While the rising international price of energy and mineral resource increase since 2000, Korea promotes forward a national project like overseas resource development with great interest targeting resource-rich countries. However, Korea has short history to enter and invest into Mongolia for mineral development, which is the ten major mineral resource rich country in the world, is near from Korea geographically, and is very similar racially with Korea. Because Mongolia is land locked country surrounding China and Russia, Korea has a big problem to transport the mineral resources that Korean corporations invested and developed by land.
Global major mineral development corporations started to invest into Mongolia in the early 2000s when international price of raw materials are rising, and they thought that mineral resources development of Mongolia have great potentials. As a result, companies from China and Canada achieved substantial success to develop minerals as the first discoverers of a great mine in Mongolia. Foreign companies already begin to develop the mine of Oyu Tolgoi with government of Mongolia, and they try to participate in development of one of strategic mine, Tavan Tolgoi which Mongolia selects bidders to invest Tavan Tolgoi in the near future. 
At the same time, Mongolia attracts foreign investors for development of mines, which it can not develop because of funding, and for jumping up to be a industrial country based on development of mineral industry. In other words, Mongolia implements a policy that gives equal rights to foreign investors and deregulate foreign investment or exempts from corporate tax, windfall profits tax, and value added tax.
However, entry situation of Korea into Mongolia is not reach their potential to cooperate between two countries. Korea entered into Mongolia much later that major countries, and participate in develop the mines, but it can not get a profitable outcome yet. Because Korea imports mineral resources amount 16 billion dollars from Australia annually, it is one of the most important policy to secure mineral resources for the future of Korea. In this point, Korea has to expand the level of cooperation with Mongolia.
Since Korea established diplomatic ties with Mongolia on March, 1990, researches about history and culture of Mongolia were progressed actively while researches about economy and political issues of Mongolia were not. Especially, methodical researches of mineral resources of Mongolia that is representative mineral-rich country were barely in Korea. The existing researches covered only situation of mineral development, so they could provide a limited implication for understanding and analyzing all about mineral policy of Mongolia and entry strategies synthetically. Therefore, more Korea corporations could not invest into Mongolia because of lack of information about mineral resources investment, and social recognition of Mongolia. Because Korea needs to secure mineral resources at national level, Korea really has to expand research about mineral resource of Mongolia.
Therefore, the main purpose of this study is to examine and analyze synthetically policy and institution of mineral resources and situation of foreign companies investing in Mongolia, and then it will be used to provide policy implications and new strategies for expanding entry of Korean companies that consider to invest into Mongolia. In other words, this study covers situation of mineral resources in Mongolia, minerals and related foreign investment policy of Mongolia, and entry situation and strategies of major countries into Mongolia, so it can contribute Overseas resource development policy of Korea to invest and participate in the mining development of Mongolia actively.
This research composes with 6 sections. After introduction, section 2 provides history, classified three periods, of mineral resource development in Mongolia in the period before 1990 when Mongolia started economic system reform. Section 3 analyzes synthetically situation of mineral resources and related policy of Mongolia including regulation and law, especially importance of mineral resource of international strategy of Mongolia is also analyzed. Topic of section 4 is major countries' such as Canada, Australia, Russia, China, US, Japan, and Europe development situation of mineral resource and entry strategies into Mongolia, so it and its comparative analysis can provide implications for Korea to invest into Mongolia. Section 5 examines mineral development cooperation between Korea and Mongolia and assesses their results, and also provides cases of success and failure that Korea companies invested into Mongolia for twenty years, then it can provide useful information to Korea corporations consider to enter into Mongolia. Finally, section 6 provides an effective counterplan to expand investment and development in Mongolia.
In short, this study suggests 7 ways to participate in development mining of Mongolia for Korea companies and contributes to establish investment policy of Korea government. The 7 ways are ① establishing a active support system of Korea government, ② linking entry of financial companies to development of mineral resources of Mongolia, ③ accompanying with mineral service and promising sectors, ④ linking constructing factories to development of mineral resources of Mongolia, ⑤ investment of package strategy that covers development of minerals and environment restoration, ⑥ analysis of mineral resource development strategies of major countries, ⑦ giving attention to enter into Mongolia for Korean companies. These also include concrete ways and detailed strategies.

The recent international political and economic environment in Central Asian countries have recently been undergoing rapid change. Given the situation, the importance of analyses on cases of investment by foreign companies in Central Asian countries have become more important.
The investment climate of Central Asian countries is generally acknowledged to be inadequate. The procedures for establishing businesses are complex, business practices lack transparency in any sense, and government policies are inconsistent. Also, infrastructure is poor due to lack of investment for roads, railroads, and ports. Therefore it is necessary, through various analyses, to prepare diverse strategies for investment in Central Asian countries.
This study focuses on analyzing characteristics of investment of foreign companies in Central Asian countries. We find several implications in this study for Korean companies concerning future strategies for investment in Central Asian countries.
First, there is a high possibility that service sectors in Central Asian countries will expand from continued economic development. The progress toward greater openness in markets of Central Asian countries will also increase the possibility for opening of several service industries that are now closed to foreign investors. Therefore, competitive Korean companies will be able to enter the various service sectors like insurance and banking. In addition, there will also be much potential with respect to investment in fundamental service sectors like education and medicine, which are not strong in Central Asian countries.
