Executive Summary 

I.  Introduction 

II. General Survey on the Belarusian Economy 
2.1 Current Economic Situation 
2.2 Foreign Investment Climate in Belarus 

III. The External Economic Relations between Belarus and the EU 
3.1 Economic relations with the EU 
3.2 Political relations with the EU 

IV. Conclusion 

References 

Belarusian economic growth over the past 10 years has been fueled primarily by high economic growth in neighboring Russia and the rise in world prices of oil products. In particular, the basis of Belarus’s robust economic growth was subsidized energy prices from Russia and increases in domestic petrochemical industry production on the back of sustained high oil prices. Like this, the Belarusian economy depends significantly on external factors, especially the relations with Russia and its macroeconomic conditions. However, the fact that Belarus is Europe’s last autocratic nation and with little freedom of speech puts some distance between Belarus and the EU. Recently, the government of Belarus has undergone subtle changes in its external relations and foreign investment policy since the crisis in relations between Belarus and Russia started. Belarusian government will maximize its own interests by attracting investment from the EU.
This paper deals with a rough sketch of the macroeconomic situation of Belarus and its economic structure, and addresses economic relations between Belarus and the EU in depth. Moreover, this study predicts future external policy directions of Belarusian government and provides its policy implications from the viewpoint of foreign investors. Based on this study, although the government shows a favorable attitude in the foreign investment and relations with EU, Belarus’s accession to the EU or accession to a free trade zone with the EU does not seem likely to be realized in the near future. First of all, the EU is not interested in expanding their borders due to the fact that it brings EU countries more trouble than advantages. Belarus also does not have any plans to join the EU or seek formation of a free trade zone with the EU. Firstly, after joining the EU, Baltic countries have lost control of their industry and agriculture, and became simply a market for European companies. Second, due to its special relationship with Russia, Belarus has enjoyed the lowest prices on energy sources among all EU countries and most CIS countries. Third, Belarus has a political and economic system, which cannot be integrated into the European system, as they are distinguished from EU in the view of not only economic management, but also with respect to the role of state and government in society.
Considering these factors, it is much more possible for the Belarusian government to simply maintain a balance between pro-Russian and pro-European policies. The foreign policy of Belarus will be aimed primarily at expanding the level of FDI. To attract foreign capital, the government will seek to maximize several advantages of Belarus including geographical position, presence of free trade areas with Russia and Kazakhstan, cheap energy, well-developed infrastructure and skilled and cheap labor. Also, Belarus will try to expand its external relations to other countries, such as Latin America. Thus, from the viewpoint of foreign investors, it would be wise policy to keep an eye on Belarus’s subsequent external policies towards both EU and Russia.

There is increasing interest and investment on the 'new and renewable energy' technology as current government announced 'green growth' as major economic paradigm. While profile and promotion policy of developed countries such as EU, U.S.A. and Japan are known generally, those of South East Asian countries adjacent to our country are not known well. In this context, this study investigated economic profile, demand and supply of energy, development status and promotion policy and planning of new and renewable energy technology of five major South East Asian countries including Indonesia, Philiphine, Malyasia, Vietnam, and Thailand.
Based on the above primary study, the purpose of this study is to derive possible ways for improving reciprocal benefits in terms of mitigation of green house gases. Besides, we studied on current status of international cooperation projects relative to new and renewable energy between Korea and South East Asian countries and Korean government's supportive policies on oversea's resource development law and mitigation policy on tariff with regard to new and renewable energy.
First of all, transfer of integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) technology, hydrological power generation technology, biomass and biogas, biodiesel power generation and refinary technology, heat pump technology, and provision of feedstock for bioenergy are selected as major potential cooperation fields. It is expected to increase rate of return of the projects if they are connected with CDM program. Next, we suggest utilization of pre-existing international cooperation programs such as R&D cooperation projects of international energy agency, APEC new and renewable energy cooperation projects, and new and renewable energy forum of ASEAN+3.
Finally, as potential government supportive policies in the sense of cooperation with South East Asian countries, overseas resource development policy and tariff mitigation policy should be modified in order to boost overseas plantation of bioenergy and accommodate imports of feedstock for bioenergy.

