This study provides a model for the Korea’s Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) considering three major problems of the current structure and practice of the KSP. The most critical problem of the current KSP is that most programs are formulated and conducted from the suppliers perspectives rather than those of recipient. At the same time, those programs are not based on adequate study on the delivery methods of aid. Finally, individual programs are not harmonized well enough to achieve aid effectiveness despite that Korea’s experience includes extensive areas of economic and social development. A desirable KSP has to reflect these problems in order to enhance aid-effectiveness and keep KSP’s uniqueness as a development assistance program.
In developing a desirable KSP model, it is important to understand that KSP is only a part in Korea’s overall ODA policy structure and it has to follow international norms regarding development assistance. As a way to develop a desirable KSP, this study proposes four principles KSP: ‘Willingness Encouragement,’ Half Step Ahead Along Her Way, Selective Focus, Multi-stage Efforts. The principle of ‘Willingness Encouragement’ requires KSP to develop a  program so as to encourage and assist recipients’ willingness for socio-economic development. The principle of ‘Half-step Ahead Along Her Way’ is that a KSP program has to fully incorporate recipients’ capacity for implementing any proposed program. The principle of ‘Selective Focus’ has to be applied all the stages of KSP including identification of recipients, area, assistance methods, etc. Finally, the principle of ‘Multi-stage efforts’ means that a KSP has to be developed from a long-term perspective with successive multi-year measures which are necessary to enhance institutional and human capacity for development.
This study provides a model case of designing a KSP program for Uzbekistan incorporating the above mentioned principles. For the purpose of identifying the candidate areas of development assistance, this study first conducts both quantitative and qualitative assessment of Uzbekistan’s development capacity. The candidate areas include the improvement of governance, strengthening Uzbekistan’s capacity for industrialization and poverty reduction. According to the four principles, this study proposes ‘to help alleviate rural poverty by assisting the production and export capacity of agricultural sector of Uzbekistan’ as an area of cooperation. This study also shows how the ‘Product Cycle Management’ has to be applied to a specific KSP program in various stages.

This work outlines the results of a national image survey conducted to measure the level of awareness of the people of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan concerning Korean companies and corporate brands, along with the types of exchange and cooperation they want to see between their respective countries and Korea. In order to ensure objectivity, the survey was commissioned to BISAM (Business Information, Social and Marketing Research Center), a professional survey organization in Kazakhstan; and the ISR (Institute for Social Researches under the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan), an Uzbek government institute responsible for conducting an array of social research. 1000 adult subjects were selected from major cities of each country to form a survey pool.
A comparison of the survey results reveals sharp differences between the two countries concerning their experiences concerning Korea. 42.3% of persons surveyed in Uzbekistan had met or conversed with a Korean, whereas the figure was a mere 7.3% for Kazakhstan, with just 1.9% of Kazakhs surveyed having visited Korean homes. As for Korean products, the most frequently used in Uzbekistan were automobiles, while electrical appliances were the majority in Kazakhstan. Samsung was the most recognized of Korean corporations in Kazakhstan (98.9%), with Daewoo achieving a similar rate of recognition (92%) in Uzbekistan. But while Korean corporations were deemed as highly reliable by the majority of the respondents in both countries, the same could not be said for the Korean government, whose reliability in the two countries were markedly low in comparison.
The percentage of persons who have seen Korean TV dramas were consistently higher in Uzbekistan. In terms of age groups, the percentage was the highest among persons in their thirties in both countries, yet the percentage was still higher in Uzbekistan. Percentage of persons recognizing Korean leaders or celebrities were generally low in both countries, but was especially low in Kazakhstan, where no Korean person of note was recognized with the exception of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (20.7%). ‘Kareiski (Korean) Salad’ was the favorite Korean food for those who have tasted Korean food, followed by kimchi. As for prospects for war in Korea, a higher percentage of Kazakhs(33.6%) viewed war in Korea as possible compared to Uzbek respondents(15.3%).
