국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 배경 및 필요성
2. 연구의 방법 및 구성

제2장 미국의 세계전략과 한반도
1. 사상적 기반과 주요 논쟁
2. 트럼프 정부의 세계전략
3. 트럼프 정부의 지역전략 - 중국과의 전략적 경쟁
4. 트럼프 정부의 한반도 정책

제3장 중국 시진핑 정부의 세계전략과 한반도
1. 사상적 기반과 주요 논쟁
2. 시진핑 정부의 세계전략: 목표와 과제

제4장 러시아의 세계전략과 한반도
1. 사상적 기반과 주요 논쟁
2. 푸틴 정부의 세계전략: 목표와 과제
3. 푸틴 정부의 한반도 정책

제5장 결론

참고문헌

Executive Summary

   This study aims to analyze in depth grand strategies of the US, China, and Russia, and to draw implications for the realization of ‘New Korean Peninsula Regime.’
   The grand strategies of the US, China, and Russia are directly reflected in their policies on the Korean Peninsula. The Policy toward the Korean Peninsula of the Trump administration develops as follows. First, there are nuclear negotiations with North Korea. However, these negotiations remain deadlocked after Hanoi Summit because of differences between the White House and the Washington bureaucracy over the solutions for denuclearization. Second, there is the economic pressure on the Republic of Korea. Trump administration has criticized the allies for ‘Free-Riding’ on the US security commitments and demanded an increased share of defense expenses. And at the risk of damaging the alliance Trump also has put economic pressure on allies to solve its trade deficit, demanding revision of FTA and invoking the safeguard clauses. Third, there is a demand for strengthening the ROK-US alliance and switching allied strategy. Trump administration is pushing to strengthen the alliance to expand the Republic of Korea’s role in Indo-Pacific strategy. However, the US also reveals the intention to maintain military influence on the Korean Peninsula by expanding the role of UN Command even after the return of wartime operational control.
   There is no significant difference in policies of Xi Jinping administration toward the Korean peninsula from those of previous administrations. The basic principles that China invariably adheres to in the process of its policies toward Korean Peninsula are as follows: First, the stability and peace of the Korean Peninsula, Second, problem solving through dialogue and negotiations, Third, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Fourth, maintaining and expanding its influence on the Korean Peninsula using equidistant diplomacy and geopolitical means. Until now, Xi jinping administration has faced many complicated problems in relation to the Korean Peninsula. The biggest problem among them is the denuclearization of the korean Peninsula. China in association with Russia has proposed alternatives called ‘Freeze-for-freeze and dual-track approach’ to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and promote peace, but the negotiations between the US and North Korea remain deadlocked. China is participating in international sanctions and economic support for North Korea at the same time, leading to denuclearization and contributing to the stabilization of the North Korean regime while still regarding North Korea as a strategic asset. Also, Xi jinping administration is attempting to expand its‘One belt, One Road’ project into Northeast Asian region. The linkage of ‘One belt, One Road’ with the Korean Peninsula would serve as an opportunity to promote minilateral and multilateral economic cooperation in the region.
   Tasks of Putin administration’s policy toward Korean Peninsula are as follows: First, Adherence to the line of equidistant policies to both Koreas. Since the 2000s, Russia has made an effort to maintain a balanced friendship with the two Koreas to enhance its strategic value on the Korean Peninsula. Second, Peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and establishment of multilateral peace and security mechanism in Northeast Asia. For Russia, the North Korean nuclear issue is regarded as a immediate threat, but the regional confrontation centered on the ROK-US, the US-Japan and the China-North Korean alliances is a more intrinsic threat. Therefore, by establishing multilateral peace and security mechanism in Northeast Asia and allaying its security concerns in the region, Putin administration strives to focus on developing Far East. Third, Expansion of economic cooperation with both Koreas and realization of tripartite economic cooperation. After the acceleration of so-called ‘Eastern Policy’ since 2012, in which Russia has tried to develop Far East through close economic cooperation with countries in Northeast Asia, these economic cooperations have become a major task on Russia’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula.
   If so, how should the Republic of Korea respond to realize the ‘New Korean Peninsula Regime’ initiative? Under the Trump administration, it appears that the existing alliance between the Republic of Korea and the US seems to be nearing its end, and the ‘Pursuit of common interests’ has also been replaced by ‘Seeking American interests.’ Therefore, to pursue its own interests, the Republic of Korea also needs to make a complete revisions to its strategies as follows: First, when it comes to excessive calls for increased share of defense expenses, the government of the Republic of Korea should weaken the justification of the pressure, utilizing Washington’s bureaucracy and Congress’ concerns that excessive demands could lead to Seoul’s departure from the alliance. Second, regarding calls for participation in the Indo-Pacific strategy, the government of the Republic of Korea should express its willingness to strengthen the role of the Republic of Korea in the defense of the Korean Peninsula, reducing pressure of Washington’s bureaucracy, taking advantage of President Trump’s indifference. Third, in order to reduce the security vulnerability caused by security dependence on the US, the government of the Republic of Korea should seek a ‘shift in alliance’ that fills the security vacuum by establishing a multilateral security regime in the long-term.
   The Republic of Korea is facing a diplomatic dilemma due to China’s growing influence and hegemonic competition between the US and China. As the competition between the ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’ and the ‘One Belt, One Road’ strategy is getting intensified, diplomatic options of the Republic of Korea will narrow more. Considering this situation, the Republic of Korea needs to implement the following strategies. First, it needs to be emphasized that even if the Republic of Korea participates in the Indo-Pacific strategy limitedly, this does not mean that it participates in any hostilities or siege against China. Second, the Republic of Korea should actively support the ‘One Belt, One Road’ connection to the Korean Peninsula, the conclusion of the Korea-China-Japan FTA and the institutionalization of the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership). This could not only contribute to paving the way for the initiation of minilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia, but could also serve as a framework for providing economic rewards to North Korea in the process of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.
   Since the 2000s, Russia has adhered to the line of equidistant policies to both Koreas that maintains balanced friendship with the two Koreas, while steadfastly pushing for a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, the establishment of a multilateral peace and security mechanism in Northeast Asia, the expansion of economic cooperation with the South and North Korea and the realization of tripartite economic cooperation between the two Koreas and Russia. Therefore, the Republic of Korea needs to make active use of Russia’s policy on the Korean Peninsula as follows: First, in order to maintain the impetus for the peace process on the Korean Peninsula in the short term, it is necessary to ask Russia to provide a firm support for a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and to play a role in preventing any heightened tension in the face of an unexpected crisis. In this process, strengthening relations between Russia and North Korea can be a positive factor in reducing North Korea’s excessive security and economic dependence on China. Second, the Republic of Korea should work closely with Russia in relation to ensure the security of the North Korean regime and to establish a multilateral peace and security mechanism in Northeast Asia. It is necessary to cooperate closely with Russia to establish this mechanism as means and process for realizing a peaceful cooperation community, a vision of the ‘New Korean Peninsula Regime.’ Third, with regard to the development of the Far East and the promotion of tripartite economic cooperation between the two Koreas and Russia, the level of cooperation with Russia should be raised step by step. the Republic of Korea has to Recognize that Russia’s development of the Far East and promoting tripartite economic cooperation between the two Koreas and Russia can serve as a basic driving force for the realization of the economic cooperation community, which is a vision of the ‘New Korean Peninsula Regime’, and should improve the level of cooperation with Russia gradually, as the situation on the Korean Peninsula changes.