Second, human resource management in Central Asian countries will become more globalized and organized in accordance with social changes of these countries. Thus Korean companies that expect to invest in Central Asia would have to adopt a more transparent system of recruiting and incentive programs for employees, as roles and functions of labor unions in Central Asia will expand compared to present.
Third, Korean companies should prepare marketing strategies based on the those of foreign companies currently doing business in Central Asia. The analyses on social changes in Central Asia should also be reflected in their marketing strategies. As Central Asian countries’ economies grow, the importance of both global strategy and localized marketing strategies will increase. The economic development of Central Asia will also lead to the expansion of the middle class and strengthen its purchasing power.
Generally, Korean companies that will be doing business in Central Asia should try to adopt investment strategies that will accord with socio-economic changes in Central Asian countries. Another factor that should be considered is that economic cooperation among Central Asian countries and with CIS countries will increase. As a result of these processes, the Central Asian economy will integrate into a single economy. The economic integration will promote intra-regional trade and change the trends of investment and trade through institutions like common custom duty, etc.
Also, Central Asian countries will continue to foster policies for industrial diversification along with their economic development strategies. Each Central Asian country has adopted its own economic development strategy but all revolve around the same core concept: development of manufacturing industries. Central Asian countries want to lower the share of energy industries and agriculture in their economies, and expand that of manufacturing. Therefore, the focus of Korean companies’ investment should be on the manufacturing industry that each Central Asian country plans to promote.
Central Asian countries have common characteristics including a socialist past, their status as transition countries, the importance of personal connections and a certain degree of non-openness. These characteristics have had much influence on their economies. Therefore, the peculiarities of these economies were major considerations  when foreign companies invested in Central Asian countries. However, the characteristics listed above have decreased in significance as their economies have become more capitalistic and institutionalized during transition periods. Accordingly, Korean companies must keep these factors in mind when engaging in human resource management, and preparing marketing strategies related to investment in Central Asia.

Economic growth of Korea and its entry into the ranks of developed countries was made possible by utilization of its only abundant factor, labor, and excellent human capital; despite its lack of physical capital and natural resources. Future economic growth for Korea would still depend on accumulation of human capital and its utilization. Human capital has been regarded as a very important factor in the development of national economies for a long time. In the 21st century, the rise and fall of nations will not depend on territory and natural resources but human capital. Having more creative and innovative citizens, and more population in general, has become more important than natural resources.
In the global economic system, management of not only one’s own human capital but also those of other countries is an important issue. In terms of exchange of human capital with Korea, Central Asia constitutes one of its most active partner regions compared to other regions. In summit talks between Korea and the respective nations of Central Asia, the exchange of human capital was the most actively-discussed subject during the 17 summit meetings between Korea and Central Asia since the Central Asian countries became independent in 1992. There have also been over 80,000 non-governmental exchanges since that time.

The active exchange between Korea and Central Asia results in increases in exchange in various sectors and also create good opportunities for understanding each other. Especially, transnational marriage and family accounted for the exchange of about 2,602 persons in 2011; and emigrant workers from Central Asia in Korea number about 30,000. On the other hand, Koreans in Central Asia (Korean Diaspora) plays an important role as intermediaries for cooperation between Korea and the region.
This report includes a statistical and empirical analysis about human resource exchange at the governmental and non-governmental level. Such research can provide legal and institutional policy implications for Korea in human exchange between Korea and Central Asia as follows:
First, various human networks have to be established for continuous cooperation between Korea and Central Asia, from their Presidents down to the people. For this, Korea needs to establish a governmental organization (tentatively named 'Ministry of International Human Resources) which covers human networking, DB, and financial policy. The scope of this organization will cover strategic regions including Central Asia for Korean foreign policy,  managing and constructing the global human resource network for Korea in the long term perspective.
Secondly, the relationship between Presidents of Central Asia and Korea has to develop continuously, as it constitutes the substance of cooperation between Korea and Central Asia. To strengthen the relationship between Korea and  Central Asia, the relationship with ruling parties in Central Asia needs to be expanded. Case in point, Korea has been engaged in exchange with the ruling party in Kazakhstan, by holding the 'Korea-Kazakhstan Forum' annually. Korea has to bolster not only this Forum but also work with officials in developing countries as well as Central Asia to increase the level of exchange, and create a program for mutual reinforcement of capabilities for common endeavors.
Third, networks in education has to be established for the future generations and for building knowledge-based economies. The Korean government has to change its existing employment policy to promote the creation of a ‘labor pool’ system that can bring together talent in various countries including Central Asia. For this, an exclusive organization for attracting talented foreigners under the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology has to be established; and this organization has to provide much employment information for reinforcement of the human network in this regard.
Fourth, it is important to establish the human network and promote human exchange at the corporate level. When Korean firms plan to enter into Central Asia, they need to actively provide training opportunities in Korea for local workers to learn the technology that is required in the work place. On the other hand, the Korean government must cooperate to ease the entry of Korean personnel from industries or education sectors into Central Asia. For example, when Korea obtain rights to a major development project in Central Asia, the Korean government can provide support that allows necessary personnel to better participate in those project in Central Asia.