Due to the global financial crisis, the role of developing countries has risen on the international stage. Therefore, the importance of cooperation with ASEAN - the major trading partner of Korea - is growing more and more. Especially, Vietnam and Indonesia are the major concerns among ASEAN countries because both have successfully overcome the global financial crisis and maintain the stable economic growth. Moreover, both are one of top countries in ASEAN in terms of an inflow of foreign capital. Notable is the fact that Vietnam and Indonesia have much interest about the industrialization in Korea. Also, they recognize that the major driving force of miraculous economic growth in Korea is the accumulation of human capital. Accordingly, they try to figure out the status of their human resource and develop it. The quantity and quality of human resource in Vietnam and Indonesia also matters for Korean firms and government considering them as candidates for the global production network.
Because of the interest in labor market of Vietnam and Indonesia, a lot of researches have done, especially in Japan. Representative ones are ｢アジア企業の人材開発｣ (副谷正信, 2008), ｢アジア 諸国における 労働力の 国外送りだしに関する 調査研究｣ (野村総合研究所, 2009), ｢ベトナム人材力調査報告｣(JETRO 2009). These researches mainly focus on the status of the labor markets, labor policies, and potentials of the labor market in South-East Asia. However, previous researches just end up with simple and plain approach, or depend on subjective data like surveys. Therefore, this research covers the information of labor supplies in Vietnam and Indonesia by profession as well as by population and region, and use various sources like objective data, interviews, and surveys.
Implications of the analysis of labor markets in Vietnam and Indonesia is related to global production network in Asia. In the international production division with China as the center, both countries will complement or partially replace China in terms of production. The key factor to construct the flexible and horizontal structure of the production division is human capital. In this context, this research analyze the status of the labor markets in Vietnam and Indonesia in various perspectives and evaluate them. The conditions in the labor markets is fairly positive. Both have cheap labors and young populations, and moreover, there is virtually no cultural and institutional obstacles. In Vietnam, labors are diligent and enthusiastic to learn new skills. The government also tries to enhance education and labor productivity. Indonesia has the large pool of stable labor force. Despite of complex regulations, low fluctuation is one of strongest advantages. Due to the skyrocketing wage compared with productivity, however, these positive circumstances might not go long. Policy measures for this problem is described below.
First, firms and government should find causes of rising wage and control them. Thoughtless wage increase to scout labors by firms plays a role to boost up wage. Therefore, firms should make commitment not to increase wage if not needed, and not to deprive labors of other firms without proper reason. Also, government should provide firms with the information of the labor markets so that they can be more flexible. Second, firms and government should find the way to increase the labor productivity in a long run for Vietnam and Indonesia not to lose their competitiveness. Firms can internally train workers for a long time, or financially support educational institutions. Korean government can support the policies of local governments for improving productivity. Or Korean government can provide local workers the chance to get a job in Korean labor market to improve their abilities. Third, stabilizing labor-management relations is needed. Especially in Indonesia, occasional strikes hinder foreign investment from times to time. These kinds of labor-management conflicts usually result from cultural differences, not from wage or welfare. Therefore, managers should understand their culture and maximize effective communication. Forth, Korean government can give advice for both countries on policies for industrialization and human capital based on its experience. It is difficult for them to change the industrial structure and to develop human capital by themselves. This kind of advice and cooperation can be beneficial for all in terms of promoting social and economical interaction. Fifth, we should change the way we understand Vietnam and Indonesia. We should not regard Vietnam and Indonesia as poor developing countries any more. There is a very little chance that Vietnam and Indonesia will stay in the low-quality production bases for decades. Therefore, we have to construct the more flexible global production network, which is not vertical network based on technological differences. Accordingly, firms should diversify their investment and expand to high value-added field. Moreover, we have to prepare to sell goods in their domestic market. Finally, we should consider them as future economic partners with high level of income and technology.

Thanks to the sweeping popularity of Korean pop culture around the world, known as Hallyu, or the Korean Wave, South Korea’s image overseas has changed significantly in recent years. Yet, a systematic, long-term research on this trend hasn’t been conducted thus far. Here we are going to examine potential ways to further promote South Korea’s image perceived by the Vietnamese media, based on Korea-related articles in Vietnamese daily Nhan Dan and a survey of local people.
In Vietnam, terrestrial, digital and satellite broadcasting as well as cable TV and radio broadcasting are available, with the number of international broadcasting channels on the rise. The media serves simply as a propaganda tool in Vietnam, since its key role is to promote the communist party and the government.
An analysis of Korea-related stories carried by Nhan Dan shows that the most frequently reported topic about South Korea comprised the relations between South Korea and Vietnam, while the Vietnam News Agency was the main source of those stories.
Economy-related photos topped the list in the number of pictures, and the Vietnam News Agency and Vietnamese photo journalists were the main providers of those photos.
As for news stories, there were many more reports that simply narrate particular incidents than in-depth, analytic articles dedicated to the backdrop, history and the social structure to explain incidents.
100 questionnaires were distributed to Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh and Ben Tre each, and the respondents were divided by ages, genders, jobs and hometowns. (About 68 percent of the questionnaires were collected in the end.) Those in their 20s made up the largest proportion of the respondents at 36 percent, women at 55 percent, teachers at 30 percent and those from urban cities at 86 percent.
In regards to South Korea’s image, 84.7 percent of the respondents replied that they had a positive image of South Korea. Asked if there was any shift in the image of South Korea, the largest proportion of 17 percent, except those who refused to answer (55 percent), said that they had no interest in South Korea at first but developed a good image gradually. The biggest factor influencing the creation of a positive image of South Korea was Korean dramas, followed by Korean movies and entertainers.
Based on these findings, we suggest that South Korea’s image be promoted both at the governmental and private level. First, the government needs to enhance cooperation and support aimed at providing the Vietnamese media with more accurate news stories about South Korea, expand the Vietnamese-language broadcasting program airing from Korea, show more interest in the correct use of the Korean language, and support the efforts toward more diversified and consistent broadcasting for Vietnamese people residing in Korea. It is also necessary to nurture and sponsor experts who will work at diplomatic offices in foreign countries and those specialized in multiculturalism-related issues as well as Korean-matters professionals in Vietnam. Lastly, the government needs to increase its economic assistance and exchanges of volunteer activities between the two countries.
At the private level, it is necessary to encourage and support not only exchanges of cultural products but also those of culture-related personnel and technologies. South Korean companies doing business in Vietnam should make greater contribution to Vietnamese society to improve Korea’s image in the area of private-level economic exchanges. Korean expatriates in Vietnam, for their part, should make as much effort as Korean companies there to contribute to promoting Korea’s image, bearing in mind that each and every of them is a diplomatic envoy representing his or her home country. And last but not least, it is necessary to support Vietnamese people living in South Korea through cultural and media programs so that Korea’s national image can get a big boost.