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구배경 및 목적
2. 연구범위 및 구성

제2장 기업환경 분석
1. 각국 경제와 중소기업
2. 거시경제 현황
3. 중소기업 현황
4. 소결

제3장 법적, 정책적 환경 분석
1. 머리말
2. 중소기업법
3. 중소기업 지원정책
4. 소결

제4장 노동ㆍ비즈니스 환경 분석
1. 머리말
2. 노동환경
3. 비즈니스 환경
4. 소결

제5장 중소기업 협력방안
1. 머리말
2. 한국과의 수출입, 투자관계
3. 유망 협력 분야
4. 소결

제6장 맺음말

참고문헌

Executive Summary

   Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary, Visegrad Four, are considered some of the most successful countries in translating their economic and political systems from communist to capitalist ones. They have successfully adopted both liberal democracies and functioning market economies, also enjoying a rapid growth of both large-scale and small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs). While the former has been led by foreign firms, the latter has been based on innovative ideas. By doing so, they are gradually able to catch up with those of most of western European countries in terms of their business size, skills, and contribution, all of which also in turn contributes to their overall economic development. As a result,  all of the four countries became the members of the OECD (Czechia 1995, Poland and Hungary 1996, Slovakia 2010, and Estonia 2010), and the European Union member sates (by the EU’s 2004 eastern enlargement).
   The overarching strategies for these countries’ economic development, i.e., the former central and east European countries(CEECs), are related to the establishment and consolidation of their economic infrastructure first funded by the EU and then later on by the foreign direct investments. Yet, in the process of their economic development, there are also some unwanted side effects observed: the first is that they are too dependent on the EU markets with the latter becoming the main outlets for their exports; the second is that since their economic performances are pro-cyclical of the international economy, they also became very vulnerable to external shocks, if and when they occur. Thus when the sub-prime mortgage crisis hit the globe hard, and the sovereign debt crisis ensued and engulfed the entire Europe, for example, these countries also economically and politically suffered a lot, although their growing interconnectedness with the external economies once functioned as a boost for their economic growth.
   Having experienced such economic turmoils, these countries began to think that their past strategies of economic development should be refurbished, and in particular in order to prevent any forms of future economic crisis, their focus should not necessarily be on the existing large-scale state-owned smokestack companies. It should be on the small-and-medium sized enterprises, which might provide more flexibility and innovation, thereby allowing them to tap into growing niche markets, as all of this would eventually invigorate their economic growth. Thus the CEECs began to commit themselves to expanding their private sectors, promoting innovative entrepreneurship, and providing relevant financial aids, tax breaks, and consulting services so that their start-ups can grow to the extent that they are truly and internationally competitive.
   The geo-economic advantages most of these countries, the relatively cheap forces, and as integral part of the EU market make them as attractive markets for foreign investment and trade. It is these specific and combined reasons that Korea’s car and electronic companies were also attracted, and led to invest heavily in these markets. Yet, the large-scale investment, for example, by Samsung electronics and Hyundai Motor Co., soon became slowed down, even making the trade volume between South Korea and CEECs languished. And an argument for an alternative routes of trade and investment to facilitate further growth is getting further legitimate over time.
   Given the decreasing volume of trade and investment from Korea, but with the growing share of job opportunities and the amount of values added by the growth of small-and-medium sized companies, SMEs arguably are the future focus of investment and trade.
   While CEECs are now becoming a new market for large-scale investment and export partners, there nonetheless exist some issues to be addressed, such as how to cope with increasing competition and the structural difficulty in securing local cooperation. But given the calculation that securing this highly lucrative market is important, the Korean SMEs should now be vigilant of the problems likely to be encountered. The first barrier is how to address the language barriers, and the second one, and equally importantly, is how to secure the fundamental local information necessary to start their business in the region. So, understanding the economic situation of these countries, the economic and legal status relating to the business activities of the SMEs, and the relevant legal and administrative barriers seems to be prerequisite.
   With all this in mind, this research aims to identify, dissect, and examine the macro-economic conditions of these five targe countries, with particular reference to the economic status of their SMEs, the relevant legal and administrative environments both hampering and boosting their growth, and the conditions of the labour and business markets that would also affect their business activities. By doing so, it also aims to facilitate the export and investment of the Korean SMEs in these markets, believing that all of this information would eventually help their business activities in the region.
   The next chapter, Chapter Two, investigates the overall economic environment of the five target countries, examining the extent to which their SMEs have been able to contribute to the employment growth, the overall economic growth of the country, the production and export shares, and by doing so, it also attempts to demonstrate that they are the one that would lead their economic growth in the future.
   Chapter Three delves into the legal and administrative environments, focusing on the support program for the growth of SMEs, such as relevant government policies, and tax breaks, and so on. Despite a variation in terms of the support programs, there is a commonality: the EU’s Small Business Act(SBA), for example, has been equally applied, along with the individual-level of support. While the EU funds are not directly granted to individual SMEs, the fact that any companies, be foreign or domestic, working there are nevertheless able to benefit from these support funds seems to be noteworthy.
   Chapter Four deals with the labor and business environments. While CEECs provide cheap labor forces, they also have some structural problems, such as an increase of labor costs, the aging of their labor forces, and the increasing outflow of their skill workers into the western Europe. All of these would make the target countries as a future market less attractive, and providing an accurate assessment of these market for the future advancement of the Korean SMEs is therefore of utmost importance.
   Chapter Five suggests that replacing the decreasing roles of large-scale companies, the increasing commitments and innovative approaches of SMEs should be highlighted. And to facilitate the business of Korean SMEs in the markets, the chapter also suggests areas of cooperation, by taking a careful consideration of  the current conditions of local markets, their labour-market conditions and the relevant government policy for SMEs.
   Chapter Six concludes that instead of maintaining the extant unilateral and one-dimensional approach emphasizing internationalization and globalization of SMEs, all the necessary information, such as macro-economic conditions, SME policy, existing incentives, business environments, has to be acquired in prior for a successful future business.

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 목적과 필요성
2. 연구의 범위, 방법 및 구성
3. 연구의 의의 및 한계

제2장 아프리카 지역경제공동체와 AfCFTA
1. 아프리카 지역경제공동체 현황 및 평가
2. AfCFTA 출범 배경 및 주요 내용
3. AfCFTA의 출범과 순항을 위한 기본 과제 및 전망

제3장 AfCFTA에 따른 아프리카 산업 및 교역구조의 변화와 전망
1. 경제성장 및 빈곤감소
2. 투자환경 개선 및 기업 활동의 활성화
3. 산업 부문별 변화
4. 아프리카 역내 가치사슬의 강화
5. 상품 및 서비스 교역 활성화

제4장 한국의 AfCFTA 활용 방안
1. 아프리카 지역경제공동체와 한국의 교역관계로 본 AfCFTA의 전망
2. 협력 거점국가 선정 및 유망 산업의 도출
3. 한국기업의 아프리카 무역 증대 방안
4. 한국기업의 투자 유망 산업 분석

