile capacity, there are few alternatives available in Africa and the Middle East to support the residents in these regions in the event of severe changes in weather patterns. Accordingly, major donor countries and international organizations continue to provide food to areas affected by the food crisis. In order to prepare for the rapid increase in food insecurity and severe food shortages occurring in Africa and the Middle East as a result of climate change, Korea will also need to establish a support system in advance for vulnerable groups in Africa and the Middle East.As a final point, the cooperation system should include not only bilateral cooperation but also multilateral cooperation with international organizations. In the area of expanding technical research cooperation with international researchers, the Rural Development Administration should assume a more prominent role. The majority of African and Middle Eastern countries are classified as vulnerable countries due to climate change, and accordingly, Korea has limitations in cooperating in agriculture or food assistance alone. Therefore, it is necessary to cooperate with international organizations that have already entered many countries and are carrying out projects in those countries. Moreover, CGIAR research institutes have conducted a number of studies on the demand for agricultural technology in Africa and the Middle East, facilitating the development of agricultural technology research and development projects in Africa and the Middle East by conducting joint research with CGIARs and internationally recognized agricultural research institutes. -
Policies and Implications of Reorganizing Global Supply Chains by the Biden Administration: Focusing on Semiconductor and Battery Industry
This study discusses the current status and future prospects of the Biden administration’s U.S.-centered supply chain reorganization policy for the semiconductor and electric vehicle battery industries. In addition, based on the ..
Gusang Kang et al. Date 2022.12.30
Economic security, Industrial policy United States of AmericaDownloadContentSummary정책연구브리핑This study discusses the current status and future prospects of the Biden administration’s U.S.-centered supply chain reorganization policy for the semiconductor and electric vehicle battery industries. In addition, based on the current status of the global semiconductor and battery industry supply chain, this study addresses the future direction of the industry supply chain reorganization. Finally, this study indirectly estimates the impact of implementation of the Biden government’s supply chain restructuring policy on the U.S. and Korean economies, and derives policy implications accordingly.In February 2021, President Biden signed an Executive Order on the implementation of the supply chain structure and development strategy for major industries in the U.S. Accordingly, a government- wide review of the supply chain structure, supply chain risks, and policy proposals for four key items (semiconductors, large-capacity batteries, core minerals, and pharmaceuticals) over a 100-day period was announced in June 2021. Subsequently, in February 2022, the results of a one-year analysis by seven relevant government departments were released to secure a stable supply chain in six major industries (defense, health, ICT, energy, transportation, and agriculture). Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress passed a series of bills to strengthen the nation’s supply chain. For example, the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, which includes incentives for investment in semiconductor manufacturing facilities and equipment in the U.S., was passed by the Congress on July 28, 2022. In addition, the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 for electric vehicle purchase subsidy policy was passed in Congress, and took effect on August 16, 2022 upon President Biden’s signing.This study examines the changes in the global supply chain in the semiconductor and battery industries of the U.S. and Korea using the export and import concentrations for each major item. First of all, while the supply chain for system semiconductor exports in the U.S. shows a trend toward diversification, the supply chain for imports is gradually becoming more centralized. From the perspective of stabilizing the supply chain, it is clear that U.S. system semiconductor exports are diversifying, but the fact that the U.S. is increasingly dependent on imports from Asia remains a challenge. On the other hand, the memory semiconductor sales supply chain in the U.S. also showed a trend of diversification due to the expansion of exports to North America, while the purchasing supply chain remains highly concentrated due to the high proportion of imports from Asia. Unlike the previous two items, U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment exports tend to be quite concentrated due to their high dependence on Asia, while the U.S. supply chain for purchasing these items is relatively diversified, centering on Japan and the Netherlands.Both the sales and purchase supply chains of system semiconductors in Korea show a strong tendency of centralization. First of all, Korea’s system semiconductor exports are highly dependent on Asia, and imports of these items are mostly dependent on