Fifth, the reinforcement of a network with ethnic Koreans (Goryeo-saram) network is also important. Overseas Koreans, or Goryeo-saram, in Central Asia live mostly in big cities and work in commercial sectors. Because they cannot obtain credit loans in Central Asia, the Korea government need to offer them financial assistance in the form of microcredits programs such as a 'Korean People’s Financing Network'.
Sixth, cultural exchange is also important in stimulating human exchange between Korea and Central Asia. This can be done utilizing Korean popular culture such as K-pop and drama which are very popular in Central Asia. Business for exchange of cultural content will assume a key role in expanding the human exchange between Korea and Central Asia.
Exports is one of the main pillars of the Korean economy, but the line of thinking that assumes trade takes priority over everything else cannot sustain relationships with other countries. To become a truly ‘developed’ country, Korea has to strengthen its hard, soft, and ‘sticky’ power based on its human capital.
In the 21st century, global order is expected to be determined by which countries have more sticky power. Even though US has the most hard and soft power, US has a difficult problem with diplomacy in Afghanistan and Iraq because sticky power of the US is weak. Sticky power is the power that can tie both the elite and the people of another country with one’s own country through the attractiveness of its economy and culture. Through global informatization and democratization in Arab Region, Korea government has to strengthen its sticky power that can cover everyone in Central Asia from the political elite to the common people.
Central Asia is the region that sticky power of Korea can be applied with the greatest effect, as everyone from presidents down to the people in Central Asia consider Korea a friendly nation. They are interested in Korean popular culture, and they want to travel, work, and study in Korea. The new policy agenda for the Korean government therefore, has to involve developing its Korean sticky power in Central Asia and at the global level.

Myanmar has long been considered one of the last frontiers of Asia. Despite being abundant in labor and rich in resources, Myanmar has not been able to achieve economic development for a long time. A military-backed civilian government took office in 2011, and last year pushed forward political and economic reforms at a rate that has surprised many both in and outside the country. Myanmar’s reforms offer long-overdue opportunities for the country’s economic development through liberalization and re-integration into the world economy. This report aims to provide a better understanding of the country’s potential for development from two perspectives. The first half of the analysis focuses on the relationship between Myanmar’s socio-cultural factors and development. The second half examines recent reforms in politics, economy and international relations.
Myanmar’s socio-cultural landscape has had a profound effect on policy. A wide range of religious and traditional elements motivated aspects of earlier economic policies. The subsequent Socialist period, whose arrival was partly triggered by religiously motivated policies of the previous administration, saw the stagnation and isolation of the once-prosperous economy. The prominent place given to Buddhism in conjunction with the country’s ethnic diversity have led to security issues and human rights problems, and for several decades, armed conflict between the central government and ethnic minorities have seriously undermined economic development of the country.
On the other hand, Myanmar's traditional culture also holds great potential for economic development by creating favorable conditions for investment in human capital. Myanmar has higher literacy rates than other countries with comparable levels of economic development and the country is known for high levels of achievement motivation. Myanmar’s institutionalized religions, where Theravada Buddhism holds a prominent place but also with large congregations of Christians and Muslims among ethnic minorities, contributed to human capital accumulation through cultural norms that emphasize learning and institutional support through monastic schools. Nonetheless, it is equally true that Myanmar has serious limitations in human resources outside basic literacy rates, due to low public investment in education. Yet the country’s cultural potential suggests that once aggressive investment and institutional reforms are in place, Myanmar's human capital could increase rather rapidly.
Political and economic reforms initiated by the newly formed civilian government show encouraging signs of society-wide change. It should be remembered that when the new government took office in early 2011, expectations of substantial change were modest because the military still maintained tight control over the political process. Yet subsequent actions by the government included substantive measures that include the meeting between Aung San Suu Sukyi and President Thein Sein, restoration of the NLD as a political party, release of political prisoners, and legalization of street protests. On the other hand, peace negotiations with armed ethnic groups appear face complex hurdles. Several minority armed groups have resisted the government demand for their integration into the government-controlled Border Defense Forces. More fundamentally, the government and ethnic minorities disagree sharply over center-periphery relationships including the level of autonomy for minority states.
The government is gradually introducing market liberalization and promoting private economic activities. Special economic zone law has been introduced and foreign investment law is being revised while the Myanmar Investment Committee gained renewed government support and has been regrouped. To pave the way for foreign exchange reform, the Myanmar government invited a delegation from the IMF for technical assistance. Private banks were allowed to handle currency exchange transactions for the first time since the military coup in 1962. The Myanmar government already privatized state firms in control of natural gas and oil in 2010. A significant number of SOEs under the ownership of 15 government ministries and entities are also expected to be on sale.
The reforms in Myanmar have proceeded at a time when the United States is trying to respond more directly to China’s growing influence in Southeast Asia. Myanmar’s political and economic liberalization can lead to gradual easing of economic sanctions imposed by Western governments, and the West can and will further encourage reforms through easing of sanctions. Myanmar appears to be willing to take advantage of its geostrategic location with respect to the US-China rivalry in the Asia-Pacific region, finally seeking to end its heavy economic and military dependence on China.