제5장 결론 및 정책제언

참고문헌

부록

   The African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) is a flagship project of the African Union (AU) in the implementation of the Agenda 2063 aiming to unify Africa. It is a newly established institution that was formally declared to commence on 30 May 2019. Major provisions, such as rules-of origin (ROO), non-tariff barriers, and safeguards are currently under active discussions; the minimum provisions that generally constitute an FTA, such as preferential tariff, concessions, ROO, have not been agreed upon as of yet. However, the AU’s determination to achieve ultimate economic integration of the African continent seems to be unwavering. As such, the advent of a market with a US$3 trillion GDP and a population of 1.25 billion is an inevitable outcome.
   As a matter of fact, the AfCFTA is an institution whose coming was very much expected. The genesis of the AfCFTA dates back to the time of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in the 1960s. The rise of Pan-Africanism led to the birth of the OAU, which was the beginning of a step towards the unity and integration of the fragmented African economies and to integrate them with the international economy.
   The genesis of the AfCFTA dates back to the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980 and the Abuja Treaty of 1991. The AfCFTA soon became a reality in the negotiation of the Continental FTA at the African Union’s Head of States meeting in 2012 and subsequently its signing by 44 Heads of States in Kigali, Rwanda in 2018. The AfCFTA established its fundamental objectives with the unity and development of Africa by creating an integrated single market based on free movement of capital and labour, thus promoting intra-continental trade activities. It is expected to generate positive effects in all aspects of the African economy, such as boosting intra-continental trade, building regional value chains, integrating of Africa with the global value chain, etc.
   However, there are downsides to instituting the AfCFTA. Firstly, the AfCFTA is an FTA with the highest income inequality among member countries. The gaps from the sizes of economies and the levels of industrial development that exist among member nations serve as hindrances to the member states’ ratification of the AfCFTA. Such countries as South Africa, Kenya, Egypt, Nigeria, and Ethiopia that possess a certain level of industrial capacity in the manufacturing would grow more through the agreement; other countries’ national incomes would be eclipsed by these countries with large economies. Thus, the income inequality among nations would grow even larger. Nevertheless, direct, as well as potential, benefits of the agreement would not only offset negative transaction costs but also lay a foundation for future growth in Africa. In order to achieve this, however, there are a number of pre-requisites that have to be resolved, such as the setting of a harmonious relationship between the AfCFTA regime and the existing regional economic communities (REC) in Africa as well as the amicable agreements of the provisions and regulations relating thereto. In addition, it is crucial that the hindrances to the flow of free trade such as the dearth in infrastructure, unfriendly business environment, etc. arising from the fact that most African countries are least developed countries (LDCs) have to be removed.
   Korea’s trade with Africa is inconsequential. However, Africa has always had the attention of Korea’s enterprises as a potential market. The institution of the AfCFTA, the largest economic bloc in the world, is a manifestation of Africa’s potential. Thus, it would not be too early to seek Korea’s strategic approaches to the African market at this point in time. Indeed, the effect of this new FTA on the trade relationship between Korea and Africa should be weighed now, so that adequate market-entry strategies could be sought accordingly.
   Amidst this backdrop, this study weighs the future of the relationship between Korea and the AfCFTA by observing the effects of past establishments of African RECs on the trade between Korea and Africa in general using the Herfindahl-Hershman Index (HHI). An analysis based on the HHI reached an affirmative conclusion that the ACFTA would relieve trade concentration so much so that it would distribute Korea’s trade to many African countries, thereby increasing Korea’s overall trade with Africa. This implies that Korea needs to actively engage in the African market under the AfCFTA regime.
   A caveat needs to be observed at this point, however. Africa is colossal in size and consists of diverse ethnic groups, languages, cultures, norms and the interest of 54 sovereign states that crisscross across the continent. In other words, Africa is not a single market with a single characteristic. With this premise, this study explored the most adequate trade, investment, and industrial strategies for Korea to enter the African market under the AfCFTA.
   As pointed out, Africa is not a single market with one characteristic; there is a mix of countries with different levels of economy, particularly those with manufacturing bases and those without. Thus, this research subdivides the market, selects a base country for each sector from the subdivided markets, and suggests a strategic concept of setting up a “space network” that expands our trade and investment space in these base countries.
   Together with the identification of the base country, for Korea to effectively advance into Africa under the AfCFTA regime, the following four market-entry strategies are proposed:
   (1) Segment the African market to target the middle-class African consumers. That is, by selecting middle-class African consumers first as the market target in order to establish a bridgehead for increase in exports;
   (2) Select fast growing industrial sectors in Africa and enhance exchanges of these sectors between Korea and Africa. It will be necessary to develop diverse policies that can actively engage with the industrial sectors of Africa that are expected to develop fastest as the AfCFTA further evolves;
   (3) Execute the expansion strategy of a roundabout export utilising the base countries. This means that the base countries selected by this study are to be utilised as the bases for the roundabout export of our domestic products; and
   (4) It is necessary to restructure the export strategy of Korean products by utilising the new information on the African region’s geography of economy and trade structure expected to change due to the AfCFTA. After the AfCFTA goes into effect, the increase in trade within the region and the possibility of constructing a regional value chain will be more likely and it is expected that investment in Africa will rise in general. As the AfCFTA is in effect, the most adequate strategy for the Korean firms is the investment expansion strategy centred around the base countries with the “space network” concept as the basis.
   The AfCFTA will be an opportunity for Korean companies to newly perceive the African market as a major export and investment location for diversification of their market. Therefore, support of the following policies is necessary to execute the regional export and investment strategies in Africa with the strategical concept of a space-network expansion:
   (1) The means to act on the regulation of the country of origin is prepared in concert by the industry and the government. The regulation on the country of origin in the AfCFTA regime maximises the benefits on the “made in Africa”; Korea’s export competitiveness in Africa would be lagging behind those competing countries producing locally unless “localisation” is not pursued. Therefore, localisation is absolutely necessary, like establishing an exclusive industrial complex for Korean companies, M&A of the local company, and joint ventures for the means to minimise the risk of the exclusiveness of the AfCFTA. Furthermore, signing the FTA agreements with countries that have influences in each region like South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt to secure base countries for roundabout trade is important. Additionally, the government’s role is urgently needed as to take the lead to prepare measures to minimise the risks and maximise the effects of the AfCFTA on Korean companies amidst the emergence of the AfCFTA;
   (2) A legal basis for supporting trade and investment in Africa must be provided. It is true that in the past Africa has been perceived mainly as a region to aid. Hence, in the face of the rise of a gigantic AfCFTA market, Korea needs to break away from the usual aid argument and newly perceive the change in Africa’s economic geography. Korea needs to realise that anticipative and proactive trade and investment expansion are the best ways to co-operate with African countries. But for this, policy support like the expansion of access to finance for the companies and tax support by the government are necessary. To this end, a legal basis for the policy support of trade and investment in Africa must be in place. This measure would be absolutely necessary in diversifying the export market and for developing a new market in Africa;
   (3) Expand the size of policy-finance. The AfCFTA could become an opportunity for trade and investment in Africa for Korean firms and yet, it could also be a birth to an obstacle in advancement, as the AfCFTA could be an emergence of another exclusive economic zone. Therefore, in order to make the AfCFTA an opportunity for companies to advance to a new market, certain factors for opportunities should be emphasised more and negative effects arising from obstacles should be minimised through policy support from the government. The expansion of policy finance is necessary to resolve the problem of accessibility to finance for companies desiring to mobilise to African countries. One of the most vexing challenges in advancing to Africa is the access to finance. As most of the African countries’ credits are rated below the OECD standards (below B+), it is difficult to access commercial loans as well as the support of policy-finance. In this case, utilising the support of the international finance organisation and governmental finance institutions like the IFC (International Financial Corporation) or AfDB (African Development Bank) would be effective. But to this end, a strategical approach with the investing nation’s policy finance as intermediary is necessary. But in the case of Korean companies, active cooperation with the government’s policy financing institutions or international financing institutions is not yet possible. This is because the current size of the Korean government’s policy finance for Africa is not big enough to be effective and also because the small shares in international finance institutions and little influence do not provide actual aid. Therefore, it is necessary to expand the limit of policy finance, i.e. EDCF or the Special Account of Export-Import Bank of Korea, greatly to increase the chances to the companies and to actively support those companies that desire to advance their business to high risk countries in Africa; and
   (4) For the advancement of diverse domestic companies to Africa, support for the advancement to Africa is encouraged. In particular, for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME) that have difficulty accessing information on African markets, combining the provision of customised market information to SMEs with personnel support and tax and financing support are necessary in identifying the “Window of Opportunity” for SMEs. For example, in advancing the ICTs or digital media markets of Africa, the advancement of major SMEs in this type of industry is effective. But, the SMEs inherently find difficulties in accessing information, finance, and markets, and as a result, the government need to complement these areas of inherent difficulties.
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 필요성 및 목적
2. 연구 방법 및 범위

제2장 한국의 아세안 투자 분석
1. 한국의 아세안 투자
2. 한국의 아세안 주요 국가별 투자
3. 소결

제3장 한국기업의 해외 자회사 데이터베이스 구축과 특성
1. 이용자료
2. 구축방법
3. 데이터베이스 기초통계
4. 소결

제4장 한국기업의 아세안 투자 분석: 제조업을 중심으로
1. 지역별ㆍ산업별 제조기업 해외 자회사 현황
2. 제조업 산업별 경영성과와 동남아 진출
3. 제조업 경영성과와 중국 및 베트남 진출 여부
4. 소결

제5장 결론
1. 요약
2. 연구의 한계와 과제

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary

   China’s economic growth and wage hikes, and prolonged trade friction between the U.S. and China, have weakened China’s advantage as a production base hub, and increased the need for post-China production bases. As a result, ASEAN has emerged as a major global investment destination based on its cheap labor, and the trend of global companies relocating their production bases to ASEAN will likely become more pronounced. Amid this trend, Korean companies are also actively investing in ASEAN, and Korea’s accumulated investment in ASEAN from 1980 to 2018 has grown to an extent comparable to China’s accumulated investment.
   With ASEAN emerging as South Korea’s main investment destination, the need for research on the performance of ASEAN investment has been raised. However, due to the lack of micro data, it is difficult to conduct an empirical analysis of this investment based on data. The Export-Import Bank of Korea has the most reliable information on companies’ overseas investment, but does not provide micro data due to the confidentiality clause of Article 22 of the Foreign Exchange Transaction Act. Meanwhile, the corporate activity survey published by the National Statistics Office of Korea provides data on companies with more than 50 employees, but has the disadvantage of lacking information on small businesses.
   The purpose of this study is to establish integrated data linking the data of overseas companies and domestic parent companies to address these limitations. Once the data is collected according to the purpose of this study, it will become possible to analyze the characteristics and impact of domestic companies’ investment in ASEAN. For this purpose, we use overseas companies data and Korea Enterprise Data (KED) released by the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA).
   The research can be summarized as follows. In Chapter 2, we look into the trends and structure of Korea’s investment in ASEAN. Korea’s accumulated investment amount in ASEAN during 2015-18 recorded 54.5 billion USD, accounting for approximately 14% of Korea’s total outward direct investment. In the same period, the annual average of Korean FDI outflows to ASEAN increased by 17%, largely outpacing the average annual growth rate of 4% in investments to China. Korea’s major sectoral investment in ASEAN has been diversified from manufacturing into finance, insurance, wholesale, retail, and mining, mainly focused on Vietnam.
   Chapter 3 introduces the methodology and basic statistics of the KOTRA Overseas Enterprises Data and Korean Enterprises Data. The KOTRA Overseas Enterprises Data has information on parent companies and we have combined KOTRA’s data with parent companies’ corporate registration number as a parameter. Korean firms mostly advance into ASEAN as an independent investment for production, concentrating on manufacturing and business services. In addition, utilities companies with overseas subsidiaries show the highest average capital and sales.
   In Chapter 4, the current status and characteristics of Korean investment are analyzed based on the KOTRA Overseas Enterprise Data combined with the corporate registration numbers of parent companies. The analysis shows that Korean firms are mainly expanding into China and Southeast Asia. While the number of Korean enterprises entering China is significantly changing by year, the number entering into ASEAN shows steady growth. The Korean enterprises are mostly advancing into ASEAN in the garment manufacturing industry, which indicates a difference in the level of productivity between China and ASEAN since most Korean firms producing electronic components and telecommunications equipment choose to enter China. The parent companies expanding into both China and Vietnam have higher average sales and profit but the enterprises entering only Vietnam recorded lower figures.
   This research is meaningful in that it has established a database which allows us to examine various dynamics of Korean companies that have advanced overseas. However, the established database has certain limitations, such as missing accurate information for identifying parent company. For future policy research, it will be necessary to collect specific parent identification information, add additional overseas subsidiaries’ information, and expand its time series.
   Through this study, we analyzed the characteristics of Korean companies operating in Southeast Asia and the financial performance of their parent companies. Based on the database established through this study, various analyses are available through future research, such as the impact of foreign direct investment on domestic employment and industrial competitiveness, the relationship between increasing cost of overseas production and the financial performance of the parent company, and the effectiveness of government policy on companies advancing overseas.