 

This book explores how national museums and monuments in Southeast Asia have constructed national identities. The book identifies the museums and monuments as cultural and political texts that have been used for certain purposes throughout history. At first colonial regimes made use of museums as means to construct the colonial territories and impose colonial identities on the governed peoples and also to promote themselves as benevolent preservers of the heritages of the colonies. Later, the modern nation-states inherited the colonial museum practices and have employed museums to realize and embody imagined communities.
The book comprising six case studies in major Southeast Asian countries is an outcome of interdisciplinary research that involves historians, anthropologists, and political scientists who shared their research methods and theoretical viewpoints developed in each discipline.
The first case study is concerned with Singapore. The Singaporean government established the Merlion, a half-lion and half-mermaid figure, as its national symbol along with various museums. The Merlion, an "invented" national symbol, came into being in reflection of explicit political intention. When the notion of "nation" was alien in newly independent Singapore, the government paid a close attention to create its own history in an attempt to mould various ethnic groups into the "Singaporeans." Through the displays of historical and cultural objects in the museums, the government intended to invent a "long" history of Singapore, as if it had enjoyed some hundred years of "collective" history. The museums in Singapore have been employed to plant such an image that Singapore is an old country. Exposed to the imagination, the Singaporeans are expected by the government to have a collective identity as Singaporeans.
The second case deals with the National Museum of Cambodia. This museum, established in 1920 when Cambodia was a French Protectorate, inherited both harms and benefits from colonial modernism. This legacy continues even today. Given that tourism is the most important income source for Cambodia, cultural policies concerning historical monuments are directly translated into national identity. It means that the Cambodian government's commercial promotion of the country as a legitimate heir of Khmer civilization is deeply associated with the projection of national identity. Thus, Cambodia identifies its national identity with Khmer identity, both identities not being separable. Indeed, this Khmer identity was a product of colonial scholarship. Later, the Khmernization of Cambodian identity was once again emphasized and strengthened under the Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1979). The current government also attempts to project the equation of the "Cambodian national identity = Khmer identity = Angkor civilization" and employ it as a political and diplomatic tool to build up national identity and increase international attraction.
The third case engages in the National Museum of Indonesia. Unlike other museums in Southeast Asia, this museum represents the colonial discourse in its display. Established as a colonial museum, this museum still sustains colonial views on the indigenous society. The republic utilized the images constructed by the colonial force to identify its newly-defined national territory. However, in transferring the colonial museum to the modern one, the Indonesian republic failed to decolonize the museum display patterns. For instance, while the display emphasizes the Hindu-Buddha period, there are few displays regarding the Islamic period, when the archipelago experienced another internal development. In addition, another main emphasis of the display is focused on the "colonial era," which was defined in the museum display as a period spanning from the 17th to the early 20th century. This time depiction is erroneous as the real colonial period just started after the 19th century. What draws our attention is that the items categorized as artifacts of the colonial period include European-made scientific objects and furniture. This exhibition pattern gives the visitors an impression that during the period the scientific Europe was the only figure and in contrast indigenous initiatives remained absent. In sum, the museum display accounts for the archipelagic history with a few points: first, the archipelago once had a high civilization in the ancient Hindu-Buddha period; second, the archipelago lost its dynamics and inner energies to develop society afterward; and third, the loss of inner dynamics inevitably invited European colonial control equipped with scientific knowledge and technology. The failure of decolonization of museums was attributed to the lack of financial support and the inability and mismanagement of the Indonesian government and people in running the museum. It tells us that not every museum or monument project aiming to construct national identities resulted in success.
The fourth case explores the Bangkok National Museum in Thailand. The case focuses on how the museum intensifies three pillars of Thai national identity, namely "monarchy", "Buddhism," and "nation." The display of historical artifacts legitimizes the formation of Thai national identity. The salience of the monarchy-related artifacts comes from the historical fact that the monarchy was deeply involved in the initiation of the museum. It is also prominent that the Bangkok National Museum displays a number of Buddhism-related artifacts. It shows how Buddhism has been intimately associated with Thai national identity under the sponsorship of the monarchy: Buddhism was declared as the state religion during the reign of Rama V. However, the form of national identity relying on Buddhism contradicts religious reality in Thailand. Indeed, Brahmanism has been accommodated in various royal ceremonies throughout history. Furthermore, Buddhism has become syncretic, influenced by Brahmanism and animism. Despite the fact, the museum emphasizes only Buddhism, dismissing other religions such as Islam and Christianity both of which take some portions in southern Thailand and among hill tribes respectively. Above all, the museum heavily focuses on ethnic Thai cultural artifacts, paying little attention to other ethnic groups' ones. The history of Thailand in the museum is evidently equal to the history of the ethnic Thais; in contrast, the histories and cultures of other ethnic groups are not represented at all. The Bangkok National Museum displaying only the three pillars' related artifacts is limited in representing the whole reality of Thailand. The problem with Thai national identity in representation is clearly evident in the museum.
The fifth case deals with the Vietnam Museum of Ethnology (VME). This museum exhibits cultural artifacts of 54 ethnic groups in Vietnam, which were officially categorized by the government. During the post-1954 period, Vietnam launched socialist reform, declaring the elimination of feudal practices and colonial influences and the rehabilitation of Vietnamese tradition. In addition, the accommodation of various ethnic groups was another important task for the government. For the purpose, the government launched various programs including the establishment of the VME to intensify national identity and harmonious relations among ethnic groups. The VME's priority is to represent the cultures of the 54 ethnic groups in their "original" forms to the public. It is also targeted to meet the need to attract foreign tourists by promoting the Vietnamese tradition of harmony and co-existence. However, the VME reflects certain dilemmas in its exhibition. First, the government faces an unsettling task to emphasize uniformed national identity among the ethnic groups and demonstrate the variety of numerous ethnic cultures at the same time. Second, while the museum emerges as an important tourist destination, the government needs to maintain a socialist stance in the management of the museum. The solution to these dilemmas is to describe the ethnic cultures as their "original" forms, without reflecting their dynamics or changes over time.
The last case investigates the Ho Chi Minh Museum in Vietnam. This museum, with a particular focus on the life of Ho Chi Minh, represents a series of historical processes that Vietnam has experienced, including independence and unification. The project of venerating Ho Chi Minh as the father of nation is initiated not only as a credential to his dedication to nation but also as a tool to gain the legitimacy of the Communist Party's rule. Emphasis on Ho Chi Minh is closely associated with the fact that the legitimacy of the current regime has been weak as economic reform has been intensified. In response to the situation, "Ho Chi Minh Philosophy" officially emerged in the early 1990s and it has been employed as a legitimate ideology since then. Various objects showing the life of Ho Chi Minh particularly emphasize how Ho Chi Minh became the symbol of unification of the North and South of Vietnam. In addition to the sections introducing the life and revolutionary projects of Ho Chi Minh, the museum installed two sections displaying Ho Chi Minh's affection for the southerners and in turn southerners' affection for Ho Chi Minh. Although this museum appears to exhibit a life of one man, indeed it displays the history of Vietnam since Ho Chi Minh is the personification of national destiny and history.
We make sense of some overarching issues through the cases explored in this book. First, there remains a gap between the displays and actual histories. The Southeast Asian nation-states' attempts to make use of the museums to create nationalistic narratives often result in widening the gap between them. Second, the discourse of colonial modernism is still evident in present-day Southeast Asia. The museums in Southeast Asia directly or indirectly inherited colonial legacy. Third, the degree to which the building up of national identities through museum-monument projects is successful is dependent on the governments' ability to recognize museums as useful political texts and exploit them for the purpose of nation-building.
This book will enhance the understanding of Southeast Asia and thus increase mutual relations between Korea and Southeast Asia. The book also provides a foundation for future studies that would engage in the issues of decolonization in museums and cultural policies in Southeast Asia. 