North America, including the U.S., specialized in system semiconductor design. Korea’s memory semiconductor exports are mainly concentrated in the Asian region including China, which has a huge domestic market, based on the international competitiveness of Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix. On the other hand, Korea’s imports of these items tend to be quite concentrated, with the share of North America significantly decreasing and being replaced by imports from Asian sources. Finally, Korea’s semiconductor manufacturing equipment sales supply chain has recently become more centralized as its dependence on exports to Asia has increased.In regards to the battery industry, the U.S. lithium-ion battery export and import markets show different patterns in terms of concentration. First of all, the export supply chain is spread evenly in North America, Europe, Oceania, and Asia, showing a considerably diversified structure. On the other hand, U.S. imports of these items tend to be concentrated, although their dependence on imports from Asia has eased with a slight increase in the portion of imports from Europe recently. Meanwhile, Korea’s lithium-ion battery export market is gradually reducing its high dependence on Asia thanks to Korean battery producers (LG Energy Solutions, SK On, Samsung SDI) with global manufacturing competitiveness, while steadily expanding and diversifying export regions. On the other hand, Korea’s supply chain for imports of these items is highly concentrated, with a high dependence on Japan and China, which have strengths in material and mineral processing.For the first analysis to indirectly examine the economic impact of the global supply chain reorganization of the semiconductor and battery industries, we estimate the impact of changes in the export share of the semiconductor or battery industry by country on the change in GDP per capita. Our results show an increase in the export share of semiconductors or batteries has a statistically significant increase in GDP per capita. These results support the reason why the Biden administration is moving to expand its exports through the reorganization of the U.S.-centered supply chain in the industry. By reorganizing the supply chain centered on the U.S., President Biden intends to attract production facilities in weak sectors such as memory semiconductors, foundries, and lithium-ion battery manufacturing to the U.S. through cooperation with partner countries such as Taiwan and Korea in the short term. In conclusion, this policy promotion seems to be part of a strategy to discover sustainable economic growth engines for the U.S. while checking China’s technological rise in key industries, and restoring U.S. leadership.Secondly, we estimate the impact of changes in export concentration or import concentration by semiconductor or battery item in the U.S. and Korea on the change in net exports by the two countries. First of all, in the case of the U.S. semiconductor industry, changes in export concentration and import concentration did not have a statistically significant effect on changes in net exports of the corresponding item. However, in the case of the Korean semiconductor industry, an increase in export concentration had a negative impact on the net export of the item, whereas a change in import concentration did not have a statistically significant effect on the change in Korea’s net export of the same item. In the case of the U.S. battery industry, as the import concentration by item increases, the U.S. net export of the same item decreases. However, we find that both the increase in the concentration of exports and the concentration of imports in the Korean battery industry decrease net exports of the product. Taken together, it can be inferred that the concentration of supply chains in the semiconductor and battery industries in the U.S. or Korea has the potential to hinder economic growth by reducing net exports of the relevant items in both countries.Based on the above analysis results, this study concludes with the following policy implications. First, it is necessary to strengthen norms-based supply chain cooperation with the U.S. Second, it is necessary to expand efforts to maintain the technological gap in the memory semiconductor field, where Korea has strengths. Third, policy support is needed to enhance Korea’s competitiveness in the system semiconductor field, which is relatively weak. Fourth, it is necessary to prepare a prompt support system for semiconductor infrastructure based on the National High-tech Strategic Industries Act. Fifth, it is essential to expand tax support for investment in semiconductor facilities through revision of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act. Sixth, efforts are needed to diversify the lithium-ion battery supply chain. Seventh, it is necessary to strengthen cooperation between Korea and the U.S. in the field of next-generation battery technology. -
Challenges and Implications for China’s Economic System Reform in the Third Term of Xi Jinping: Focusing on Establishing a Socialist Market Economy System
The year 2022 marks the 30th anniversary of China's declaration of economic system reform to establish a “socialist market economy system(社会主义市场经济体制)” Over the past 30 years, China has strengthened the role of the market in ..