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 배경 및 목적
2. 연구의 범위와 구성 및 방법
3. 선행연구와의 차별성

제2장 한-인도 항공·우주 분야 산업 현황 및 해외협력
1. 국내 항공·우주 분야 산업 현황
2. 인도 항공·우주 분야 산업 현황
3. 국내 및 인도 항공·우주 분야 해외협력 현황
4. 소결

제3장 한-인도 항공·우주 산업 협력 현황
1. 한-인도 항공·우주 분야 정책적 협력 현황
2. 한-인도 항공·우주 분야 산업적 협력 현황
3. 한-인도 항공·우주 4차 산업분야 협력 현황
4. 소결

제4장 한-인도 항공·우주 분야 산업 협력 매칭
1. 전문가 인터뷰
2. 전문가 설문
3. AHP 평가
4. 항공·우주 연관기업 매칭

제5장 한-인도 항공·우주·4차 산업분야 협력 방향
1. 한-인도 항공·우주·4차 산업분야 특징 및 협력분야
2. 한-인도 항공·우주 및 4차 산업분야 협력 방향

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary
 

   Since the Fourth Industrial Revolution was mentioned at the World Economic Forum in 2016, it has become a key issue in the global industry, and policy responses have been accelerated, especially in developed and some Asian countries. Korea has also responded to the 4th Industrial Revolution by forming a new industry promotion plan. However, in the field of traditional strength of domestic companies such as automobile, shipbuilding, and machine-related companies, each company is facing difficulties due to technological competitiveness with advanced countries and price competitiveness with China and Vietnam. The strong industrial sector in Korea is in need of securing competitiveness from a new perspective due to its weak linkage with the fourth industry. Therefore, it is necessary for Korea to respond more appropriately to the fourth industry and to secure and respond to the capabilities of related core technologies.
   The core technologies of the 4th industry are 3D Printing, IoT, Big Data / Cloud, AI, and Intelligent Robots. The five core technologies are areas that can create more synergy when linked with the aerospace space sector. This is because the core technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution are being used in drones, personal vehicle (PAV), space launch vehicles, and satellite industries.
   Korea has a competitive edge in the ICT industry, and has the basic industrial capacities linked with the core technologies of the 4th industry. However, the history of the aerospace industry is not long and the level of technology is not high. Therefore, it is necessary to secure industrial competitiveness and create synergy through linkage with overseas countries where the aerospace industry has developed.
   Among the countries where the aerospace industry has developed, India is one of ASEAN countries and targeted as win-win prosperity community policy. India, in particular, has long history of aerospace industry development and a high level of technology. Therefore, it is necessary to combine aviation and aerospace technologies with core technologies of the 4th industry through cooperation with India, thereby strengthening cooperation between domestic companies and securing competitiveness.
   Based on the above background, this study reviewed the status of aerospace industry, import/export status, the 4th industry related industries and companies in both Korea and India. Time span of the research is the last 10 years and expert interview, expert survey and AHP evaluation is conducted in order to set cooperation priority between the two countries and to draw more appropriate measures.
   According to review for current status of both countries, Korea has a shorter development time than that of India and the Korea has a large technology gap on the space technology level.  In the aerospace sectors, Korea relies heavily on imports of assembly but the parts industry has a competitive edge, and the satellite services and equipment sectors have developed relatively among other sectors. In the case of India, the aviation industry is characterized by the establishment of a regional center in a foreign country through a partnership between foreign aircraft companies that pays attention to India's R & D capabilities. The MRO industry and the transportation industry are also developed. As for the aerospace industry, India has grown to be one of the top aerospace countries in connection with defense policy, particularly in aerospace embedded software, and recently focuses on satellite and GPS systems.
   As a result of reviewing the current status of the 4th industry in both Korea and India, focusing on five core technologies, both countries are manufacturing aerospace / space components using 3D printing. However, IoT, big data / cloud, artificial intelligence, and intelligent robots are still in their early stages.
   On the other hand, overseas cooperation between Korea and India is in common that both countries cooperate heavily withthe United States, and India has a long history of cooperation with Russia as well as the United States. The policy / industrial cooperation between the two countries was promoted through the exchange of manpower and the consultation of practitioners based on the summit meeting. In the case of industrial cooperation, India is promoting 'Defence Production Policy 2018' to expand private investment, but industrial cooperation between the two countries is focused on the defense sector.
   In terms of cooperation in the field of utilization, the two countries are planning to strengthen cooperation in the 4th industrial sector through the summit meeting in early 2019, and are pursuing 'co-funding international joint technology development project' hosted by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy.
   After reviewing current status of industry in both countries and expert interview,  there is a limit to promoting cooperation of aerospace sector in two countries by private companies because the aerospace sector and its related technology has security issues. Survey and AHP evaluation resulted that increased investment in policy cooperation, cooperation in aeronautical manufacturing (completer), manufacturing of aeroplane / 3D printing / satellite navigation, big data and cloud, in cooperation with Korean Air, bilateral cooperation are required. Target countries for export on the basis of cooperation between two countries are resultedd Indonesia were identified as Indonesia / Vietnam.
   For the future cooperation between the two countries, this study suggests the strategy on the basis of short, medium and long term classification.
   In the short term, advancement of MOU agreements, regular exchange of personnel, international joint research are required. In the medium term, the establishment of the Korea-India Aerospace Utilization Research Center, funding between the two countries are required. Finally, in the long term, it is necessary to jointly enter a third country where the aviation / space and utilization industries are in the increased demand through the establishment and operation of a joint venture between Korea and India. In this way, Korea will be able to secure competitiveness and strengthen its position in the 4th industry in connection with the development of the aviation / space sector.

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구 배경 및 목적
 가. 연구 배경
 나. 연구 목적
2. 연구 범위 및 방법
 가. 연구 범위
 나. 연구 방법
3. 선행연구 검토 및 차별성

제2장 가나의 국가 현황 및 개발전략
1. 국가 현황과 특징
 가. 일반현황
 나. 정치·사회
 다. 경제
 라. 국제관계
2. 가나의 국가개발전략
 가. 지속가능 국가경제발전 정책
 나. 가나 수산발전계획과 수산업 부문별 개발수요
 다. 가나 국가인프라계획(2018-2047)
 라. 가나 수산관리계획
 마. 가나 카누 조업구조 설문조사
3. 가나의 수산업 현황
 가. 전 세계/아프리카 수산업 생산 일반현황
 나. 가나 수산업 생산 현황
 다. 가나 수산업 구조
 라. 가나 수산업 가치사슬에서의 여성의 역할
 마. 가나의 수산물 교역 현황
 바. 가나의 수산물 공급
 사. 가나 수산업의 이해관계와 기회
4. IUU어업의 현황 및 문제점
5. 가나 다랑어산업의 글로벌 가치사슬 분석
 가. 가치사슬 분석 개요
 나. 가나 다랑어산업의 가치사슬 분석 내용
6. 소결 및 수산분야 시사점
 가. 외줄낚시어업의 구조조정 및 경쟁력 제고
 나. 다랑어 어업구조 변화에 따른 지역 파급 영향 대응 필요
 다. 다랑어 어업관리 인프라 강화

제3장 가나 수산분야에 대한 국제사회의 개발협력
1. 국제사회의 지원현황
 가. ODA 지원동향
 나. 수산분야 지원 현황
2. 주요 공여국의 가나 수산분야 개발협력 현황
 가. 일본
 나. 미국
 다. 스페인
 라. 노르웨이
 마. 캐나다
 바. 중국
3. 주요 국제기구의 가나 수산분야 개발협력현황
 가. 세계은행
 나. FAO
4. 소결 및 시사점

제4장 한국과 가나의 수산분야 개발협력 현황과 과제
1. 한국과 가나 간 협력현황
 가. 한국과 가나 간 교역현황
 나. 對가나 투자현황
2. 한국의 개발협력 일반현황
 가. 개발협력 정의
 나. 개발협력 정책방향
 다. 개발협력 추진체계
 라. 개발협력 추진현황
3. 한국의 수산분야 개발협력 현황
 가. 규모 및 주요 지원분야
 나. 지원전략
4. 한국의 수산분야 가나 지원현황
 가. 규모 및 주요 지원분야
 나. 지원전략
 다. 세부 사업 및 사업 평가 결과
5. 한국의 對가나 타분야 지원 주요 시사점
 가. 농업분야 시사점
 나. 교육분야 시사점
 다. 기타 시사점
6. 소결 및 시사점

제5장 가나 수산분야 개발협력 방안
1. 개발협력의 기본방향
2. 세부 협력방안 및 우선순위
 가. 추진전략 목표 및 계획
 나. 세부 협력사업 방안
 다. 단계별 추진전략
 라. 협력유형
3. 결론 및 정책제언