The opening of Myanmar’s economy offers considerable investment opportunities for Korea and its importance is only heightened under current global recession. The implications that can be drawn from the current report are as follows. First, it is imperative to understand that the socio-cultural environment of Myanmar will produce complex effects, with mixed results for development potential of the country. The emphasis on Buddhism in a country with high levels of ethnic diversity poses challenges for peace and nation-building, which is a prerequisite for economic development. Yet another aspect of Buddhism and deep religiosity of ethnic groups helped create cultural norms and institutions conducive to human capital accumulation. Second, Korea needs to fully utilize its advantage in credibility over other countries when Myanmar opens up for international economic cooperation. For Myanmar, Korea can make a successful case that it has no geopolitical agenda like the US, China or India. Unlike Japan, Korea has no historical baggage with respect to Myanmar from colonial rule or wars. Korea should design its economic cooperation strategy with Myanmar based on such understanding of Myanmar’s domestic politics and international relations in addition to technical knowledge of development processes.

The new Myanmar government has been trying to introduce a series of political and economic reform measures which are intended to improve its relationship with the western countries including the US and the EU. Those reform measures also shows that Myanmar has greater willingness to gear up its socio-economic development.
Myanmar has been known for its growth potential with plenty of natural resources as well as its sizable land and population. Recently, Myanmar’s role in the ASEAN has been increased and strengthened. There will be more opportunities for economic and development cooperation with Myanmar. In this vein, Korea considers Myanmar as one of the important partner countries for development cooperation. Nevertheless, development cooperation strategies as well as country studies on Myanmar are hardly found in Korea. 
This report analyzes the current status of Myanmar’s socio-economic development, and then evaluate development cooperation efforts made by donor countries including Korea up to now. Based on the analysis and evaluation, three directions are derived for Korea’s development cooperation for Myanmar. Firstly, Korea needs an early and considerable increase in its ODA for Myanmar. Currently, per capita ODA amounts for the nearby important partner countries such as Cambodia, Rao PDR and Vietnam from Korea, are well above those for Myanmar. Secondly, concessional loans have not been provided by Korea since 2005. They need to be resumed to help Myanmar construct and improve its physical infrastructures (especially electric transmission lines, small local roads and bridges, local ports etc) which are prerequisite for social and economic development. Lastly, Korea has to prepare the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) that is a comprehensive framework for development cooperation allowing for Myanmar’s mid/long-term development process.
The CPS has to identify priority areas or issues of development cooperation. Based upon the analysis of Myanmar’s socio-economic development and the selection principles such as willingness, alignment, selective focus, harmonization, spill-over and short-term urgency, this report recommends the first and second tier priority areas of development cooperation for Myanmar. The recommendation will be a very useful reference in devising the CPS for Myanmar.

The current study was undertaken to identify and analyze images of Korea and India as perceived by the other, and provide basic input for formulating policies to further enhance bilateral cooperation. To ensure that the study was implemented more systematically and objectively, it was conducted using a well-structured questionnaire survey. While the survey was conducted nationwide in Korea, it was carried out in four metropolitan cities in Northern, Southern, Eastern, and Western India respectively; i.e., Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, and Chennai. The sample size was 1,000 both in Korea and India.
The main findings of the survey are as follows. First, the level of awareness among both Indian and Korean respondents of the other country was considerably high. In particular, in the case of Indians, the level of awareness rises in a linear fashion in accordance with the income level. 30.4% of Indian respondents answered that they learned about Korea through TV and newspapers, thus ranking the mass media as their no. 1 source. The TV and the news media were also ranked high in the case of Korean respondents with 53%, followed by school textbooks at 34.9%. Notably, Korean products were ranked relatively high in terms of recognition value among Indian respondents, which shows that Korean companies play a major part in raising the awareness of Korea among Indians.  
Also the survey revealed that few Koreans have visited India and vice versa, that the level of preference of the other country as a tourist destination is low for both Koreans and Indians. In terms of popular culture, movies have been identified as the most commonly experienced medium by both Koreans and Indians, and this tendency was more pronounced among Koreans.
In terms of awareness of companies among Indians, Nokia was identified as the most well-known foreign company (97.4%), followed by Samsung (93.8%), LG(92.6%), Hyundai(86.6%), and Toyota(86.4%). The level of awareness corresponded with the manufactures of products most widely used by Indians, namely, mobile phones, automobiles, and electronic products. However, the respondents did not necessarily know the nationality of those companies. On the other hand, the survey showed that Indian companies are little known among Koreans, with Micromax identified as the best known company, by a mere 11.1% of Koreans. Mahindra&Mahindra, a company known for its acquisition of Ssangyong motors, also showed a 7.3% recognition level. Very few knew exactly which country the companies actually came from, and this can be attributed to the limited usage of Indian products by Koreans. 