This survey has implications not only towards policies for Central Asian nations but other countries as well. It should be noted that in Central Asia, Korean companies are viewed in a much more positive light than Korea the country. This means that the people of Central Asia first become aware of Korea through its products and companies, with the resulting favorable image being transferred to the originating country. Therefore, the Korean government should provide support for companies seeking to invest in Central Asia and elsewhere in the world, with a view to raising Korea’s recognition value, aside from the usual purpose of expanding trade volume and improving trade balance. Second, this survey shows clearly the importance of strengthening human exchange between countries, a fact amply demonstrated by a higher level of awareness concerning Korea in Samarkand and Andijan (Uzbekistan), where more people are likely to have visited Korea; much higher than in Atyrau and Karagandy (Kazakhstan), where those who have visited Korea were not many. An adjustment of the current visa system and strengthening mutual connection through promotion of mutual employment or study is necessary for expanding exchange between Korea and Central Asia. In particular, as most Kazakhs visiting Korea do so for the purpose of sightseeing, the current system of requiring formal invitations for issuance of tourist visas need to be reformed. Third, Korea’s ODA to Central Asia needs to be tailored for specific needs, instead of the smorgasbord (thus lacking focus) of ODA being offered currently. In areas where Korea is well-recognized, as shown in the latest survey, simple community work or SOC infrastructure construction should be displaced by income-earning ODA such as KSP projects. However, traditional ODA should be expanded and more personnel dispatched to regions such as Nukus (Uzbekistan) or Atyrau (Kazakhstan) or other locations where people are not familiar with Korea. Lastly, the survey demonstrated that Uzbeks and Kazakhs are very earnest about economic cooperation with Korea, meaning Korean enterprises and the government can feel more confident about making long-term investments in the region. Central Asia’s relatively low international credit rating and high risks in investment can be more than compensated by their higher level of trust toward Korea and its positive image in the region. As Korea’s positive image in Central Asia transcends class lines, from top to bottom, Korean investment will be received favorably by everyone in the country concerned and thus is likely to be met with success.
In conclusion, this report will provide basic statistics for strengthening Korea’s economic and diplomatic capacity vis-à-vis Central Asia, and provide plenty of implications for Korea’s entry into and activities in global business. In addition, it will also present useful data for academics researching the social, economic, cultural, and anthropological aspects of the region.

The purpose of this treatise is to ascertain Kazakhstan & Uzbekistan’s potential for economic growth through the study of the industrial plant market in the Central Asia, widely considered the newest Greenfield of the rising these economy, and contemplate measures that will allow Korea to make inroads into that market.
The industrial plant market recently taking shape in the Central Asia, a region bordering the Korean Peninsula, presents Korea with new opportunities for growth, considering Korea’s world-class competitiveness in the construction and operation of industrial plants. However, the plant market in the Central Asia also presents significant obstacles including lack of institutional/legal support, unlike the Middle East, Korea's current No. 1 industrial plant market; insufficient funds to place orders for plant construction; not to mention fierce competition from China and Japan. This paper intends to outline strategies Korea might want to consider for its entry into the Central Asia industrial plant market, in the face of massive financial wherewithal and political clout possessed by the Chinese and the Japanese.
Taking the above situation into consideration, the achievements and limitations of the current ‘package strategy’ combining existing resources and development will be discussed, followed by proposals for the creation of an overseas investment fund for the development industrial plants and natural resources. Korean companies expecting to succeed in the industrial plant market in the Central Asia should be acutely aware of and forewarned against the limitations of the package strategy. As the package strategy involves, by nature, a highly political agreement, country risks latent in the Central Asia should be handled and managed most deliberately.
In order for Korea’s plant-building industry to prevail over competitors from China and Japan, the ability to procure sufficient capital should form the core element of the effort, as the success of Korea’s package strategy is largely dependent upon timely supply of necessary funds to companies participating in actual investment efforts. This means the Korean government must create a solid financial vision if Korea is to be successful in competition with rivals like China and Japan in developing regions like the Central Asia.

This study covers 4 areas - economy and policy, natural resources and industry, infrastructure, and law and institutions - to analyze FDI attractiveness of the 5 Central Asian countries.
According to our analysis, investment attractiveness of each Central Asian country can be summarized as follows. First, in terms of economic and policy factors for attracting FDI, Kazakhstan has the highest attractiveness by virtue of economic scale and income level; but the other 4 countries are much less so. As for potential for economic development, Uzbekistan is the most attractive because of its population, with the largest population among the Central Asian republics. In the area of policy, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are more attractive than the other 3 countries because of their openness to the international society and fewer regulations that can constrain activities and investment of foreign companies. In political stability, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan score comparatively well; whereas Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan do not. In government effectiveness, Kazakhstan has the best indicators while those for the other 4 countries are low.