Pyoung Seob Yang and Hongwon Kim Date 2022.12.30
Economic reform, Economic developmentDownloadContent
SummaryThe year 2022 marks the 30th anniversary of China's declaration of economic system reform to establish a “socialist market economy system(社会主义市场经济体制)” Over the past 30 years, China has strengthened the role of the market in resource allocation and economic operation, and has promoted ownership reform in which both the public – the core of China's socialist economy - and the non-public sectors of the economy develop together. China has continued to build a “basic economic system of socialism(社会主义基本经济制度) with Chinese characteristics”, in other words, an economic system which is based on fundamental socialist institutions but combines market economy mechanisms. At the same time, however, entering his third term Xi Jinping has stressed a Dual Circulation Strategy aimed at common prosperity and domestic consumption (“internal circulation”), leading to forecasts that China may be strengthening the socialist nature of its economic system. Therefore, from the perspective of completing the socialist market economy system that China is pursuing, this study aims to infer changes in China's economic system in the 3rd term of Xi Jinping, specifically by analyzing tasks related to economic system reform included within China's mid- to long-term development strategy and the direction of its promotion.The reformation process of China's economic system following the implementation of reform and opening policy can be understood as one of establishing a basic economic system of socialism with Chinese characteristics. This process can be comprehended as changes in the relationship between the three elements of the basic economic system of socialism: joint development of public and non-public sectors of the economy (ownership relationship); the coexistence of various wealth distribution methods, with labor income as the main body (distribution relationship); and the socialist market economy system (relationship between market and government). In addition to reforming its economic system, China's opening and trade policies to connect the domestic economy and the world economy have played an important role in promoting domestic reform. From this aspect, China has pursued a strategy of linking reform and opening, which means to promote reform through opening. During his official report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping announced the goal of reforming the economic system, while also reaffirming that accomplishing the socialist market economy system lies at the foundation of the “Basic Economic System of Socialism” In addition, reforming current wealth distribution systems for the realization of common prosperity, promoting Dual Circulation as a new development structure, and institutional opening-up with regard to rules, regulations and standards were presented as important tasks for the next five years.This study focuses on analyzing these issues. First of all, the key to completing the socialist market economy system is to complete market-based allocation of production factors. It includes the market supply of land, free labor mobility, and marketization of raising capital, together with marketizing transaction and standardization of new production factors like technology or data. In this study, we identified the areas of land system reform, “hukou(户口)”system reform, interest rate and capital market reform as the most representative tasks related to this goal. Second, as it advances toward a new development structure through dual circulation, China will accelerate reforms to eliminate obstacles blocking the virtuous circle of production, distribution, and consumption. To promote a virtuous circle within the domestic economy, reform tasks have been presented to allocate production factors at the stages of production, distribution, and consumption. Third, achieving common prosperity is a key goal of Chinese modernization pursued by China and thus will be further promoted as an important goal in the 3rd term of Xi Jinping. In order to realize common prosperity, reformation of the wealth distribution system is inevitable. Common prosperity will be pursued in two aspects: strategies to increase the size of the economic “pie,” and those to ensure a fair share for participants. The former is to form an olive-shaped income structure by maintaining a stable income for workers while fostering a middle class, while the latter is to reduce relative wealth inequality through redistribution and tertiary distribution. Fourth, more opening efforts will be made to connect the domestic economy and the international economy, in the form of institutional opening-up that connects rules, regulations, management, and standards related to investment and trade globally. However, there is a need for caution when considering how the strategy links safety and openness in response to risks arising in the opening-up.The Chinese economic reform and opening-up aimed at achieving China's socialist market economy will continue in the third term of Xi Jinping. This study performed an in-depth forecast, based on the criteria of marketization and privatization, on the direction of China's future economic system reform. Marketization reform is expected to be pushed ahead, focused on market-based allocation of production factors, while privatization centered on reformation of mixed ownership is also likely to be gradually advanced. However, while such reform is taking place in the Chinese economy, the possibility of competition between China's socialist market economy system and the Western capitalist economic system continues to escalate amid the strategic competition between the U.S. and China. Under this situation, it will be an important task for a middle power like the Republic of Korea to firmly establish its principles and directions for competition issues as they arise. -
A Roadmap for Korea’s Digital Trade Agreements
This report examined the short- to medium-term roadmap for Korea's digital trade agreements. It suggested that the roadmap include, among other things, an assessment of Korea's position in the network of digital trade agreements, ..