Continuous economic crisis have deepened resource nationalism, and natural resources have been transformed from simple trade goods to state-of-art strategic weapon in recent decades. Since Latin America is one of the biggest market and raw material supplier, most industrialized countries are looking for the concrete collaboration with Latin America.
However, Korea’s bargaining power is not strong enough to ensure the solid partnership with Latin America. Japan and US traditionally have the strongest leverage in this region and China is emerging rapidly through financial power based on economic growth.
This research project has mainly focused into energy and sustainability. Because of dramatically increased public’s awareness on environmental problem and sustainability, Latin American governments have limited political power to exploit its natural resource without serious consideration on environment. As time passes, environment protectionists are acquiring bigger political influence in local politics.  Latin American governments and foreign investors should face uncountable difficulties, if their natural resource development lacks serious consideration on environment. We show the current status of Latin American natural resource and environments and reveal the increasing importance of sustainability of development in this region. Through such approach, we provide the chance of deeper and wider understanding on this region's natural resources and environmental problems to policy makers as well as private companies.
The first half deals with the issues related with petroleum industry in the world, bio ethanol in Brazil, natural gas industry in Venezuela, as well as thorough overview on the status of natural resource of Latin America. The second half deals with forest development and environmental problem in Mexico, Amazon development, coffee industry, eco tourism as well as the overview on the development strategy of Latin America. The former mainly disputes about natural resource and energy while the latter provides analysis on environment and sustainability problems in this region.

In this study, it focuses on the social and cultural codes and its successful case, consumption pattrns of Telenovela which popular sentiment is best reflected in the television series in Latin America regarding the broadcasting and video industry as the heart of the cultural industry.
Telenovela is the drama genre and has become popular culture, regardless of the age and sex, to be enjoyed in the current Latin America about 20 million viewers as well as around the world. Both home and abroad, the industry is growing due to international co-productions and to channel secure with theme and narrative configuration capabilities, through the foreign direct investment. Therefore, for the effective spread and settlement of the Korean Wave, first and foremost an in-depth research is indispensable.
Regarding to Telenovela in Latin America, there are already some valuable researches in Korea, but most of them are introduced an overview of that in fact. In this study, unlike previous studies, the successful factors of Telenovela will be defined by social and cultural context. This study will be able to understand social, cultural and historical characteristics of Latin America further the emotion of local people and their experiences. It will be provided reference points and the implications to establish export strategy of Korean broadcasting and film industry represented by the Korean Wave, in Latin America, ultimately.
In this study, it is focused on Mexico and Brazil in Latin American countries. With the U.S. both countries are market leaders as well as major producers and consumers of Telenovela in the world. Especially Televisa and TV Azteca in Mexico, Brazil's TV Globo and SBT are regarded as representing broadcasting organizations. In addition, Mexico and Brazil, as belonging to a culture of Hispanic America and Portuguese-speaking America each, geographical and cultural diversity can be considered respectively. They are best examples of representing different typical Latin American Telenovela genre. Moreover, to visit the survey site in an impossible situation that is relatively easy to secure data points of the study area, such as it is considered that reason has.
Meanwhile, it is limited to analyse Telenovela production, which aired since the 1990s until recently. The study set by since the 1990s, the data acquisition is relatively easy including timely background like the transition of the global paradigm, which is the end of the Cold War and neoliberal launched in Latin America. Thanks to the development of the relevant media and technology, Telenovela was developed to the spread point full-fledged pop culture industry in Latin America.
This study assess the audience's interpretation of the messages imparted by Telenovela through a reception analysis for tracing successful factors and consumption patterns of political and social situation of the country under the relationship between the area's cultural and emotional factors considering the implications. Through this survey, by predicting in future political, social and cultural trends and spending patterns of consumers of Telenovela in Latin America, it is possible to examine the merits of Korean TV drama and to propose for the future effective policy measures.
The main contents of this study can be divided into five parts as follows.