참고문헌

   The purpose of this study is to contribute to the improvement of Ghana’s Country Partnership Strategy(CPS) and to the establishment of policies for development cooperation in the oceans and fisheries sector. Ghana owns an affluent fishing area in western Africa, and along with Senegal has served as one of the base camps for Korean deep-sea fishing industry during the last 50 years. Despite Ghana's national importance to Korea, very few systematic studies have been conducted on ODA projects in the fisheries sector based on the demand for development cooperation in Ghana. No research has been made to identify new projects and efficiently pursue developed projects. Therefore, there is a strong need to pursue research on development cooperation projects in the fisheries and aquaculture sector which can actively reflect the interests of Ghana.
   To this end, this study analyzed the current situation of the fisheries industry in Ghana through relevant databases and on-site visit survey, also analyzing current directions in the international community development cooperation support areas. In addition, the study identified the current status of trade, investment and human exchanges between Korea and Ghana, and conducted an analysis together with Ghana’s local experts on cases of support provided in other areas for the country. Further case studies were conducted on future support for the fisheries business by reflecting the assessment results of previous projects. Building on the results of these analyses, the basic direction of development cooperation and specific development cooperation plans with detailed projects were proposed.
   According to the results of our study, the fisheries sector is a very important industry in Ghana. The extent to which the fisheries industry contributes to Ghana's GDP is estimated to be at least 4.5 percent. The fisheries industry is directly and indirectly linked to the livelihoods of 2.5 million people, which is about 10 percent of all Ghana's population. It is also very important in terms of food security, accounting for 60 percent of the population's animal protein supply. In response, the Ghanaian government is working to promote the fisheries industry strategically by establishing the "2017-2024 Economic and Social Development Policy Program.” The biggest problems in Ghana's fisheries industry now are the depletion of fisheries resources, lack of processing capacity, education, support systems for small-scale fishers, and efforts to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.
   It has been confirmed that the international community has conducted various support programs for Ghana. The programs include the convergent and comprehensive programs in the oceans and fisheries sector. From 2002 to 2017, Ghana's fisheries aid accounted for 0.3 percent of the total aid and 3.5 percent of total aid in the agricultural and fisheries sector. Ghana's largest bilateral aid partner in the fisheries sector is Japan, followed by Spain, the United States and Norway. South Korea ranked sixth, providing about $71,000 in aid. However, only a very limited range of projects were carried out, such as the KOICA’s master degree course in fisheries and the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries’s Fisheries Infrastructure Support Project. Ghana's major multilateral cooperation agencies in the fisheries sector were led by the FAO and World Bank. The results of our analysis suggest that the FAO's projects have been particularly effective. Overall, the fisheries sector still accounts for only a small portion of Korea's ODA. However, when analyzing the overall trend, it becomes evident that ODA in the fisheries sector of Africa is of considerable importance. Up to now, Korea has conducted no loan programs in the fisheries sector. Instead most of the projects in the fisheries sector were training programs for government employees, capacity building and simple material support projects. Recently, it was confirmed that the government is diversifying the target of training from government officials to local fishers and is making efforts to enhance the effectiveness of these projects by transferring management technologies while pushing forward with the project.
   In the future, it will be necessary to combine the existing areas of cooperation with those of the oceans and fisheries sectors in Ghana. Potential new grant or loan projects could include the construction of a fishing port in Lake Volta, projects to reduce poverty in fishing villages, or various capacity-building projects through the establishment of fisheries education institutes such as maritime school education programs with ships donated for training purposes. Korea's grant aid projects in the fisheries sector concentrate on capacity development projects for the sustainable development of Ghana's fisheries industry. This is why Korea has a comparative advantage in capacity-building sectors, which can include fisheries technology transfer. In addition, government-private partnership projects can push ahead with projects to protect marine resources in the coastal region of the Gulf of Guinea.
   In view of the importance of the fishing industry in Ghana, and the need to support local small-scale fishers and women fishers, the Korean government should select the fisheries industry as one of the CPS-focused major cooperation areas, as in the case of Senegal, and should dramatically increase support for Ghana’s fisheries sector. The ODA projects which Korea has provided to Ghana so far cannot be seen as actually contributing to sustainable development in terms of their quantity or quality, nor the economic development in Ghana, and thus need to be improved. Efficiency is expected to double if implemented in cooperation with other countries and international organizations with successful implementation experience. In addition, it is difficult to expand the scale of ODA projects in the fisheries sector as legal provisions on the formation of the International Development Cooperation Committee (Article 7 of International Development Cooperation Framework Act) have not been revised to include the Minister for Oceans and Fisheries explicitly(Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the International Development Cooperation Framework Act). The Decree should be revised as soon as possible.
   While there has been some general study on the Korean fishing industry and cooperation in global waters, in-depth analysis of the fisheries industry in specific countries and the excavation of related development cooperation projects based on it have been very rare. Starting with this study, there is a need to continue research on development cooperation projects in major African countries, Asian countries, Latin America, as well as Small Islands Developing Countries in the South Pacific.

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 배경 및 필요성
2. 선행연구 검토 및 차별성
3. 연구 방법 및 구성

제2장 캄보디아의 국가 및 환경 현황
1. 국가 현황
2. 환경 현황 및 환경정책
3. 환경분야 국제협력
4. 시사점

제3장 캄보디아 환경 도전과 SDGs 연계성
1. 캄보디아의 환경 도전
2. 2. 환경 도전의 SDGs 상호연계성
3. 시사점

제4장 한ㆍ캄보디아 개발협력과 환경
1. 한ㆍ캄보디아 개발협력
2. 환경분야 지원 현황
3. 환경분야 개발협력 성과 및 평가

제5장 한ㆍ캄보디아 환경분야 개발협력 방안
1. 기본 방향
2. 개발협력 추진 방안
3. 협력사업 제안

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary

   The Kingdom of Cambodia (hereinafter Cambodia) is one of Korea’s priority partner countries for official development assistance (ODA) in accordance with Korea’s second Mid-term Strategy for Development Cooperation for 2016 to 2020. Based on the Korean government’s Country Partnership Strategy (CPS), Korea’s development cooperation with Cambodia focuses on transportation, water management, health and hygiene, education and agricultural development. Although water management is one of the priority cooperation areas, Korea’s development cooperation in the environmental sector is limited.
   This research studies Korea’s development cooperation in Cambodia in the environment sector. Cambodia’s national environmental strategies and policies were reviewed together with development cooperation projects from major ODA donor countries, international societies and institutions. We also identify environmental challenges within Cambodia based on available resources and a workshop which included representatives from the National Council for Sustainable Development, Ministry of Environment, Royal Academy of Cambodia, among others. The identified environmental challenges in Cambodia include: 1) forestry, 2) water and hygiene, 3) waste, 4) climate change and greenhouse gas emission and 5) atmospheric environment.
   In addition, the research identified how Cambodia’s environmental challenges are interconnected with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This was analyzed using the SDG Interlinkages Analysis & Visualisation Tool (V.3) developed by the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies. The analysis of the environmental challenges illustrates the synergies and conflict effects that could potentially occur depending on the interactions between the different goals and indicators of Cambodia’s SDGs.
   In conclusion, the research suggests the future direction of development cooperation for the environment in Cambodia. Fundamentally, development cooperation between Korea and Cambodia in the environment sector should reflect and be in line with Korea’s New Southern Policy, which seeks to expand cooperation with the member states of the ASEAN including Cambodia. In addition, based on the review of Cambodia’s environmental challenges and the SDGs interlinkage analysis, the research suggests four areas for development cooperation for the environment between Korea and Cambodia: 1) support for the establishment of environmental policies and institutions, 2) capacity building and technological support, 3) additional financing, and 4) enhancing existing development cooperation based on the SDGs interlinkage analysis. Furthermore, development cooperation projects in the areas of forestry, water and sanitation, waste, climate change and atmospheric environment are suggested considering the SDGs interlinkage analysis.

제1장 서언

 

제2장 푸틴 시기(2000~17) 러시아 극동개발 정책

1. 제1기(2000~07) 극동개발 정책

2. 제2기(2008~11) 극동개발 정책

3. 제3기(2012~17) 극동개발 정책

 

제3장 러시아 극동지역의 투자 여건과 발전 전망

1. 극동지역의 사회ㆍ경제적 변화와 과제

2. 극동지역의 주요 투자 프로그램 이행 현황

가. 극동개발기금의 설립과 인프라 및 산업생산 부문 투자

나. 선도개발구역(TAD)과 국가별ㆍ부문별 극동 투자

다. 투자 플랫폼의 확대와 중국 주도의 극동 투자

3. 극동지역의 선도개발구역 정책과 극동개발공사의 역할

4. 극동지역의 장기 발전 전망 

 

제4장 러시아 극동개발과 주변국 협력

1. 러시아와 중국

가. 러시아-중국 간 투자 및 교역 현황 평가

나. 서방의 경제제재와 러시아-중국 관계 변화

다. 중국-러시아 극동 간 인프라ㆍ에너지ㆍ농업 부문 협력

2. 러시아와 남북한

가. 부침을 거듭한 러시아-북한 관계

나. 러시아-북한 간 인프라 현황과 계획

다. 유엔제재와 러시아-북한 간 노동 협력의 전망

라. 남-북-러 3각 협력

3. 러시아와 일본

가. 푸틴-아베 정상회담과 러-일 협력의 새로운 변화

나. 영토 문제와 경제협력의 새로운 접근법

 

제5장 푸틴 집권 4기 극동 정책의 새로운 변화와 주요 내용

1. 극동연방관구의 주도 이전

2. 자바이칼 변강 및 부랴트 공화국의 극동연방관구 편입

3. 동방국가계획센터(Vostokgosplan)의 설립

4. 극동연방관구의 북극개발 업무 관장

5. 북극개발과 극동개발 간의 상호 연계성 강화

6. 극동연방관구의 북극 관할과 주요 연방주체들의 이해관계

7. ‘극동 헥타르’ 프로그램의 목표와 현실

 

제6장 결어: 한-러 극동 협력 심화를 위한 정책 제언

 

참고문헌

Executive Summary

   This book is the outcome of a joint research project commemorating the 15th anniversary of the establishment of the cooperative relationship between the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) and the Institute for Economic Research of the Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ERI).
   As is well known, the year 2020 will mark the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Korea and Russia. Therefore, it is time for the two countries to prepare for the “2.0 Era of Korea-Russia Cooperation” while comprehensively evaluating existing achievements and tasks. In particular, in order to build a sustainable relationship  between the two countries, it is necessary to establish a strategic contact point between Korea’s New Northern Policy and Russia’s new Eastern policy, which can be realized through bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the Far East.
   In this regard, the main purpose of this study is to understand the main directions, key objectives, and political and economic implications of Russia’s policies in the Far East, which have been strategically pursued since the launch of Putin’s fourth term, and to explore new opportunities and possibilities for development cooperation in the Far East.
   We hope that this book will serve as a useful guide to open a new path for Far East development cooperation marking the 30th anniversary of Korea-Russia diplomatic relations.
 