Kyu Yub Lee et al. Date 2022.12.30
International trade, Electronic commerceDownloadContentSummary정책연구브리핑This report examined the short- to medium-term roadmap for Korea's digital trade agreements. It suggested that the roadmap include, among other things, an assessment of Korea's position in the network of digital trade agreements, the objectives and directions of digital trade agreement policies, the scope and content of digital trade agreements, the priorities and selection criteria for negotiating partners to reach digital trade agreements, the procedures and timeline for such agreements, and the expected quantitative and qualitative effects of digital trade agreements.Understanding Korea's current position in the process of developing a roadmap for digital trade agreements necessitates objectivity. This report claimed that Korea's influence on the network of digital trade agreements has been moderate. It is the outcome of assessing using network analysis, which takes into account centrality of digital trade network, similarity of agreement text, and the size of the economy.The report suggested Korea to target becoming a hub for digital trade as a short-term and mid-term strategic priority. It is costly and subject to numerous restrictions for Korea to be a global leader in the digital space in the short- to medium-term. That is, to be a leader in the global digital trade and to establish relevant digital trade rules, Korea requires a sufficiently sizable digital trade market, abundant human resources, and high-skilled labor. In particular, it needs specific strategies to support the leadership that sets rules for norms in digital trade. The report thus suggested that Korea's primary role in the short- to medium-term is to become a rule-promoter of the digital trade norms through an active promotion strategy based on the roadmap for digital trade agreements.When determining the scope and content of digital trade agreements, it is critical to develop criteria for selecting negotiation partners and rank countries in order of importance. Essentially, digital trade agreement text for Korea should be written in a way that reduces or eliminates barriers to digital trade and challenges faced by domestic businesses. Furthermore, Korea should make efforts to improve the thoroughness of the form and content aspects of trade law in relation to key elements identified as appropriate for the development of the digital trade roadmap. To achieve policy objectives of digital trade, the report recommended to develop a Korean-style digital trade agreement template with varying levels of protection. This is due to the fact that the process of developing a template comprised of digital trade norms appropriate for Korea has numerous advantages and can take the lead from selecting a partner to negotiate with to coordinating, through negotiating contents of the text, to signing the negotiation. The report also emphasized the importance of developing supplemental content to strengthen digital economic cooperation in order to increase trading partners' willingness to negotiate and activate digital trade among countries and regions.The report listed four criteria for selecting a partner to negotiate with, such as the possibility for export expansion, the potential for market growth, the compatibility of the regulatory framework, and practicality. For instance, the top 20 countries in Korea that export digital services are estimated to be the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Hong Kong, China, Singapore, Australia, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Ireland, India, France, Canada, Italy, Brazil, Spain, Russia, Norway, and Sweden, in that order. Thus, the most important are the Korea-UK FTA, Korea-China FTA, Korea-EU FTA, Korea-Canada FTA, Korea-India FTA, and Korea-Mercosur TA. The report came to the conclusion that Korea should actively participate in IPEF negotiations and consider upgrading the most recent digital trade rules in the FTA. Furthermore, it advocated for the creation of a digital trade agreement in the style of Korea.According to the report, domestic regulations and institutional reform plans must be developed in accordance with the scope and content of the digital trade agreement. This is because maintaining the coherence of domestic regulations and system restructuring for digital trade are linked to the problem of determining the content and level of digital trade agreements and selecting a negotiating partner. Korea should consider how to collaborate or respond jointly with other nations in relation to current issues related to digital trade, such as internet service, data localization, and cloud. It was also recognized that a careful assessment is necessary to keep domestic rules in line with industry standards for digital trading.The report concluded by saying that it is critical for enhancing effectiveness of digital trade agreements to have the process of actively soliciting feedback from businesses involved in digital trade transactions, as well as public relations strategies that can elicit support from the general public. A roadmap for Korea's digital trade agreements is necessary to explain the anticipated economic implications of its conclusion quantitatively and qualitatively. -
Comparison of ESG Raters and Rating Scores: Focusing on Korean Firms
In response to increasing demand for sustainable management, adopting Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) measures is now more important than ever. Firms now must disclose ESG performance to receive investment and meet the..