But overall, the Central Asian region made up of those 5 countries is not a very attractive choice as an investment destination presently, due to a relatively small population and low income level compared to other regions. However, investment for entry into this new market has to be considered in the context of a larger regional market, the CIS, rather than just the individual countries in Central Asia. Even though Central Asia is a small market, it should be noted that 4 countries have recently posted steady economic growth, which is expected to last into the foreseeable future. Kyrgystan is the outstanding exception, as it has which has recently undergone a political crisis.
Second, in terms of natural resources and industry, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have higher FDI attractiveness because of their energy, mineral resources, and relatively robust agricultural sectors;  Turkmenistan also has potential due to its abundant natural gas reserves. Attractiveness of Kyrgyzstan will increase if its rare earth deposits are exploited and developed actively. As for the industrial sector, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have higher attractiveness for establishment of fixed capital.
Third, there is the problem of Central Asia having insufficient infrastructure in general. However, as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are competitive in air transport; Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan has higher attractiveness in distribution; Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have high wire or wireless distribution rate; and Kazakhstan has the highest internet penetration rate; all in relative terms.
Fourth, in terms of law and institutions, the legal process for establishing corporations is the simplest in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, while the country requiring the highest number of documents / certifications is Turkmenistan. Meanwhile, setting up businesses in Uzbekistan takes the longest in terms of the time required. As for real estate, 4 countries except Kazakhstan do not recognize ownership of land by foreign corporations and foreigners. In connection, lease, rent, and loan by credit are not recognized in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, making them the least attractive in this area.
The conclusions of our analysis reveal that Kazakhstan is the most attractive, followed by (in order) Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Turkmenistan is presently implementing a policy of openness to the world as well as vigorous policies to attract investment, which has had an important effect in increasing the country’s investment attractiveness. Completion of a gas pipeline to China also positively influenced its investment attractiveness. On the other hand, there is severe political confusion in Kyrgyzstan, which decreases its FDI attractiveness.
In analyzing Central Asia’s attractiveness for investment, the changing political and economical environment must be considered. Because politics in this region exert significant influence upon the economy, changes in the domestic and external environment have direct (or at least indirect) effects on foreign investment. Recent improvement in inter-country economic exchange among 5 Central Asian countries along with CIS countries is one of the most important factors in increasing investment attractiveness of the region. Through promotion of international economic cooperation, 5 countries in Central Asia can reform their weak economic system and enhance their political transparency necessary for improving FDI conditions.
Therefore, Korea has to observe and research continuously and monitor constantly the changing relations between Central Asia and other countries. Only then would Korea be able to focus on investment into strategic industries of Central Asia. Korea also has to consider an export strategy to Russia, CIS, Middle East, and Europe from Central Asia when integration of this region has been achieved.
Despite weaknesses in FDI conditions in the 5 Central Asian countries, they are potentially highly attractive for FDI in terms of rapid economic growth, abundant energy and resources, integration possibility for integration of the regional economy, and mid-to-long term economic development strategies of each country. Therefore, if the Korean government and enterprises can enter Central Asia with a deeper understanding about the strengths and weaknesses of the region, along with detailed  information about each country, prospects for investment would be bright indeed.

 Environmental cooperation has been becoming one of the most important international agendas. Korean government has planned to increase the amount and proportion of green assistance to developing countries in the near future. It has already implemented “East Asia Climate Partnership” in 2008. The total amount of assistance is as much as 200 million US dollars and it will continue until 2012. Korea needs to develop its ability to conduct efficient and effective environmental cooperation with developing countries. The experiences of Japan and EU are expected to give Korea good examples of environmental cooperation.
This report is aimed at introducing Japan and EU’s environmental cooperation in some sectors such as energy efficiency, climate change, water supply, and waste management. This report also gives us some information on Japan and EU’s ODA policy from the environmental perspective. We have conducted voluminous comparison analysis and suggested some policy implications from Japan and EU’s case study.