󰋫 The Purpose of the Study
It is supposed to suggest implication of the effective strategies of next 'Korean Wave' for Latin American market by evaluating through essential code of the social and cultural and consumption patterns of Telenovela which is admitted as a representative successful case in Latin America.

󰋫 Theoretical Background
Including theoretical discussions of cultural exchanges between countries with respect to content, with view of media, political economy theory and traditional cultural imperialism and active consumerism, microeconomic models with vision of the media-economics and the centrists to the point of view of the third alternative and so on. Based on this, to discuss the concrete process how cultural contact and acculturation appear after examining through the "cultural discount effect" and "sweet potato runners" and then broadcasting film aspects from the perspective of cultural studies are properly consulted mainly.

󰋫 Overview of the Telenovela Broadcasting Video Market and Industry in Mexico and Brazil
It is mentioned the status of the television broadcasting industry which is divided into terrestrial and pay-TV market in Mexico and Brazil. It is recognised the gravity and the significance of Telenovela industry throughout investigating their growth process of Televisa, TV Azteca in Mexico and TV Globo and SBT in Brazil, in which are in charge of production, consumption and the initiative export. In addition, it is introduced the origin and content, formal characteristics and content competitiveness of Telenovela.

󰋫 Analysis of Successful Case of Telenovela with Social Political Code
In this chapter, it is analysed by applying a comprehensive analysis of Mexican and Brazilian Telenovela that reflected in the social and cultural codes and successful case, Telenovela consumption patterns on consumers. By analysing in various aspects as women, drama, religion, history, social issues, education, and politics, etc. it is traced on the other hand Telenovela consumption patterns and the paradigm shift, further the policy implications  for Korean Wave spread in Latin America to be utilized as basic data.

󰋫 Suggestion and Policy Implications
In this chapter, it is analysed and evaluated previous articles related to strategy and policy around broadcasting video contents for the spread of the Korean Wave and then is suggested alternative for Korean Wave spread and settlement in Latin America.

This report is presented with primarily social and cultural point of view, consisted of two parts largely related to the production of the drama and the policy.
Production-related policies are presented "making storytelling style reflected the narrative structure of Telenovela and the co-operation script with local writers", "settlement ongoing monitoring systems for local viewers in Latin America", "rediscovering effort for dramas which was not popular in Korea", "co-production of Latin American market-oriented Drama", "co-translation including Latin American culture experts".
In terms of political "the formation of industrial, academic, council affiliated organization for the spread and settlement of Korean Wave", "providing broadcasting contents diversion to free of charge" are presented.

 
Aging of the population, development of advanced yet expensive medical technology and growing income inequality in Korea present tough challenges to its current health care system. Korea is certainly not alone in the pursuit of solutions to such challenges. Developed countries including the US and the Britain have already implemented different measures to reform their health care system while Latin America has been introducing various reforms to its health care. Health care reform efforts of developed countries such as the US, Japan, Britain and Germany have already been analyzed by and presented to Korean academic community.
However, researches on health care reform in Korea, which is extensively focused on cases of developed countries, turned out to have several limitations. Considering the complex nature of Korean health care system, it is crucial to look into cases from developing countries where health care has developed as a tool to induce rapid industrialization rather than a way of expanding citizenship rights. Therefore, just by looking into health care systems in developed countries would not be enough to fully understand possible reform measures for Korean system.
In that sense, Latin American cases offer valuable lessons. Both Korea and Latin America need to reduce health care expenditure without sacrificing its quality of care. Latin American countries have attempted health care reforms introducing measures such as privatization, decentralization, community participation and targeting. One interesting aspect of Latin American cases is that it tends to address the whole health care system rather than just focusing on health insurance. By shedding lights on reform measures tried by Latin American countries, we could obtain an opportunity to overcome simplistic understanding of health care reform which equates health care reform with health insurance reform.
This research aims at introducing Latin American health care reforms, especially reforms in Chile, Mexico and Argentina, to Korea academic community in order to broaden health care reform researches in Korea. Furthermore, this study hopes to contribute to diversify Korean Latin American Studies which have not paid much attention to policy analysis especially of health care.
This research consists of 6 chapters. The second chapter overviews health system and discourses regarding its reform in Latin America. It pays special attention to policy recommendations from international financial institutions such as World Bank, IDB and IMF. From the chapter 3 to the chapter 5, this paper analyzes three cases of Latin American health care reforms; Chile, Mexico and Argentina. Each chapter overviews health system in each country and analyzes process and effects of health care reforms. In the last chapter, this study sheds lights on some lessons from Latin American health care reforms to Korea.
Latin America achieved significant improvement in health since the World War II. From 1960s to 1990s, the average life expectancy of Latin America increased from 54 to 70 while its infant mortality dropped during the same period from 161 out of 100,000 live births to 60. However, the important improvement in health does not necessarily mean diminution of health inequality in the region. The health inequality based on race, gender, class and region still persists or gets worsen. For example, indigenous groups in Latin America tend to experience lower life expectancy and higher infant mortality.