Second, the survey shows that Korean companies are no.1 with respect to image associated with Korea among Indians, followed by the 2002 World Cup, and economic development. While Indians' perception of Korea derived, to a significant extent, from Korean products and economic achievement; Koreans' perception of India had mostly to do with religion and customs - Hinduism(36.2%), spiritualism(13.2%), the caste system(13.1%), poverty, and religious strife. Only 4.9% of Koreans associated India with its IT industry. As such, India is still perceived by Koreans as a country with a long history and poverty, despite the significant strides India has made on the economic front in recent years.
In terms of likeability, Korean products are ranked higher by Indians than Korea in general, while popular and traditional Korean culture were rated low. On the other hand, India’s traditional and popular culture are ranked highest by Koreans, while Indian products were ranked low. 
As for the assessment of bilateral exchange, both Korea and India chose Japan as a major partner country, followed by China. While Korea and India identified each other as a no.2 or no.3 partner, other Asian countries did not figure significantly. Moreover, it is interesting to note that Koreans chose India as a partner for cooperation in resource development. In particular, in the case of Indians, the more educated and wealthier the respondent is, the more active attitude (s)he had toward exchange with Korea, which was also the case for Korean respondents. There was a high level of willingness on both sides to visit and learn more of the other.
Korea-India cooperation has been expanding by leaps and bounds since the entry into force of the Korea-India CEPA in 2010. As the center of gravity of the world economy shifts towards Asia, the relations with India, an emerging regional economic powerhouse, are bound to assume greater importance. However, the mutual awareness and understanding still leaves much to be desired, and thus, further effort is needed to improve the image of Korea in India and vice versa. In this context, the following policy implications can be provided regarding Korea-India relations.
First, people-to-people exchange between Korea and India should be increased. The survey revealed that a more positive attitude was seen among those who have visited or met a person from the other country. As such, there is a need to increase opportunities for exchange and interaction.
Second, there should be enhanced support by the governments to increase investment opportunities at a bilateral level. The survey showed that companies play a major role in the image-building. Therefore, the Korean and Indian governments should make efforts to create more favorable policies and environment in this regard. At the same time, CRS(corporate social responsibility) should be given additional encouragement.
Third, efforts are needed to increase cultural exchange, and to build an image different from that of Japan. Both Koreans and Indians have little experience with each other's culture. To that end, the governments and the private sector should scale up efforts to expand cultural exchange. And as Indians often confuse Korea with Japan, a focused approach should be taken to address the problem.
Fourth, exchange-related provisions in the Korea-India CEPA should be utilized. The relevant provisions allow for the movement of independent professionals, and joint production of audio-visual materials.
In conclusion, despite challenges and limitations, the present study is significant as an unprecedented attempt to survey the images of Korea and India as perceived by the other. It provides comparative analysis of the formation, elements, the role of national images in improving economic and socio-cultural cooperation, and policy implications. Thus, the study is expected to serve as a useful policy-oriented reference on Korea-India bilateral cooperation for a broad readership including not only policy-makers, but also scholars, researchers, and students with an interest in the subject.

The purpose of this research is to analyze the achievements and the limits of MERCOSUR as we near the 20th anniversary of its establishment. This research outlines the direction of the organization’s progress in the future, in light of conflicting arguments respectively favoring internal depth and greater expansion, in addition to asymmetries, and the recent global financial crisis. Also it presents implications as references in the establishment of Korea’s economic cooperation policies with MERCOSUR member states and possible FTA strategies, by looking at external/internal integration processes and prospects for MERCOSUR.
The implications of MERCOSUR intra-regional cooperation are as follows. First, MERCOSUR started off with an unstable base due to negative political and economic developments internationally, such as the dependence on foreign direct investment, recurring economic crises, appearance of neo-liberalism, and so on. Moreover, civil society and the state that must support the integration were also vulnerable. In other words, MERCOSUR has been established under the unfavorable circumstances including fragile political institutions; an immature, patron-client relationship between the state and civil society; and a high level of dependence on foreign capital. MERCOSUR set limits on the trade liberalization, which made it unable to achieve integration goals for a common market, and its member states had no intention of sacrificing part of their sovereignty to supranational organizations that spearhead integration. International economy often subjected MERCOSUR to shocks, and the leaders of MERCOSUR were not easily held to promises they have made in order to achieve integration. Moreover, all the efforts to intensify integration including social agendas simply turned out to be failures. Therefore, the implication of MERCOSUR integration is that the control of intra-regional differences is very important although uncontrollable factors such as changes in the international political/economic environment are excluded. In order to achieve a focused but stable integration, further policy adjustment including resolution of various conflicts and exchange rate regime divergent from trade liberalization is in order. Also, new policies for membership expansion, adjustments for common foreign policies, and social issues should be initiated. Lastly, the establishment of supranational institutions and partial transfer of sovereignty should be finalized.
It is expected that MERCOSUR will remain in its current state without rapid progress or regression, as competing models of integrated models based on neo-liberalism and revisionism will assume priority in turns. Industry associations of MERCOSUR member countries agree on this recognition and acknowledge this state of affairs. Available facts show that member countries have overcome the difficulties through their geographical solidarity and continuous efforts to get over the internal asymmetry and contradictions that appeared in the integration process, in spite of several instances where the possibility of MERCOSUR collapsing loomed prominently.