Jiwon Park and Yerim Lee Date 2022.12.30
Financial system, Business managementDownloadContentSummaryIn response to increasing demand for sustainable management, adopting Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) measures is now more important than ever. Firms now must disclose ESG performance to receive investment and meet the regulation making ESG disclosure mandatory in many countries and exchanges.With growing intertest in ESG and relating topics, evaluating firms’ ESG performance become necessary. Many regional and global ESG raters exist, focusing on different sets of firms. Regional ESG raters such as Sustinvest and Korea Institute of Corporate Governance and Sustainability (KCGS) in Korea are more knowledgeable in domestic situations and Korea-specific characteristics, and in particular, they can evaluate companies without English ESG and business reports. However, regional raters mostly focus on domestic firms, making it difficult to compare to internatioanl companies. Global raters have an advantage in this regard, however, their coverages in Korea are restricted to very large global companies. Major global raters include Sustainalytics, Moody’s, MSCI, S&P Global, CDP, Refinitiv, Bloomberg, and FTSE.Unlike credit ratings, ESG evaluation is heterogenous across raters as a company’s ESG performance is assessed using non-financial indicators with strong qualitative characteristics. Divergence in ESG evaluation is inevitable due to difference in eveluation objective, standards, categories, measurement, etc. However, if ESG ratings diverge too much, it misleads the investors and researchers by sending confusing signals on ESG performance. This research focuses on the divergence of ESG rating of Korean firms, and by following previous research that decompse ESG rating divergence in scope, measurement, and weighting.Chapter 2 analyzes the major raters’ methodologies, standards, objectives of ESG ratings. We focus on Sustinvest and KCGS for regional raters, and Refinitiv, Moody’s, Sustainalytics, and CDP for global raters. Each rater focuses on heterogeneous factors to produce the final scores and ratings. Except for CDP, the objective of global raters’ ESG rating is to provide information to investors, as a part of their financial service. Korean raters both sum E, S, G scores and subtract controversy scores of each area, similar to Refinitiv. The two agencies have different objective as well; Sustinvest is to provide information to investors, on the other hand, KCGS is a part of Financial Services Commission, rating ESG performance to provide information to evaluated firms and to support sustainable management.In chapter 3, we empirically analyze the divergence in eight ESG ratings of Korean companies. We show that rated companies by the eight raters are not representative firms. The rated firms are disproportionately large and in specific industries, which is more noted in global raters. We also show the correlation coefficients of rater pairs and decompose the divergence into contributions of scope, measurement, and weight. The average correlation coefficient is 0.48; while the coefficient between Sustinvest and KCGS (Korean raters) is 0.7, coefficients between Korean and globla rater are not as large, ranging from 0.03 to 0.641. The average coefficients of each E, S, G score are 0.59, 0.48, and 0.43. In fact, the correlation coefficients of Korean-global raters are vefry small, implying that divergence in G is the greatest. Finally, I redefine each ESG rater’s rating categories into 26 common categories and perform variance decomposition. I find that measurement contributes 37% of the divergence, Scope 77%, and weights -13%.This research is first to conduct a very close analysis of ESG score gap among Korean companies, including domestic evaluators, and it empirically analyzes rater differences to derive policy implications and further contributes academically. -
Korea-Australia Supply Chain Cooperation: Focus on Critical Minerals and Hydrogen
The U.S.-China rivalry and COVID-19 have increased the supply chain's vulnerability and reshaped the global value chain. The weaponization of resources, such as Russia's natural gas export restrictions in response to the war in Uk..
