KORUS has contributed to the expansion of new trade opportunities for both parties. Both trade and investment are now substantially larger than before KORUS. Overall, goods and services trade has risen from $129.2 billion in 2011 to $145.31 billion in 2016. This is almost five times as fast as the U.S. growth rate in goods and service trade to the world over the same period. The annual growth rate of the U.S. trade in goods and services with Korea between 2011 and 2016 was 2.4 percent while the figures with NAFTA and the rest of world were 0.4 percent and 0.5 percent, respectively. Clearly, KORUS has benefited both economies during a slowdown in global trade.

However, the White House seems to consider trade deficits as impeding economic growth and prefers taking a bilateral approach to trade imbalances. In particular, Trump seems to think KORUS has led to a decline in U.S. exports to Korea, and the "flood" of Korean imports has resulted in U.S. trade deficits with Korea that equate to lost American jobs. This gross oversimplification of the impact of KORUS is indicative of the Trump administrations lack of understanding of the data used in creating trade policy.

Renegotiating or reforming the KORUS FTA could be a difficult process for both governments. Officials under the new Moon Jae-in government would be very sensitive to new U.S. demands and pressure, which might provoke an anti-American backlash in South Korea. Moon could face severe political pressure domestically to stand apart from the United States and draw closer to China or even to North Korea. In such a situation, Moon might not have the necessary room to make a compromise to benefit both countries. Moreover, given the current tensions on the Korean Peninsula, neither side should want severe trade frictions to undercut or even signal discord in the U.S.-Korea strategic alliance.Thus, renegotiating KORUS demands very careful attention, especially in terms of approaching the negotiating framework.