Analysis on economic effects of MERCOSUR integration draws out the following implications. It indicates that MERCOSUR integration shows characteristics of integration among developing countries, which are different from the economic achievements generally expected in cases of economic integration between developed-developing countries or developed-developed countries. In the case of integration among developed-developing countries, what shows up is macroeconomic synchronization with developed countries as centers, and they also enjoy complementary effect of trade in accordance with economic development stages. However, the integration among developing countries like MERCOSUR cannot be expected to achieve the effects mentioned above.
Firstly, according to the result of analysis on changes in macroeconomic indices before and after the establishment of MERCOSUR, macroeconomic synchronization between member countries are progressing differently in accordance with each variable such as GDP growth rate, consumption price level, exchange rate, trade openness and so on. The result can be explained by sensitive reaction of small economies on the demand changes of trade partners, and little possibility of synchronization for countries like Brazil where the share of trade share in its economy is small, as well as different economic structures between member countries. In conclusion, it can be reasonably estimated that macroeconomic synchronization of MERCOSUR’s member countries, impacted by conflicts between member countries during the process of overcoming macroeconomic shocks and crisis three times after MERCOSUR establishment, is relatively weak in comparison with EU and NAFTA. Therefore, it is necessary to promote jointly macroeconomic synchronization and the coordination of macroeconomic policies in MERCOSUR in order to deepen the integration process and make it stable.
Secondly, it shows that the share of intra-regional trade of MERCOSUR is lower than that of EU and NAFTA during the analysis period. Frequent economic crises within the region and trade conflicts by unadjusted countermeasures contributed to weakened intra-regional export. This highlights the importance of adjustment of closely-related trade policies between member countries. Meanwhile, it shows also that Brazil’s share of extra-regional trade has been rising for two decades, whereas other countries saw more increases in their shares of intra-regional trade. Therefore, the asymmetric character of trade structure, where a small economy is subordinate to a large economy, is also shown in this research. In addition, intra-industry trade in the non-traditional manufacturing sector has increased noticeably in intra-regional trade among member countries except Paraguay. It means that integration in intra-regional production is accelerated directly or indirectly by production specialization created during the integration process.
Third, an analysis of the scale of trade diversion and trade creation effects shown after the establishment of MERCOSUR through the use of the gravity model indicates that the trade creation effect is bigger than the trade diversion effect. Also, trade creation effects for non-member countries are also identified as a result of the analysis, whereas trade diversion effects do not appear. In a nutshell, it represents that there are positive effects on integration of both intra-regional and offshore trade.
Meanwhile, the implications of MERCOSUR extra-regional integration upon efforts for Korea-MERCOSUR FTA are as follows. First, MERCOSUR was passive about entering into FTA with extra-territorial countries except Uruguay. This means there is limited possibilities for the actual promotion of Korea- MERCOSUR FTA. Lukewarm attitudes concerning FTA with Korea can be confirmed from a survey targeting industry associations of MERCOSUR member countries. Second, extra-territorial integration in MERCOSUR is being undertaken for international politics purposes, namely for the sake of south- south co-operation, finding the export market for agricultural products and so on; and MERCOSUR’s target countries/regions for FTA negotiation was actually limited to the Middle East, Latin America, etc. This implies that it will be difficult for Korea to be regarded as a country of major concern with respect to a MERCOSUR FTA. Third, various trade agreements that MERCOSUR concluded are limited to preferential trade agreements, which are restricted to partial market opening of certain specified industrial products. The assumption here is that Korea-MERCOSUR FTA will only be regarded as a preferential trade agreement, qualified within narrow scope, and results that Korea can actually obtain from negotiations are also limited. Lastly, as shown in the case of MERCOSUR’s negotiations with the EU, the process proceeded very cautiously and excruciatingly, and sometimes even interrupted by negotiation strategies that cleaved to damage minimization for intra-regional industries and expansion of agricultural products export. This shows that Korea-MERCOSUR FTA negotiation might take a longer than any other FTAs Korea concluded or is negotiating. Also, the process of negotiation including adjustment of opinions among internal interest groups of both sides seems to be difficult.
According to a survey concerning the awareness among Korean businesses about the Korea-MERCOSUR FTA, there seemed to be great deal of interest among exporters. The survey showed 80.4% of the respondents gave affirmative answers to Korea-MERCOSUR FTA. Even though the respondents surveyed were not sensitive to discrimination from non-conclusion of the FTA, they exhibited the most interest toward measures related to lowering or elimination of customs duties and simplification of customs clearance during FTA negotiations. And Korean companies that invested in the MERCOSUR region stressed the need for conclusion, insisting that they are being discriminated against or suffer losses because Korea did not concluded FTA with MERCOSUR yet. Also Korean companies expect the damages on the local business of them if MERCOSURㆍEU FTA is concluded so that countermeasures for it are required to be established. Most companies that made inroads into the region answered in the affirmative on FTA with MERCOSUR and expected preemptive cooperation with Brazil when needed. 