Seung Jin Cho and Minlee Shin Date 2022.12.30
Economic security, Economic cooperationDownloadContent
SummaryThe U.S.-China rivalry and COVID-19 have increased the supply chain's vulnerability and reshaped the global value chain. The weaponization of resources, such as Russia's natural gas export restrictions in response to the war in Ukraine, demonstrates that the government must take urgent measures to stabilize the supply chain. Korea relies entirely on critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earths from other countries because these minerals are essential for the electric vehicle and secondary battery industry. Moreover, Korea will increasingly rely on hydrogen imports to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050.Korea and Australia signed a memorandum of understanding on December 2021 for cooperation in the area of critical mineral supply chains, carbon-neutral technology and a clean hydrogen economy. Australia is the world's largest producer of lithium and contains large deposits of other critical minerals such as nickel, of which it has the largest reserves in the world. Australia has a favorable geographical environment for producing hydrogen. Australia also has the advantage of being relatively close to Korea, and is one of the countries expected to become a major hydrogen-exporting country. From Australia’s point of view, Korea offers a stable demand for critical minerals and hydrogen. Therefore, bilateral cooperation to stabilize the supply chain is expected to increase. Accordingly, this study analyzes Australia’s policy on critical minerals and hydrogen, and the current status of international cooperation. Based on this, effective measures to strengthen the supply chain cooperation between Korea and Australia are derived.The Australian government announced its critical minerals strategy in 2019 and 2022. This critical minerals strategy and modern manufacturing initiative were launched to boost the weak indigenous manufacturing sector. The Australian government is also aiming to boost the capacity of downstream industries by leveraging its strengths in the mining sector of critical minerals. This policy is also found in Western Australia’s Future Battery Industry Strategy and Critical Minerals and High-tech Metal Strategy announced by the state government.In addition, the Australian Government has announced the National Hydrogen Strategy in 2019 under the vision of becoming a leading country in the global hydrogen industry by 2030. Also, all Australian states are implementing a hydrogen strategy or plan, and are committed to fostering the green hydrogen sector. They also aim to promote demonstration projects and research assistance to improve efficiency in the hydrogen field, enhance community trust, and improve institutional problems.Regarding Australia’s international cooperation in critical minerals, Australia participates in the multilateral Minerals Security Partnership. Australia and the U.S. plan to build a critical mineral facility in Texas to import critical minerals from Western Australia. Japan has been collaborating closely with Australia since China banned rare earth elements exports in 2010. Australia and Japan signed a critical minerals partnership in October 2022. The Australian state government and companies are also participating in the European Commodity Alliance launched in September 2020. Australia has also developed active research collaborations with India.Australia's international cooperation in the field of hydrogen is focused on producing hydrogen in Australia, especially green hydrogen, and transporting it to partner countries for their own use. Japan can be evaluated as the country with the most progress in cooperation with Australia in the hydrogen field, and cooperation with Korea and Germany is also active. Many pilot projects, feasibility studies, and joint research projects are underway with Japan. Furthermore, exports between Australia and Japan for commercial purpose are expected to begin around 2025.This study recommends four measures to secure the critical minerals supply chain. First, installing a critical minerals control tower will play a significant role in establishing Korea's long-term strategy for critical minerals and reducing investment risks for the private sector. Second, stronger linkage with the Australian industrial development strategy would help develop the secondary industry and Korean companies enter the Australian energy storage system market. Third, developing critical mineral technology through the establishment of a joint fund could improve critical mineral extraction productivity and strengthen competitiveness in the critical mineral processing field, where both Korea and Australia are weak. And the fourth measure is to establish a mini-lateral network that allows Australia, Korea, Indonesia or India to participate. This network would help construct a value chain between the participating countries.This study proposes three methods to stabilize the hydrogen supply chain. First, Korea and Australia should conduct more demonstration projects to evaluate the commercial and technical feasibility of hydrogen cooperation projects, as the formation of the hydrogen supply chain is at an early stage. Second, technical development of hydrogen transportation is required to introduce hydrogen produced in Australia to Korea. This development will facilitate the hydrogen transportation sector and establish the entire hydrogen industry cycle. Third, policy efforts are required to preoccupy global hydrogen technology standards and reflect Korea’s opinions in international standardization organizations through cooperation with Australia. -
Measures to Strengthen Korea's Public Diplomacy toward Latin America
In 2010, Korea pinpointed public diplomacy as the three pillars of Korean diplomacy and has made efforts to strengthen the institutionalization of public diplomacy by securing various resources and overhauling its implementation s..