This research paper seeks to understand the nuclear policies and trends of the MBA (Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina) in the nuclear renaissance era and discuss how Korea’s nuclear energy policies should change to make inroads in the MBA region. By looking into the history of MBA’s nuclear energy policy and status quo of their nuclear energy industry in depth, it is possible to see the changes made in the nuclear energy industry accordingly to national policy changes. Policy variables that are needed for Korea to enter the nuclear energy market of MBA, such as technological self–reliance, financial investment resources, institutional perspectives of nuclear energy laws and institutions, fuel cycle, the degree of international cooperation, have been analyzed. For future cooperation among MBA and Korea in the nuclear energy sector, SWOT analysis was used to identify the possibilities of policy approaches and broaden our understanding of the matter.
The first chapter, the introduction part of this paper, examines the start and development for the nuclear energy industry in MBA, identifies the reasons why these three Latin American countries are significant to Korea and the possibilities for nuclear energy cooperation. In particular, how Korea should act to the recent energy policies of MBA, which is planning on diversification of its energy source and efficient management of its energy industry, is one of the critical issues. Various guidelines were set for efficient research analysis via the research’s content, scope, and method of research. Collecting and monitoring the basic data on nuclear energy industry and existing documents and papers published by think tanks and professional organizations helped increasing the accuracy of this research paper. The second chapter categorizes the history, status quo, and degree of international collaboration of the nuclear energy industry into periods. The three countries’ technological independence, financial investment, institutional characters, policy formulation, decision–making, internal and external policy conflicts, and actual policy changing process have been thoroughly dealt with.
Initiated in 1955, Mexico set forth an industry policy with unprecedented technological complexity and extremely difficult problems. The fact that in took almost 2o years to make the program for activating the Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Station as policy shows the nature of the problem. Mexico’s nuclear energy policy can be divided into 4 periods: initial nuclear energy policy formulating and agenda selection period (1955～1972); the Echeverria and Portillo administration’s nuclear energy industry implementation period (1972～1982); the de La Madrid administration’s policy crisis and commercial nuclear energy operation period (1983～1990); and up to the present is defined as nuclear energy management and new agenda selection period. The actual realization of Mexico’s nuclear industry started in the 1970s. In that period, nuclear energy rose as an alternative energy source due to the rise in international oil prices and the increase in domestic energy consumption, which meant more imports of oil. This naturally turned the spotlight to nuclear energy.
Mexico’s nuclear energy industry experienced a totally different development process compared to Argentina and Brazil. In the case of Brazil and Argentina, after World War II, the two countries developed its nuclear energy technology possessing abundant human resources (scientists and engineers) and receiving foreign aid. They put more weight on military purposes. Meanwhile, Mexico chose to rely on and adopt foreign technology (mostly from the United States). Mexico also had no chose but to focus on commercial and peaceful use of nuclear energy because it was the leading nation of the 1967 Tlateloco Treaty which aimed to prevent nuclear proliferation.
In 1967, the early part of the first period, Mexico’s Comisión Federal de Electricidad(CFE) commenced joint cooperation with the Stanford Research Institute(SRI) bearing in mind the possibility of constructing commercial nuclear energy facilities. However, the policy making process encountered obstacles from the beginning. Scientists (especially those of The National Nuclear Energy Commission, Portuguese: Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear; CNEN) argued for investment in basic science before building nuclear power plants while the CFE’s strategy concentrated on quickly acquiring the know–how of nuclear power technology by importing a power plant from abroad. Such strategy of the CFE hindered the progress in Mexico’s nuclear power development profoundly. The turnkey–based construction of the nuclear power plant did not bring much benefit. Not only did Mexico fail to gain technological self–reliance, it also failed to become financially independent. In 1970 Mexico’s first nuclear power plant was funded by the World Bank, the export–import banks of the United States and Japan, and other sources of foreign capital. Moreover, internal and external conflicts blocked the way of Mexico’s nuclear power policy aiming for energy diversification, comparative advantage, transference of technology, and elevation of its international status. The Mexican government’s policy brought limitations of its national freedom. Nuclear energy development was delayed because of public opinion and internal conflicts of nuclear power agencies even in the 1980s. Although the official objective was consistently to obtain technological independence, Mexico still remained reliant on foreign technology even after Laguna Verde became operational. The situation was the same even in the 1990s. In addition, Mexico’s vision to become a technologically developed nation or a nuclear power nation only created disputes within the country and did not lead to progress. Laguna Verde became a lesson that shows how difficult it is for developing countries to earn technological self–reliance in nuclear energy. Indeed, there were many external factors that made Mexico to constantly depend on foreign technology and investment. Examples of these factors would be the Chernobyl incident, instability of the international oil market, Mexico’s susceptibility to foreign financial market, public opinion, problems of the policies carried out by the Mexican government, and other structural factors that fundamentally did not allow self–reliance for Mexico in any aspect. Furthermore, the six–year term of each administration made Laguna Verde’s policies inconsistent.
Mexico’s nuclear power policy can be summarized as the following. The weakness of its nuclear policy is defined by Mexico’s lack of freedom, technology, infrastructure, connection between oil and nuclear power programs, and political and executive consistency. Then what should developing countries like Mexico do in order to develop nuclear power which can contribute to development and growth? Mexico’s lesson is simple. Such socially, politically, and economically sensitive industry should be coped with solutions for overcoming diverse internal and external structural limitations and obtaining technological independence, which would require international cooperation.
Brazil’s nuclear policy differed among administrations. Nuclear energy policy began in earnest during the military regime period (1964～1985). The military government saw nuclear power as both a means of national security and economic development. So Brazil’s ministry of science and technology invested heavily nuclear energy for technological self–reliance. However the first turnkey–constructed nuclear power plant Angra 1 by Westinghouse of the United States and Angra 2 by KWV of Germany did not bring satisfactory results.
Since then the Geisel administration implemented the so–called nuclear parallel plan, developing uranium enrichment technology on one hand and a nuclear submarine on the other. All major energy policies including the government led oil development plan, construction of the Itaipu power plant, alcohol fuel development policy, and the nuclear energy program, passed congress. In 1984, Brazil succeeded in uranium enrichment by using ultra high speed centrifuge.
The Sarney administration (1985～1990), the first civilian government after three military regimes, included the secretly carried out nuclear development program to the national energy policy and strived to regain international trust by ensuring the world Brazil’s commitment to peaceful use of nuclear energy via adding amending its federal constitution. Brazil announced the initial completion of its nuclear fuel cycle in 1987.
However, Brazil’s nuclear policy was halted for a decade during the Collor (1990～1992) and Cardoso administration (1993～2002). The nuclear policy regained momentum during the Lula administration (2003～2010), which adopted the viewpoint of past military regimes. As a result in October 2003, Brazil successfully enriched uranium and expected to commercialize it within 10 years. The IAEA classified Brazil as a country capable of enriching uranium up to 20%. The upcoming Rousseff administration has already proclaimed its stance on continuing efforts to develop nuclear energy as the main energy supply source.