There are several conditions to be considered in promoting the Korea- MERCOSUR FTA. Firstly, as suggested with respect to extra-territorial integration of MERCOSUR, sensitive products of MERCOSUR will need to be considered as exceptional items or excluded from concession categories in the initial stages and a strategy for facilitating a comprehensive FTA should be considered thereafter. Second, the FTA should include contents related to industrial and technological cooperation that MERCOSUR is expecting from Korea, as it had done with Israel. Lastly, there are efforts that Korea needs to undertake in advance in order to create favorable atmosphere for negotiations with MERCOSUR: adoption of national currency trade settlement system in trade between Korea and MERCOSUR, conclusion of Korea-MERCOSUR trade facilitation negotiations with focus on removal of non-tariff barriers in the long-term, promotion of their relations to a mutual strategic cooperative relationship, and reinforcing the cooperation with Brazil, the lead country in MERCOSUR.
In the meantime, plans to provide a ‘push’ for domestic companies into MERCOSUR markets are preferentially required in the light of actual limitation on Korea-MERCOSUR FTA promotion. To resolve the difficulties of Korea’s exporters and investment companies, the survey suggests the following. First, “Export Financing Fund for Small and Medium Sized Companies in Latin America” is suggested in response to the need for financial support. Therefore, a diverse array of export financing categorized in accordance with country, region, and industry, should be operated by merging them into a single source and its funding be increased in proportion to Korea’s export share to Latin America. Also, establishment of integrated database for exporters to Latin America is necessary for continuous management of companies and their activities. Second, is the establishment of a “Business Consulting Fund” for invest companies in Latin America. This fund would be operated jointly by public institutions with much knowhow in entering markets around the globe, such as an Export-Import Bank, Korea Trade Insurance Cooperation, and the Korea Development Bank; and also some commercial banks. Third, emphasis must be placed on roles of educational institutions, government, and enterprises to train local experts as part of a long-term policy. Fourth, to encourage exposition participation, a dispatch of “market pioneers” to Latin America should be considered; with the pioneers dispersed into different organizations such as government departments, local governments, associations and so on; combined with practical use of consulting companies that have abundant experience in the region to overcome financial limitations and lack of opportunities. Finally, reinforcement of aviation cooperation is required as a way to improve the local image of Korea’s economy, culture and so on, in reference to similar efforts by Middle East countries previously.

 

The aim of this study is to assess the challenges concerning support from the Korean government for businesses entering the Indian market and policy responses, through an analysis of current business operations and accomplishments of Korean businesses in India. As of Dec. 2012, Korean companies doing business in India are estimated to be around 531 in total. All of them were divided into three categories(manufacturing, non-manufacturing and personal services) and surveyed via e-mail, phone and on-site visit. Among them, 109, 76, 33 survey questionnaires were collected in each category, respectively. The survey revealed that 144 businesses(27%) had either gone out of business or unable to be found. 58.4% out of all existing businesses responded to our surveys, with the figure going up to 66.9% not counting businesses that refused to reply. These figures represent the highest response rate among all surveys involving Korean businesses in India up to this point.
The results of the survey revealed that entering and gaining access to India’s domestic market constituted the biggest motivation for Korean manufacturing companies in India. According to the survey result, reasons for why they chose the current location for business include the possibility of linking up with existing companies and the size and potential of local markets. Most of the revenues for Korean manufacturing firms came from sales in the domestic market; the same companies also acquired most of the raw and intermediate materials for production from the local market. In most companies, irregular workers comprised over 20% of their workforce, with the annual turnover rate among regular employees between 10-30%. Wages were lower than those in China, but comparable to Indonesia and slightly higher than in Vietnam. For the most part, companies were satisfied with their growth over the last three years, and were very positive concerning prospects for growth in the next three years.
Sales have increased for the greater majority of companies that invested in India. Also, the direction of operation for most businesses was geared toward increasing investment for the next three years. As for future strategies, the most frequently stated was ‘increase in sales,’ followed by ‘more robust marketing’ and ‘stronger management of production,’ in that order.
Entry into India’s domestic market was also the prime motivating factor in investments by Korean nonmanufacturing firms, in addition to expanding their presence in the subcontinent. Nonmanufacturing and manufacturing firms were not dissimilar in terms of their business location as well as domestic sales, in addition to recent growth and prospects for future growth. Though nonmanufacturing firms relied slightly less on irregular workers as a proportion of their workforce, the turnover rate among regular employees were higher than manufacturing firms. Indian workers in Korean nonmanufacturing firms were paid less than their counterparts in China, but far more than workers in Vietnam and Indonesia.
Among Korean personal services businesses, the number one pull-factor in deciding to come to India was business opportunities offered by rapidly increasing number of Korean companies entering the Indian market. Most personal service businesses preferred cities such as Bangalore and Delhi, in terms of destinations for future movement or expansion, as the number of Korean companies in those cities have swelled recently. Though the job turnover rate also posed worker management problems for businesses in the sector, it was actually lower compared to manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors. Despite many businesses expressing positive outlooks on future growth, business operations were geared toward maintaining the status quo.