Yongseok Noh et al. Date 2022.12.30
DownloadContentSummaryIn 2010, Korea pinpointed public diplomacy as the three pillars of Korean diplomacy and has made efforts to strengthen the institutionalization of public diplomacy by securing various resources and overhauling its implementation system. With the enforcement of the Public Diplomacy Act in August 2016, the division and fragmentation of public diplomacy projects was resolved, and at the same time, a control tower called the Public Diplomacy Committee was established in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to enhance the unification of the public diplomacy implementation system. Korea has emerged as a middle power and an advanced country in the international community today, and the importance of public diplomacy is becoming more salient as a means of securing influence in the international community through a series of activities such as improving the national image and national brand based on Korea’s cultural assets and attractiveness.Korea established official diplomatic relations with Brazil for the first time in Latin America in 1959 and established diplomatic ties with major regional countries such as Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, and Chile in 1962. 2022 marks the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations with 15 Latin American countries, raising the need to make this year a new leap forward to establish sustainable reciprocal relations between Korea and Latin America. Korea and Latin America are on opposite sides of the Earth, and cooperation and exchanges are relatively sluggish compared to other regions due to various barriers caused by these geographical distances, and Korea needs to strengthen public diplomacy toward Latin America to consolidate multilateralism and diversify public diplomacy.This study aims to derive policy implications applicable to Korea’s public diplomacy in the future as well as research related to public diplomacy. Due to Korea’s inherent geopolitical and historical specificity, the main diplomatic issue from the past to the present remains in the security area. Therefore, Korea’s diplomacy has traditionally focused on bilateral relations with the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia, which are called the four major stakeholders in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and peace on the Korean Peninsula. However, as a middle power with limited influence and control of international order in the international community, Korea has been developing public diplomacy in the 2010s to secure soft power, one of various types of powers, and has been seeking to strengthen and consolidate relations with cooperative partners such as Latin America. This study derived practical policy proposals that will help promote Korea-Latin America relations.The research methods used in this research are as follows. First, this study used extensive literature review as a basic research method. Existing academic studies related to public diplomacy and Korea’s public diplomacy with Latin America were reviewed to derive differentiation and originality from previous studies, and major archive data such as local public documents and news articles were collected and analyzed.Second, an “Open Survey” agency was commissioned to examine the perception of Korea(ns) in major Latin American countries and a survey was conducted on 1,400 adults (200 per country) aged 20 or older in seven Latin American countries between May 13 and May 19, 2022. The questionnaire was carefully selected after consultation with the participating researchers, and the questions were translated into Spanish and Portuguese, respectively, and provided to the respondents. Through this, we conducted a foundation analysis to further utilize Korea’s strengths in future development of public diplomacy with Latin America and draw up policy measures to compensate for weaknesses.Third, a case analysis was conducted to understand the current status of the Korea’s public diplomacy in major Latin American countries. Specifically, through case studies on Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Guatemala, we identified and derived main problems and challenges surrounding Korea’s public diplomacy in Latin America.Fourth, in this study, a field research was conducted in Guatemala. The decision to conduct an field research in Guatemala is due to the specificity of Guatemala among Latin American countries. Guatemala is a place where Koreans have increased rapidly based on the Maquila industry since the 1990s. Until the early 2000s, Koreans in this region had shown the characteristics of enclaves while being thoroughly isolated from Guatemalan society for the purpose of obtaining short-term profits. However, in recent years, Guatemala’s Korean community has been carrying out various activities, realizing that it is necessary to actively interact with the local community to expand corporate profits and strengthening the national image of Korea. This situation is not limited to Guatemala, but can be seen as all countries in Latin America. Therefore, this study attempted to analyze the diversity of public diplomatic activities conducted by Korean immigrants in many Latin American countries by analyzing the case of Guatemala.This research consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 stated the background and purpose of the study, and presented the originality of the study through analysis on existing literature related to Korea’s public diplomacy in Latin America. In addition, the scope of research and research methods were described in detail.In the following Chapter 2, a theoretical review of Korea’s public diplomacy toward Latin America was conducted. In particular, not only a conceptual review of public diplomacy, but also an academic discussion of digital public diplomacy was also reviewed. The importance of Korea’s public diplomacy in Latin America as a country that belongs to the category of the so-called middle power was examined, and the necessity of this study was emphasized.Chapter 3 analyzes the results of the survey, and based on this, we evaluated ‘Korea in Latin America’ to derive Korea’s effective public diplomactic strategies in Latin America in the future. Chapter 4 conducted the case studies on the current status, major achievements and some challenges and limitations of Korea’s public diplomacy in seven major Latin American countries—Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Guatemala, respectively.Subsequently, Chapter 5 finally presented policy implications for strengthening public diplomacy in Latin America based on the main research results explored in Chapters 3 and 4 of this study. First, a comprehensive analysis of public diplomacy in major Latin American countries was suggested, followed by practical policy implications and major promotion strategies related to public diplomacy that can be developed at a common level in Latin America. Based on the results derived from case studies, we also derived policy implications for public diplomacy specialized in seven major Latin American countries for securing effectiveness of Korea’s public diplomacy.
공공저작물 자유이용허락 표시기준 (공공누리, KOGL) 제4유형
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