국문요약 

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 배경 및 필요성
2. 연구의 범위와 구성
3. 선행연구와의 차별성

제2장 중국의 창업 현황 및 정책
1. 중국의 창업 발전 현황
2. 중국의 창업 지원 정책: ‘대중창업, 만중혁신’을 중심으로
3. 분야별 지원 정책

제3장 중국의 창업생태계 분석: 구성원별 역할 및 특징
1. 중앙정부 및 지방정부
2. 대기업 및 선도기업
3. 정부인도기금과 VC
4. 대학 및 연구기관

제4장 중국의 창업생태계 구축 사례 분석
1. 지방정부 사례
2. 대기업 사례
3. 정부기금 사례
4. 신형연구기관 사례

제5장 결론 및 시사점
1. 요약 및 결론
2. 정책적 시사점
3. 한중 창업 협력방안

참고문헌

Executive Summary

   The Chinese government is moving toward a qualitative growth model in the era of “New Normal,” transitioning from the existing quantitative growth model. In line with the transition, since 2015 the Chinese government has been implementing a strategy of “mass entrepreneurship and innovation,” which involves building a startup ecosystem in order to solve youth unemployment and create new growth engines. Thanks to the success story of China’s BAT (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent) and these new policies by the Chinese government, the startup entrepreneurship boom in China has grown rapidly, together with an explosive expansion of infrastructure and platforms for startups. In this report, we analyze China’s Startup Ecosystem policy, and examine in detail the roles and characteristics of each component of the Chinese startup ecosystem. Based on the results of the analysis, we draw the policy implications for Korea and startup cooperation between Korea and China.
   This report consists of four main contents: the current status of China’s startup ecosystem, related policies, an analysis of the ecosystem and a case study. Chapter 2 is a status analysis, and section 1 of the chapter mainly analyzes the development status of China’s startup ecosystem dividing the international and domestic aspects. It is confirmed that China’s startup ecosystem began to rapidly develop around 2015 when the Chinese startup policy was first implemented.
   Sections 2 and 3 are a policy analysis, and mainly analyze the main contents of the Major Entrepreneurship Innovation and policy by sector. In section 2, the entrepreneurship policy was analyzed based on the government documents related to the “Efforts of Mass Entrepreneurship,” the master plan for establishing an entrepreneurship ecosystem proposed in 2015. There are differences in policy-driven policies by period. Initially, it was promoted by focusing on establishing the foundation for the business ecosystem, such as improving the business environment, building a platform, and revitalizing the start-up investment market. In section 3, we reviewed the Chinese start-up policy by sector. China’s startup ecosystem policy includes various contents such as deregulation, improvement of business environments, platform construction, funding of entrepreneurship, conversion of entrepreneurship education, and commercialization of science and technology.
   Chapter 3 analyzes the roles and characteristics of each actor of the government, corporations, government funds, VCs, universities and research institutes that make up the Chinese startup ecosystem. Chapter 4 analyzes the start-up ecosystem established by local governments, corporations, national extradition funds, and new research institutes through case analysis. We analyze the main cases of establishing a startup ecosystem, focusing on the cases of Zhongguancun, Tencent, Haier, government fund and the Shenzhen Institutes of Advanced Technology (SIAT).
   Chapter 5 presents the conclusion of our study and implications. In section 1, we evaluate China’s entrepreneurship ecosystem and forecast future Chinese startup policies and markets. Section 2 suggests the implications of the Chinese startup ecosystem development strategy for Korea such as: promoting startup policies in connection with the establishment of a national innovation system, establishing a control tower dedicated to startup policies, applying the principle of “pre-enforcement post-regulation” for new business models, establishing a private entrepreneurship support platform, promoting support plans by startup development stage, market-oriented startup education, and promoting science and technology achievement transfer.
   Lastly, section 3 discusses the startup cooperation plans between Korea-China. In particular, as China is expected to develop innovative start-ups based on science and technology, the cooperation of innovative start-up ecosystems is emphasized.
 

Contributors

 

Introduction and Overview / Lee-Jay Cho

Remarks from Host Institution, Cooperating Host Institution and Country Representatives
Welcoming Remarks from Host Institution / Dong Sung Cho
Welcoming Remarks from Cooperating Host Institution / Ganbold Baasanjav
Country Representative Remarks: Republic of Korea / Kwan-Young Park
Country Representative Remarks: China / Fan Xiaoyun
Country Representative Remarks: United States / Stephen Cowper
Country Representative Remarks: Japan / Yasuo Tanabe
Country Representative Remarks: Russia / Pavel Minakir

Country Representative Remarks: Mongolia / Gankhuyag Sodnom

Contents

Part I. Building a Northeast Asia Economic Community and Its Extended Regions
The Asian Financial Cooperation Association (AFCA) / Wang Guoping
Northeast Asia Economic Community Formation and Russia’s Input / Sergei Sevastianov

Part II. Cross-border Infrastructure and Special Economic Zones in Northeast Asia
Talking to North Korea / Glyn Ford
The North Korean Economy and Special Economic Zones / Anthony Michell

Part III. Financial Cooperation in Northeast Asia
Financial Cooperation in Northeast Asia / Yutaka Funada
Should a Northeast Asia Bank for Cooperation and Development Include Financing for the Arctic? / Mead Treadwell
Some Considerations in Establishing the NEABCD / Jai-Min Lee
Understanding the World, Understanding the Region, and Understanding Financial Cooperation / Fan Xiaoyun

Part IV. Energy and Environment in Northeast Asia
Comments on Energy Technology and Policy Trajectories / Terry Surles
State of Renewable Energy and Planning of Cross-Border Transmission in Northeast Asia / Yoshiki Iinuma
Northeast Asia Power Interconnection and Cooperation / Sung Eun Kim
Improving Grid and Community Resiliency Using Advanced Microgrids with Distributed Generation / Mike Hightower
The ‘Carbon Free Island’ Plan / Hesub Rho

Part V. Tourism Cooperation in Northeast Asia
Integrated Resorts Overview: Summary of Presentations by Khalil Philander and Ray Cho / Ray Cho
Medical and Cultural Tourism Overview: Summary of Presentations by Ki-Eun Jung and Zhu Jipeng / Ray Cho
Efforts to Establish an International Ferry Service for Northeast Asia Tourism Development / Ikuo Mitsuhashi
 