After global financing crisis in 2008, China broke from the economic growth model which mainly depends on foreign direct investment and export and tried to find a balance among consumption, investment and export, especially focusing on development of domestic market. This change of paradigm of economic growth which is emphasizing on domestic demand is closely related to regional development strategy. And the strategy of developing central region in China, in other words, the strategy of the rise of Central China whose keystone is urbanization and developing megalopolis has been progressed since 2009.
The scope of existing researches about Chinese domestic market in Korea has been extended from eastern region to western region and northeastern region, while the researches about central region are relatively few. Besides, the research about central region in China from the perspective of megalopolis is extremely rare. Therefore on the assumption that the core of future domestic market in China is megalopolis in central region, this study selected four main megalopolises among six provinces in central China, which are Wuhan megalopolis in Hubei province, Changzhutan megalopolis in Hunan province, Zhongyuan megalopolis in Henan province, and Wanjiang megalopolis in Anhui province.   
First, this report went through historical background to the rise of central China and analyzed economic features of the four megalopolises using several main economic indicators. Also, it made a cross- comparison of growth possibility(GDP, GDP per capita and growth rate), marketability(market size, consumer propensity), human resources (wage level, number of college graduates), and openness(the size of foreign trade, FDI) in five major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Qingdao and Chengdu. As a result, it proved that the central China contains great potential in the speed of growth and investment environment though not being in superior position to other regions in terms of the economic indicators.
As for each megalopolis, we introduced the status of major city and evaluated megalopolis development strategy. Then we divided Chinese domestic market into three markets-industrial market, consumer market and project market and analyzed each market’s current state and characteristic. Finally we provided some implication to Korean enterprises which are searching for the chance to enter into central market in China through introducing some cases of foreign invested companies in those regions.
The four megalopolises clarify common ideas on its long-term development strategy which are to establish resource-saving and eco-friendly society and accept the industry  relocation from the East coastal region in China. It is much concerned that overlapping investment would occur due to similar plans and indistinctive industrial structure. It is therefore important to discover business projects fully supported by the local governments with specific characteristics.
In case of industrial market which consists of import market and industrial network, the market share of Korea in the import markets in those four provinces is not big compared with that of Korea in total import market in China. Therefore the differentiated export strategy considering the size and characteristics of each province’s import market is mostly needed.
As for the core consumer whose income level in upper 20%, the scale of the four provinces is comparable to that of Shanghai. However, people in the Provinces spend more on necessities(food, clothes, housing, etc.) than on service goods(transportation and communication, education, culture and entertainment, etc.).
Meanwhile, data shows the proportion of durable goods in Provinces is relatively higher than in Shanghai, whereas their penetration rate is still remains lower. These figures lead to the room for huge potential markets of durable goods such as air conditioner, mobile phone, computer and color TV.
While the share of Korean investment in total FDI in four provinces of China is mostly insignificant level, the biggest advantage in investing those provinces is geographical condition. Therefore, it is necessary to actively find out market entry with the strategies such as far-sighted perspective, partnership with local government and local firm, development of own technology, local employment, entering into non-core cities.

There can be various views about what a concrete form of the post-Kyoto regime will look like. However, in any cases, we may anticipate we will experience a certain period of time before it is completely settled down as a comprehensive legal form. This research presumes that the international climate change policy architecture will evolve into comprehensive level of international norm, but gradually. And in the meantime, the multilateral agreement will be in a loose-shape compared to Kyoto Protocol and it will be complemented by bilateral treaties. This study recognizes the importance of bilateral cooperation during a transitional period of multilateral norm formation. In this study, one of such bilateral cooperations we focus on is ETS (Emission Trading Schemes) linkage between at least two different countries or regions. 
ETS linkage is attractive to policy makers in that the linkage expands the size of permit market which leads the reduction of total abatement costs in both markets. Such a cost reduction enhances the effectiveness of persuasion of interest groups against the introduction of mandatory cap and trade system. In addition, by equalizing carbon price among linked schemes, linkage can weaken carbon leakage problem and competitiveness concern.