Korean firms in India generally agreed that the investment environment in India had improved overall over the last three years, not to mention having an optimistic outlook on the investment environment for the next three years. However, labor management, taxes, administrative services, and business location were cited as areas that worsened the most over the previous three years. As for areas likely to deteriorate in the next three years, the companies’ answers included taxes, labor management, government policy, and administrative services.
Forms of assistance from the Korean government most requested by Korean manufacturing firms in India included the following, in order: financial aid, long-term visa issuance, expansion of direct air routes, industrial complexes for Korean firms, an investment assistance center in India, training courses. The answers from nonmanufacturing/personal service businesses were as follows, in order: financial aid, long-term visa issuance, expansion of direct air routes, and an investment assistance center in India. On the other hand, Korean firms requested the following forms of assistance from the Indian government: facilitation of visa issuance, eliminating corruption, expansion of infrastructure, more direct flights, and industrial complexes for Korean firms.
Based on the survey, the following mid-term and long-term policy recommendations may be put forward for supporting Korean firms in India. First, the policies should focus on small and medium-size companies, and be divided into middle and long-term in terms of time. For the immediate future, more has to be done to increase the availability of investment and cultural information on India. In addition, a database of Korean companies in India should be established, with firm and consistent oversight. For these ends, official support for the establishment of a Korean Chamber of Commerce in India will be necessary. Another task for the Korean government would be to initiate negotiations with India on visa and aviation agreements, in order to secure a greater number of direct-flights and long-term visas.
For the middle-to-long-term time frame, a greater effort to upgrade the concessions in the Korea-India CEPA through the bilateral joint committee must be made. A case in point, a more active use of the ‘favorable consideration’ article in the CEPA regarding Korean bank branches should be made, to accelerate the entry of private banks into India. Last but not least, the lack of infrastructure being the most pressing problem and biggest obstacle facing Korean firms in India, the creation of an industrial complex for Korean businesses should be given active consideration.

This report explores the future directions for public-private partnership (PPP) in relation to Korea’s international development co-operation, particularly official development assistance (ODA).
Since most PPP studies have approached the topic from the perspective of international development agency, it would be timely and meaningful to review the issue from that of the business, one of the major participants in PPP. Taking the business view into account, this new approach helps lay a more balanced and thus feasible foundation for partnership.
Based on the literature review on corporate social responsibility (CSR), this study (1) re-assesses the scope of CSR and PPP, (2) portraits the philanthropic activities of Korean companies, especially in developing countries, and (3) introduces normative models of corporate philanthropy, recently developed in Korea and internationally.
This report concludes with some suggestions in relation to three aspects of PPP: that is, scope, performance management, and partner selection.
With regard to the PPP scope, this report suggests to combine two current PPP programs which aim for the partnership with NGOs and the business respectively. This will not only make the current programs simpler, but also facilitate the cooperation within the private sector. It is also suggested that the new PPP program should consider and facilitate the cooperation with the government and NGOs in developing countries and should include capacity-building of the business in addition to co-sharing the financial burden required for PPP.
Regarding to performance management, this report proposes that the PPP program should embrace various aspects of PPP performance, which are defined by the PPP participants with different expectations, but should prioritize development rather than ODA or CSR.
In selecting partners, PPP program should consider two more aspects, in addition to the current review of the proposed activity, that is, (1) whether the applicant company has generated a negative impact when operating in developing countries, and (2) whether the company is consistently integrating CSR activities with its business strategy.

Aid for trade takes the lion’s share of Korea’s ODA, ranking highest among the DAC countries. Neverthless, it is believed that Korea’s ODA policy particularly with respect to AfT faces major challenges in order to secure aid effectiveness. Major criticism includes that most of AfT programmes are designed from supplier's perspectives. Also, Korea’s AfT policy lacks adequate overall policy framework. In most major donor countries, AfT is either conducted as a specific sector or considered as a cross-cutting issue.
There are two major policy areas of AfT in establishing an efficient policy framework; basic principle and institutional framework. The former includes mainstreaming of trade, pro-poor Aft and strategy for aid effectiveness such as program based approach. The latter is about setting up institutional framework of AfT. As far as mainstreaming of trade is concerned, Korea has not shown any systematic efforts even though it emphasizes trade as an important area of aid policy. Also, Korea’s ODA policy puts less weights on the principle of pro-poor AfT. Considering these two principles are well regarded international norm of AfT, it is high time for Korea to introduce them into its AfT policy.
Preparation of institutional framework of AfT seems to be the requisite for establishing right AfT policy. This study recommends a hybrid model of AfT policy framework. The hybrid model simultaneously considers AfT as a specific sector and a cross-cutting issue. The rationale for this approach is to incorporate Korea’s current fragmented ODA policy structure, that is MOFAT(Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade) and MOSF(Ministry of Strategy and Finance) take responsibilities for non-concessional and concessional aid respectively. This study proposes that Korea needs to include trade in the list of specific sectors of non-concessional aid. At the same time, trade needs to be considered as a cross-cutting issue in many large concessional aid projects. Also, it is suggested that AfT strategic guideline needs to be formulated for the effectiveness of the hybrid model. In this context, this study encourages an active role of the office of the Prime Minister is important to coordinate the funtions of MOFAT and MOSF.