The reason why President Lula focused on nuclear energy is that constructing a nuclear power plant has become more economically efficient than building a hydroelectric plant. In addition Brazil plans on becoming a major supplier in the uranium enrichment market and is determined to acquire the core technology to be recognized as a self–reliant state by the international community (with only 1/3 of Brazil explored, Brazil has the world’s sixth most uranium deposits and is expected to become no. 2).
The Brazilian government aims to build an additional four nuclear power plants until 2030. Brazil is currently cooperating with Argentina in jointly constructing a nuclear reactor which would be standardized for Latin America. Therefore, human resource training and technology transference may be a significant variable in entering Brazil’s nuclear power market.
Meanwhile the federal constitution forbids private investment in nuclear energy. President Lula and President–elect Rousseff believe that the government should operate key industries. Although already privatized industries would not be nationalized again, federal energy corporations such as Petrobras or Electrobras are not likely to be privatized. Instead, creative ways for attracting domestic and foreign investment should be considered in order to lay inroads in Brazil’s nuclear power market.
Brazil is interested in the relation between Korea’s industries and government. Accomplishments in basic science are commercialized by industries which are backed by government policies. Such relation drew the attention of the Lula administration which perceived scientific innovation the source of economic growth. The succeeding administration will share the same interest. Ways to integrate Korea’s production technology and knowledge on nuclear power facilities and reactor producing technology with Brazil’s uranium development and nuclear fuel cycle technology must be studied. Moreover, we should consider policies to expand science technology cooperation between Brazil’s biotechnology, oil exploration technology, aviation manufacturing, and satellite launching technology and Korea’s IT, shipbuilding technology, and high speed railroad technology.
Argentina is rich in oil, natural gas, and water resources. Although it is capable of becoming energy self–reliant, Argentina is suffering from energy shortage due to decrease in natural gas supply and increase in electricity consumption to 9%. Argentina is considering ways to secure the energy it needs for economic growth by developing nuclear energy. Nuclear power’s advantages of stable energy supply, easy procurement of raw materials, economic efficiency, and preventing global warming are positively viewed in Argentina.
Argentina realized the economic significance of uranium already in the 1940s and carried out uranium exploration and development projects and in the 1950s initiated nuclear power generation. Argentina’s nuclear energy policy can be divided in to three periods. The first period is from 1950 to 1982 when nationalism and independence was at the core of the nation’s policies. It refused to accept the international community’s efforts for comprehensive nuclear safety measures because they limited Argentina’s national freedom. Consequently the world grew suspicious about Argentina’s nuclear program. In this period Argentina established the infrastructure for nuclear energy and succeeded in domestically producing nuclear power related technologies. The second period, 1983 to 2000, was when Argentina gave up its nuclear power development policy. Pressured by economic depression and international nuclear power accidents, Argentina scrapped its nuclear policy and joined in the Tlatelolco treaty (1994) and the NPT (1995). The last period, from 2001 to the present, is the period in which the nuclear policy regained spotlight. Influenced by the nuclear renaissance era and the desperate need for energy supply led to expansion in investment towards nuclear power
In the short term Argentina’s nuclear power policy will focus on maintaining the existing nuclear power plants. In the long term Argentina acknowledges nuclear energy as the alternative energy of the future which is why it tries to meet the international standard on greenhouse gas emissions and energy diversification despite is economic and financial problems. Even though the younger generation of the society is stirring public opinion against nuclear energy due to safety and environmental issues, the public is quite cooperative to nuclear energy policies since it has traditionally been a part of its national policy.
Argentina’s nuclear power industry was led by the government affiliated CNEA which possesses both horizontal and vertical autonomy. The CNEA enjoys freedom from authority and bureaucracy in policy decisions and has contributed to independent nuclear energy development. The CNEA carried out a consistent nuclear policy for 40 years. However in the 1990s when Argentina abandoned its nuclear policy, the CNEA’s role diminished and was divided into three bodies.
One of the key characteristics of Argentina’s nuclear energy development process is that the government induced active participation of domestic industries. Argentina has always required the participation for domestic companies in the construction of nuclear power plants and transference of technology upon signing a contract, which allowed Argentina to achieve comprehensive development.
Argentina today has two operational power plants, one under construction, six research reactors, four particle accelerators, three nuclear energy research centers, one heavy water factory, two research facilities, one uranium refining factory, and numerous nuclear medicine schools and radioimmunoassay centers. Argentina’s research reactors are considered to be the best in the world. The CNEA is entitled with full authority to own and operate the reactors. All nuclear reactors in Argentina are pressurized heavy water reactors and use natural uranium as raw material and heavy water as moderator. The next nuclear power plant will also share these traits. The three power plants each had 30%, 50%, 70% participation of Argentinean companies which was a great opportunity for domestic companies to gain experience and contributed to the localization of technology.
Based on its accumulated technology and experience, Argentina has become the key player in the fourth generation nuclear reactor market. Argentina’s very own CAREM nuclear reactor is a highly stable and economic all–in–one reactor which is a strong competitor of Korea’s SMART reactor. Argentina is planning on becoming the world’s 10th exporter of nuclear reactors. Completing nuclear fuel cycle is crucial to gaining freedom in the nuclear energy industry and energy self–reliance. Considerable economic benefits also follow. Having a  Clear objective of becoming self–reliant and investing and aiding the industry accordingly has made Argentina a key supplier in the international nuclear energy market. Argentina has cooperative relations with regional countries, Libya, Algeria, Iran, Egypt, Australia, the Netherlands, Jordan, and Korea. Recently the Argentinean government is subsidizing the nuclear industry to create more professional jobs.
Argentina is already an influential supplier and is actively implementing nuclear energy policies despite the 20–30 years when the world turned its back against nuclear energy. Therefore Korea’s strategy towards Argentina should be different from newly rising nuclear energy markets. Although Argentina falls behind in reactor management, Argentina possesses the experience, knowledge and human resources contending that of Korea. For mutual gains, a strategic affiliation would be a win–win strategy for the two countries.
The third chapter of this research paper introduces the key subject, policy directions for Korea’s nuclear energy industry. To draw up specific policies, specifics of Korea’s capabilities and MBA’s policies should be analyzed. National power may make or break nuclear energy exports which are why political will and diplomatic capability cover a huge portion in this part. First, Korea’s current export status and the Korean government’s ambitious ‘Nuclear Energy Export Industrialization Strategy’ are examined to find problems in Korea’s competitiveness in exports. Next, a SWOT analysis based on the results of chapter 2 will show what Korea must consider in exporting to MBA.
A comparison analysis has been conducted between the strengths and weaknesses of the Korean nuclear power industry and the opportunities and threats exporting to MBA have; mainly the opportunities and threats in technology, finance, energy matrix, human resources, international politics, international economy, and structural aspects. In addition, an action plan of Korean industries’ export direction has been specified. Detailed strategies or policies for Korean nuclear energy industries include strengthening inroads into the Latin American market strategy, strengthening internal strategies for exports, fuel supply strategy, strengthening international competitiveness via image improvement strategy, financial strategy, joint cooperation in human resource training strategy, and strengthening nuclear energy diplomatic capability strategy. These are specific, core plans for devising a strategic policy.

