Earlier this year, following the inauguration of the second Trump administration, one of the most consequential policy decisions was the announcement of significant cuts and halts to expenditures by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In addition, the administration initiated a sweeping reconstruction that included the integration of USAID into the Department of State and the layoff of thousands of USAID employees and contractors worldwide. As the United States remains the world’s largest donor country, these measures—driven by domestic political debates, fiscal constraints, and shifting foreign policy priorities—have sent shockwaves through the global development community, leaving many recipient countries and crisis zones facing acute uncertainty regarding both ongoing and future support. Several European countries have also announced ODA budget cuts. For example, France announced cuts totaling 2.1 billion euros, which is equivalent to a 37% reduction compared to the 2024 figure. Germany’s draft budget proposed a reduction of 836 million euros, representing a 12% decrease from 2024 levels.

However, these disruptions are not isolated phenomena; rather, they are emblematic of a broader and longer-term transformation in the international development landscape. Even prior to the recent shifts in the United States, Europe—the largest donor bloc—had already begun to recalibrate its approach. This shift is evident in the European Union’s transition from “cooperation” to “partnership” in both policy language and institutional structures, signaling a fundamental reorientation of development assistance away from traditional models and towards more strategic, interest-based and collaborative frameworks.

In Europe, the change appeared relatively more gradual. Nevertheless, a particularly notable evolution in international development can be found in the philosophy and branding adopted by the European Union. In 2017, the European Union adopted the New European Consensus on Development, explicitly naming “partnership” as one of its five core agendas and reorienting its approach to development policy.2 The Consensus frames recipient countries as “partner countries,” rather than passive aid beneficiaries, thus emphasizing joint ownership and mutual accountability. This marks a clear departure from the more unilateral, donor-driven cooperation models of the past. This new stance has been reinforced with the launch of the Team Europe Initiatives in 2020, initiated as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Team Europe Initiatives represent a coordinated effort by the EU institutions, the member states, and financial institutions to work collectively with partner countries.3 The objective of these partnerships is increasingly framed as a collaborative and mutually beneficial endeavor, rather than a one-way transfer.

While the EU’s rebranding of international development cooperation as a mutually beneficial partnership signals a progressive shift in donor philosophy, this narrative is intertwined with the rise of nationalism and growing support for far-right parties within Europe. Over the past decade, populist and nationalist movements have gained significant traction across numerous EU member states, fueled by economic uncertainty, concerns over globalization, and anxieties about migration (Kim and Kim 2024).4 Golder (2016)5 categorizes nationalism as one of the core ideological traits of the far right in Europe. This political climate has led to mounting calls for development aid to more directly serve national interests. This can take the form of linking ODA to migration control, economic returns, or security objectives, rather than prioritizing poverty reduction or global solidarity, for example. As a result, the EU’s partnership rhetoric often coexists with, and is sometimes challenged by, the instrumentalization of aid for domestic political and economic purposes (Furness, Ghica, Lightfoot, Szent-Iványi 2020).6 This tension has complicated the EU’s efforts to balance solidarity with instrumentality, raising questions about the long-term coherence and credibility of its development policy in an era of rising doner nationalism and political fragmentation (Perez, Butler, and Maseda 2025).

There has been a marked decline in international aid from many European countries in 2024, with further cuts already announced and anticipated.8 There is also suggestive evidence that funds are increasingly redirected towards domestic priorities.9 This includes security concerns—both in conventional and economic contexts—such as high-profile armed conflicts, most notably the war in Ukraine, as well as efforts to reinforce supply chains. It is not surprising to see that the support for regions such as sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America has sharply fallen.

For emerging donors such as South Korea, this shifting landscape raises important policy and research questions. As established donors reduce their commitments and increasingly align aid with national interests, emerging donors must carefully consider how to position their own ODA strategies to ensure the balance between humanitarian needs, effectiveness and credibility in the global development arena. A thorough understanding of these trends is essential for countries like South Korea to design international development policies that not only fill critical gaps left by traditional donors, but also respond to the evolving expectations of international cooperation and solidarity.

Yoonjung Kim ✉️

Ph.D., Associate Research Fellow, North America and Europe Team,

East Asian and Advanced Economy Studies