   The Northeast Asia Economic Forum (NEAEF) is a regional nongovernmental organization created in 1991 to sponsor and facilitate research, networking, and dialogue relevant to the economic and social development of Northeast Asia. NEAEF is also committed to promoting understanding and relations among the peoples of Northeast Asia, North America, and Europe.
   NEAEF’s main objective is to conduct research and conference activities aimed at functional economic cooperation such as cross-border energy, transportation and logistics infrastructure development, and capital mobilization. NEAEF holds annual conferences, workshops, and seminars for planning, facilitating, coordinating, and implementing international and interdisciplinary solutions to common policy problems. It is the only nongovernmental regional organization in which all the nations of Northeast Asia and the United States are consistent and active participants.
   Over the years, NEAEF has been promoting regional economic cooperation and integration in Northeast Asia aimed at building a Northeast Asia Economic Community. Despite some interruptions, there has been significant progress among the countries in the region except for North Korea (DPRK), which has been the critical gap in an otherwise productive network of dynamic regional economic growth.
   After alarming political tensions resulting from a series of nuclear and missiles tests by North Korea, a dramatic change took place last year in the historic summit between US President Donald Trump and North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un, providing the Northeast Asia region with both challenges and opportunities for minimizing the risk of military confrontation and war. This year, however, the prospect for rapid progress in the de-nuclearization of DPRK has considerably slowed due to subsequent summits and meetings which were not so successful.
   In this context, nevertheless, NEAEF continued its effort began in 1991, toward peace and economic cooperation in Northeast Asia by implementing conference and meeting activities in 2019. These activities are aimed at regional economic integration and thus prepare a meaningful basis and foundation for a potential next step in realizing the goal of building a Northeast Asia Economic Community.
   As in previous years, NEAEF is continuing to fulfill the need for timely and forward-looking research and meetings by focusing on  critical issues, such as 1) discussion and emphasis on connectivity in cross-border infrastructure developments involving North Korea as an integral part of a broader regional economic community in Northeast Asia, and 2) establishment of the proposed Northeast Asia Bank for Cooperation and Development (NEABCD). NEAEF has over the years developed a more cohesive basis for a strong network for functional economic cooperation through regular discussions and consultations among stakeholder country experts.
   For the year 2019, the NEAEF, in collaboration with KIEP, focused on the following topics:
   ● Building a Northeast Asia Economic Community and Its Extended Regions
   ● Cross-border Infrastructure and Special Economic Zones in Northeast Asia
   ● Energy and Environment in Northeast Asia
   ● Tourism Cooperation in Northeast Asia
   ● Financial Cooperation and the proposed development bank for  Northeast Asia
   Annual Conference and Meeting Activities:The Planning Meeting for Regional Cooperation and Strategies for a Northeast Asia Economic Community
   The meeting was held during 21-23 April 2019 in Honolulu, Hawaii, and was organized in collaboration with KIEP and the University of Hawai‘i College of Social Sciences. The plan for major meeting activities was reviewed and discussed: 1. Ad-Hoc Group Meeting on Financial Cooperation in Northeast Asia Stake Holder Countries of China, Japan, and Korea on June 14th, 2019, in Osaka, Japan; 2. The 28th Annual Northeast Asia Economic Forum; and 3. Young Leaders’ Training Program (YLP).
   At the planning meeting, participants agreed that the conference in 2019 will focus on strengthening  functional economic cooperation among the principal stakeholder countries of China, Japan and Korea, and will cover broad as well as specific, topics such as cross-border infrastructure and development and trade, a regional financial institution in Northeast Asia, aimed at a future Northeast Asia Economic Community. The topics will include:
   1. Discussion of relevant issues that will provide the basic foundation for a future Northeast Asian Economic Community
   2. Examination of current issues in functional economic cooperation in the Northeast Asian region by the countries of Northeast Asia and particularly, the stakeholder countries, China, Japan and Korea, in the context of future financial cooperation through the proposed Northeast Asia Development Bank (NEABCD)
   3. Providing wider perspectives from North America, Russia and Mongolia on the Korean Peninsula for future economic cooperation through a regional financial mechanism
   NEAEF, with support from the Freeman Foundation, has been conducting its annual Young Leaders Training and Research Program in Regional Cooperation and Development since 2006. NEAEF is planning to conduct its 14th Young Leaders Program (YLP) from July 28 to August 10, 2019 in collaboration with UNESCAP/NEA and Incheon National University.
   The Ad Hoc Group Meeting on Financial Cooperation in Northeast Asia & Pre-G20 Planning Meeting on Establishing a Northeast Asia Bank for Cooperation and Development: Summary
   1. Update on Current Situation in Japan
   Maeda Tadashi explained that the independent study group led by Tsuyoshi Yamaguchi and other key experts on the Korean peninsula consolidated their works into a proposal and summited it to Yoshihide Suga, the chief cabinet secretary of Japan. Mr. Maeda discussed the building block approach for economic cooperation in Northeast Asia and added that the blocks should be put together by the hands of the leaders of the region. Japan has changed its skeptical posture to one prepared for financial cooperation in Northeast Asia.
   Referring to the “America First” slogan and Brexit, he observed that this trend toward fragmentation of the world will lead to the US and UK losing influence, but it will make the discussion on integration in Northeast Asia more meaningful. He also described the Northeast Asia region as a missing link in terms of economic cooperation. North Korea is the major concern in the region and the Japanese government’s position has been that solving three things—denuclearization, the abduction issue, and missiles—must come first in order to normalize diplomatic relations. In this context, Mr. Maeda said that the discussion on financial cooperation in Northeast Asia and establishment of the NEABCD would be useful to prepare an institutional framework for the region, and eventually for North Korea. He concluded that this Osaka meeting could contribute to exploring ways to improve the serious deadlock between Japan and South Korea.
   2. Chinese Perspective
   Fan Xiaoyun, member of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and professor & associate dean of Nankai University, briefly explained the continuous efforts of Nankai University in researching financial cooperation in Northeast Asia and emphasized that cooperation is the best way to overcome the challenges that the region is facing now. Like the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the “Belt and Road” initiative, cooperation is the necessary path for economic development in the long run, especially for the Northeast Asian region because of complicated geopolitical matters. The region needs the NEABCD as a platform for regional cooperation and economic integration through the support of cross-border infrastructure projects. For cooperation within the region, she suggested four things: 1. the establishment of a cooperation mechanism for local governments of China, Japan, and Korea; 2. the establishment of a joint education and research base; 3. the initiation of an official communication mechanism; and 4. further financial cooperation beyond the NEABCD.
   Ming Liu, associate professor of Nankai University, added further information on China’s situation regarding the establishment of the NEABCD. As a channel to solve the trade conflict between China and the US, China wants to reinforce the trade relationship with Japan and Korea. Referring to the words of Mr. Zhou Xiaochuan, a former president of the Central Bank of China, China is making an effort to increase governance transparency and reduce trade subsidies. He mentioned that we should keep an optimistic view on Northeast Asia’s future. Moreover, the NEABCD and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) could coexist and enhance communication between the governments of China, Japan, and Korea is necessary. Regarding the North Korea issue, he noted that interests could be united under the same channel: infrastructure.
   3. US Perspective
   Mead Treadwell, former lieutenant governor of the State of Alaska, has been working with the Arctic nations, including Japan, Korea, China, and Singapore regarding the Arctic Circle based on the argument that the arctic can do nothing without these partner countries. He explained the potential roles of the Arctic region: feed the world, fuel the world, provision the world, protect the world, connect the world, inspire the world, and the fact that these activities are directly linked to the markets in Asia. While the Arctic is deficient in infrastructure, traditional development banking is less likely because most Arctic nations are typically donor nations. As an alternative, he suggested cooperative financing mechanisms on global infrastructure, energy, and mineral projects, and gave three illustrative examples of cooperative financing mechanisms: Cooperative Arctic Seaways, LNG export from the Arctic, and Rail connection between Alaska and Canada. The development of infrastructure in the Arctic area is directly tied to Northeast Asia and there has been effort to make sure that Asia is included in the Arctic Circle by encouraging the study group in the Japanese Diet and actively supporting cooperation in research. He concluded that it would be difficult to discuss the idea of developing a new regional bank for cooperation without understanding the Arctic.
   4. Korean Perspective
   Jae-Hyung Hong, the former deputy prime minister of the Republic of Korea, emphasized that it is time for Northeast Asian countries to make every effort to prevent current turbulence in the region and there are two key issues that are heightening the tension within Northeast Asia: the US-China trade war and no improvement in North Korea’s denuclearization. The G20 summit in Osaka will be important to ease current tensions and must adopt a declaration of maintaining free trade while avoiding self-defeating protectionism. Mr. Hong reiterated the importance of creating the NEABCD and suggested that member countries should work together to prepare for economic aid for North Korea to ease tensions and eventually facilitate North Korea’s economic normalization.
   Jai-Min Lee, professor of Korea Maritime University and the former vice president of the Korea Export-Import Bank, pointed out that it became more difficult to put the NEADB issue on the government negotiation table between South Korea, Japan, and China because of the unfavorable political environment around the region. However, two suggestions were made as the region should keep preparing for the establishment of the NEADB with the expectation that the NEA situation will improve. The first suggestion was to initiate multinational research on the NEADB framework, and the second was to launch a financial cooperation council between the national banks: JBIC of Japan and Exim banks of Korea and China, based on past experience of cooperation between the three banks.
   5. European Perspective
   Glyn Ford, the director of Track2Asia, explained the current political situation and the role of the European Union. He insisted that it is obvious that things have been changed since the Hanoi summit and the only way to proceed is for both the United States and North Korea to build a multilateral framework within which they cooperate, referring to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Iran deal, and the infrastructure program for North Korea. He also mentioned that the EU showed a willingness to engage regarding the North Korea issue in terms of providing technical expertise and investment; reference was made to the speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue by Federica Mogherini, high representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy.
   In the panel discussion, Tae Soo Kang, senior research fellow at KIEP and the former deputy governor of the Bank of Korea, shared his thoughts on the establishment of NEABCD, on differences between NEABCD and the existing development banks with respect North Korea’s access, and how the NEADB might be one way to approach the North Korea problem.