In terms of directions, there are two different types of linkage; direct and indirect linkage. If the only concern is abatement cost reduction, linking between two schemes is more effective than sharing a common scheme between two separated schemes. The advantages of indirect linkage is from its one-way directional property. When a link is one-way directional, it is easier to be disconnected whenever a linkage brings an undesirable consequence, such as a huge volatility of  carbon price in the linked scheme. Especially, in the early stages of formation of a new international climate change agreement, it is required to respond flexibly to rapidly changing international policy environment. In short run, from this reason, indirect linkage is preferable to ensure the policy sovereignty. And direct linkage is suitable to a long run policy.
In discussion of a short-run linkage strategy, we suggest offset market differentiation; breaking down common credit systems by country' abatement technology level. When several ETSs share a common credit system, like CDM(Clean Development Mechanism), profits from the linkage are distributed into each country unevenly. A bigger share of linkage benefit goes to a country which has a higher marginal abatement cost or a higher reduction target. International offest market segmentation may eliminate such an uneven distribution of linkage benefit. As well as it makes developing countries easier to participate in  reduction efforts, it would be consistent with a fundamental principle of UN Convention on Climate Change, ‘common but differentiated principle.’
For a long-run linkage strategy, we examine both partial and general equilibrium analysis. In our partial equilibrium model, we found that cost containment measures such as imported permit discount may help a country to maintain its environmental policy autonomy in some degree. 
To investigate the economic effect of linkage on overall economy beyond permit market, we use a CGE (Computable General Equilibrium) model, specifically GTAP-E. In case of indirect linkage, we consider a part of Korea’s national reduction target (BAU 30% by 2020) to be implemented in other developing countries, which may describe mutual recognition by bilateral agreement as well as purchasing CERs in UN framework. The bigger portion of reduction target is implemented in other developing countries, the less economic burden on Korea. It is because mitigation costs in developing countries are lower than those in Korea to reduce the same emission, which enables Korea to avoid the necessity of production reduction to reach the target. The result shows that both ASEAN and China are suitable linkage partners of Korea meaning that both Korea and linked countries get better off by linkage. In case of indirectly linking to India, we may expect India would be reluctant to link since India suffer a slight real GDP loss by linkage, though Korea gets better off.  
In case of direct linkage, we consider Annex 1 countries which have already introduced or will introduce ETS in near future. In general, Korea will experience both real GDP and welfare loss by such direct linkages to countries with a higher marginal abatement costs. This result is similar to that of partial equilibrium analysis but the reasons are more complex. Besides decrease in production activity to sell out permits, terms of trade effect and inefficiency in resource allocation interrupted.
Finally, it is considered that regional linkage between developing and developed countries in East Asia. Specifically, combinations of Korea-China-Japan, Korea+Japan+ASEAN, ASEAN +3 are considered. The result shows us that Korea-China-Japan and ASEAN+3 are preferable to Korea and Japan. In those cases, China experience decrease in real GDP but welfare gain. It implies that likelihood of climate change cooperation in East Asia through ETS linkage will depend on how much China consider change in social welfare compared to that in real GDP.

The Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI), which originated from the Tumen River Area Development Program (TRADP), is an intergovernmental cooperation mechanism in North-East Asia. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the key supporter, and four countries including the Republic of Korea, People’s Republic of China, Mongolia and Russian Federation are the major participants. In spite of its great potential, GTI had been shelved due to several challenges including disharmony of interest among member countries, weak infrastructure development, and lack of funding to reactivate the project. However, GTI has received new stimulus since China adopted it as part of its central economic development plan in 2009. Its revitalization is expected, and this means it is necessary to maintain a close watch on the development of the GTI. This book includes historical background of the GTI, analysis of reasons for its deactivation, current trends in efforts to move it forward, and policy responses for its activation and consistent development.
This book comprises of five chapters. Included in the first chapter are the purposes of this study, previous studies on subjects related to GTI, methodologies, and expected effectiveness. In the second chapter are historical backgrounds and processes of both TRADP and GTI. In the third chapter, potentials of development under GTI are assessed, in particular from the perspective of regional, transportation, and economic cooperation. In the fourth chapter, strategies and policies toward the GTI of each member country are introduced, especially the detailed description of the change in attitudes and policies of the Chinese government toward the GTI. In the fifth, policy responses to GTI activation are introduced. This part is composed of assessment of policies taken in the TRADP system, challenges in the TRADP system, and tasks in revitalization of the GTI.