 

 

This study aims to seek for Korean’s strategies and responses to expand in Myanmar, investigating on the internal and external policy of a new Myanmar government in 2011 and the changing possibilities of the major countries toward Myanmar. To do this, this study firstly analyzed the whole procedures and results of the general elections which were held on 7 November, 2010 after 20 years since 1990.
Secondly, it scrutinized views of the international society and response of the Burmese authorities. Then the Burmese economic reform achievement was surveyed focusing on privatization ahead for the general elections, and verified a diplomatic and economic exchange between Korea and Myanmar. Based on mentioned points, this paper finally aims to set up a new Korea's approach toward Myanmar.
This general elections were blamed in means of undemocratic, unfair, unfree and not inclusive for the people since approved the new constitution after the referendum in 2008. This claims were not changed when electoral situation had launched in March 2010.
Not only main political parties such as National League for Democracy (NLD) which is the winner in the 1990 general elections and Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD) did not register the political party to the Union Election Commission, but political prisoners including Aung San Suu Kyi and other 2,100 peoples cannot run for election candidate and vote for the parliament as well.
Therefore, the general elections could be estimated as being manipulated by the government authorities and as not a multi party democratic ones in terms of free and fair because the members of the Union Election Commission were filled with pro-government figures, electoral laws which were included the heavy prohibitions and regulations were severely undemocratic, and key incumbent members took part in the runs for elections as a party member of Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) which is pro-government political party came from Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA).
A new Myanmar government could be given legitimacy from the surrounding countries and some neutralized countries may seek for new approach to cooperate with Myanmar or make their own strategies to enlarge in Myanmar, though the result of the general elections were damaged internationally. Internally, a new government could clear military regime as has sustained by the military junta, but they would not keep their ruling strategies like depending on physical power and closed stance in the international society.
Even they would uphold a their ruling cause through economic development which could cause physical benefit and social welfare to the national peoples as doing away with the state owned economic structure, giving them more privatization of the state owned enterprises (SOEs).
In macro level, there is possibility that regime support countries and regime oppose countries sustain their original own policies toward Myanmar, but we have to see the changing possibilities of Myanmar's strategies. Some regime support countries would adopt more aggressive expanding strategies than present limited advances toward Myanmar, participating in excavation to energy sector and contesting regional hegemony in the Andaman Ocean and Bay of Bengal. However, It seems that Myanmar will seek rather multiple diplomatic approach than depending on the power countries what is a typical manner at present in order to enlarge her national interests through using geopolitical and geoeconomic values. On the way to do this, Myanmar wants to be a pivotal country keeping the balance of power in Southeast Asia.
For those reasons, it is time that Korea has to consider turing previous sideline approaches and needs to make a chance to preoccupy Myanmar which is to be an emerging market Myanmar. Furthermore, Korea could be an alternative power to check China and India, strengthening relation with ASEAN including Myanmar rather than to be an observer on the regional hegemony contest. It means that Korea can seek national interests with continuous overseas market expansion, improves external national images, makes advanced diplomacy which could create peaceful and harmonious regional orders as well as has a good chance to establish a status as a middle group country in Asia.