   Maeda Tadashi pointed out that this issue of NEABCD has arisen because of the shortcomings of the existing Asian Development Bank (ADB) in terms of dealing with the problems that Northeast Asia is facing. He also outlined his idea on the NEABCD dealing with cross-border infrastructure projects like the Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI). Regarding the concept of NEABCD, it was proposed that not only central governments, but also provincial, municipal governments should be part of it in order to solve the problem of income gap between metropolitan and local areas within one country. Moreover, the starting point for the building block approach is cooperation between China and Japan, as this bilateral relationship is improving.
   Ming Liu explained that a new type of development bank will benefit not only developing countries, but also developed countries like Japan and Korea.
   Mead Treadwell recommended that the Northeast Asia area be described as a significant strategic opportunity, similar to what Alaska has done to convince global investors that the Arctic should be viewed as an emerging market with better than average returns. He emphasized the need to provide a better macroeconomic snapshot. He also mentioned that North Korea is an obvious special case, but that we should proceed as if it is not the lynchpin.
   The 28th Annual Conference of the Northeast Asia Economic Forum
   The 28th Annual Conference of the Northeast Asia Economic Forum (NEAEF) was held in Incheon, Republic of Korea during August 7-10, 2019. It was hosted by Incheon National University, in cooperation with University of Hawaii College of Social Sciences, UN ESCAP-NEA, and others. Leaders and experts from China, Japan, Mongolia, Russia, the Republic of Korea, the United States, Canada, and the European Union gathered to advance the NEAEF mission of promoting economic cooperation and peace in Northeast Asia. The 2019 annual conference addressed the increased importance of continuing dialogue and cooperation in the region in light of additional indications of interest in North Korea and new infrastructure developments that carry the opportunity for supporting the integration and development of Northeast Asia, the significant role of financial cooperation in terms of a regional multilateral development bank, tourism cooperation, and energy and the environment. The wide range of topics highlights the vast potentia   l for cooperation in Northeast Asia and made for this year’s engaging conference.
   The conference was officially opened by Lee-Jay Cho, Chairman of the NEAEF, who warmly welcomed the distinguished guests and participants and thanked the host institution, Incheon National University, and NEAEF’s partner organizations for making the conference possible. He extended special appreciation to UN ESCAP-ENEA for hosting and providing the venue for the 2019 Young Leaders Program (YLP) at its offices, in most accommodating settings that greatly facilitated the YLP.
   Welcoming remarks were made on behalf of the host institution by Dong-Sung Cho, president of Incheon National University. This was followed by remarks from the cooperating host institution, the UN ESCAP-ENEA made by Ganbold Baasanjav, head of office, UN ESCAP-ENEA and former ambassador of Mongolia to the Republic of Korea. Remarks were then made by the country representatives: Park Kwan-Young, former speaker of the National Assembly, Republic of Korea and president of the National Development Institute; Fan Xiaoyun, member of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Conference, professor and associate dean, School of Finance, Nankai University—on behalf of Wang Shuzu, former vice mayor, Tianjin Municipal Government; Stephen Cowper, former governor of Alaska; Tanabe Yasuo, special representative for external relations, Hitachi, Ltd.; Pavel Minakir, academician and president, Economic Research Institute, Far East Branch, Russia Academy of Sciences; and S. Gankhuyag, ambassador and director, Investment Research Center, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia. All speakers were grateful for NEAEF’s essential role in working to meet the common aspirations of the countries of Northeast Asia for regional economic development and expressed enthusiasm for another successful conference.
   In the first session, the main theme of the conference “Building a Northeast Asia Economic Community and Its Extended Regions” was discussed. While acknowledging the difficulties created by recent regional disputes and the China-U.S. trade war, Wang Guoping examined new prospects for regional cooperation and benefits from infrastructure development complementary to the Northeast Asia region begun by the Belt and Road Initiative. Sergei Sevastianov then gave a presentation on developments in the Russian Far East that created prospects for increased transportation capabilities through a Northern Sea Route and continued interest in the creation of bilateral and trilateral energy transportation corridors. Following these presentations, an expert committee held an engaging question-and-answer session among themselves and with distinguished members of the audience. Discussions noted that historical and current tensions in the region could be overcome in the same manner as was done in the European Union, the increased interest on the part of North Korea in the Northeast Asia region, and the important role of a NEABCD to promote transportation links in the countries of Northeast Asia.
   The second session focused on “Cross-border Infrastructure and Special Economic Zones in Northeast Asia.” Glyn Ford and Anthony Michell, both with personal experience in North Korea, commented on the state of affairs in the country. North Korea desires to grow its economy, with a future possibility of cooperation with South Korea. Incremental steps will be needed, through negotiations, to establish trust and a path forward for the regional integration of North Korea. International sanctions will continue to be an impediment and Korea’s denuclearization of the peninsula is a process that will take many years.
   Session three addressed the topic of “Financial Cooperation in Northeast Asia.” An international panel of speakers composed of Yutaka Funada, Mead Treadwell, Jai-Min Lee, Fan Xiaoyun, Jae-Hyung Hong, Liu Lanbiao, and Liu Ming presented a number of promising avenues that are emerging in the region, including, for example, Arctic trade routes, developments in the liquid natural gas industry, and infrastructure projects that would be facilitated by cooperation within the region and bring in the support of other actors such as the United States and the European Union. The speakers discussed the continued importance of the NEABCD to facilitate cooperation and economic development amidst the political conflicts. Suggestions for the project included increased multilateral research and planning between the stake holder countries of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. Additionally, private sector involvement could reduce reliance on public institutions, which would help the Bank operate even in times of political turmoil. These suggestions will help the region work towards the goals of free trade and improving political relations. A concurring opinion was that the Bank could look into current methods employed by the World Bank, such as the “cascade strategy,” which seeks to increase private investment and “crowd-in” businesses by making upstream legislative and policy changes to political and financial frameworks in developing regions.
   The fourth session was dedicated to “Energy and Environment in Northeast Asia.” A dynamic panel of speakers—Rho Hesub, Terry Surles, Iinuma Yoshiki, Sung Eun Kim, and Mike Hightower—presented on energy solutions. such as wind energy, solar energy, and the use of micro grids for increased energy security. These avenues have been made possible through multilateral collaboration, advancements in technology, and the promising economic potential of new energy solutions. Because the environment is a shared resource, panelists stressed the importance of cooperation within the region and with other nations, such as the United States. The example of Jeju Island’s environmental sustainability goals was presented, including its “Carbon Free Island” plan, with the goal of being a 100% renewable energy economy with a 75% use of electric cars on the island by 2030, primarily through the use of wind power, managed as a public resource.
   Panelists also discussed increased accessibility to renewable energy across Northeast Asia, with a special focus on wind energy in China and solar energy in Japan. These changes increase security, safety, resiliency, and sustainability, which panelists concurred was more pressing now than ever due to the increased frequency and severity of natural events due to climate change. Finally, the Energy Session discussed meeting supply and demand in a renewable energy market with the incorporation of micro grids in areas subject to natural disaster to provide restoration of needed services to the impacted community. Our future commitments to renewable energy sources within the Northeast Asia region will help assure not only stronger economies, but also a stronger international community.
   Session five, devoted to tourism cooperation in Northeast Asia, examined a wide range of tourism opportunities in Northeast Asia in presentations by Ray Cho, Khalil Philander, Ikuo Mitsuhashi, Ki-Eun Jung, and Zhu Jipeng. The tourism industry in Northeast Asia is anticipated to surpass many existing industries in the near future and will be a key driver for future economic development. Integrated resorts, a new ferry service, and medical tourism were presented as prospective future tourism developments in the region. Three licenses will be awarded for the construction of integrated resorts in Japan. Integrated resorts will include facilities to let visitors experience traditional, cultural, and artistic aspects of Japan. The ferry service is an opportunity for international tourism in Northeast Asia, linking areas in China, Korea, Russia, and Japan. The development of medical tourism provides surgical, traditional, esthetic, and recuperative procedures at the best facilities, with specialists in the area, during an extended and comfortable stay allowing for exploration of the local culture. The culture and tourism industry already plays an important role in Northeast Asia and will continue to grow in this capacity.
   Northeast Asia is a complex region with its fair share of tensions, but this year’s conference embodied a sense of optimism and possibility for cooperation. With continued dedication, clearly greater functional economic cooperation in our region can be realized. The 2019 Conference demonstrated further progress towards the NEAEF goals of promoting understanding and relations among the peoples of Northeast Asia, North America, and Europe.
   Conclusion
   The Northeast Asia Economic Forum has for three decades engaged in the mission and goal of promoting economic cooperation, peace, and prosperity in Northeast Asia with its linkages to North America and Europe. Northeast Asia, endowed with abundant natural and human resources and complemented by capital and technology, is a complex region with a long history of conflicts and tension, and at the same time, also a region of shared cultural affinity.
   This year’s meeting activities, the Annual Conference and ad hoc financial meeting, embodied a sense of long-term optimism and possibility for cooperation for the future, in spite of the constantly shifting political atmosphere in the region. This project, more broadly, has continued to make important contributions in response to changing international situations through timely and necessary research, conferences, meetings, and consultations on regional economic cooperation and integration in Northeast Asia.
   With continued dedication, we believe that greater functional economic cooperation in our region can be realized. To achieve our ultimate goal of developing a Northeast Asia Economic Community, it is absolutely necessary for NEAEF to sustain its effort and momentum and to continue to strive towards the goal of regional development, peace, and prosperity.
   This volume entitled Toward a Northeast Asian Economic Community: Sustaining the Momentum, is the result of our ongoing activities, namely, the ad hoc finance meeting in Osaka, Japan in 2019 and the NEAEF annual conference in Incheon, Republic of Korea, held with a view to developing an economic community for Northeast Asia, one of the most dynamic regions of the world.
   The contents of this volume provide pertinent references and an important basis for further discussion and consideration by government policymakers and researchers in Northeast Asia. The volume also represents an important step in our continuous efforts toward regional economic cooperation and integration aimed at a Northeast Asian Economic Community.