This study examines the recent evolution of U.S. foreign economic policy, confirming through multiple sources that it is increasingly converging toward a stronger form of economic nationalism under the “America First” banner. It empirically evaluates whether major U.S. policies have achieved their intended economic outcomes and assesses their broader implications for Korea. Building on these findings, the study projects the likely trajectory of U.S. policy and derives implications for Korea’s trade, industrial cooperation, and collaboration with like-positioned partners.

Chapter 2 reviews the background and current direction of U.S. foreign economic policy. The Trump 2.0 administration’s approach represents a continuation of long-standing U.S. protectionism and isolationism, now reshaped into a 21st-century form of economic nationalism. Historical precedents include McKinley’s tariff policies and Reagan’s strategic protectionism, but current policies are more explicitly geopolitical—responding to China’s rise and global supply chain shifts. Under the four core themes of border security, energy independence, government reform, and value restoration, the administration is using Section 232, Section 301, and the IEEPA to enhance U.S. bargaining power while strengthening domestic manufacturing and tax bases through the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA). The chapter also highlights the enduring anti-China orientation shaping U.S. policy since the Obama administration’s Pivot to Asia, sustained through both Trump and Biden presidencies. Recent U.S.–China tariff negotiations have only delayed, not resolved, structural trade frictions.

Chapter 3 presents empirical analyses of key policies. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) reduced U.S. outbound FDI but increased inbound FDI, indicating a re-concentration of global investment around the U.S. economy. This suggests that Korea must adapt its FDI strategies and risk management accordingly. The analysis of Section 301 tariffs shows heterogeneous impacts: while overall benefiting Korean exports, gains largely reflect indirect trade diversion amid heightened U.S.-China tensions. A qualitative comparison of industrial policies under successive administrations reveals that Trump 2.0 policy prioritizes shipbuilding, nuclear, and AI industries, while semiconductor and renewable sectors face greater policy uncertainty—underscoring the need for sector-specific strategies in U.S.–Korea cooperation.

Chapter 4 concludes that U.S. economic nationalism will intensify, with China containment at its core. The United States is expected to further promote domestic production in strategic sectors such as steel, autos, shipbuilding, semiconductors, and biopharma, while excluding China from key supply chains. Under Trump, unilateral measures such as tariffs, export controls, and investment restrictions will likely prevail, whereas a future Democratic administration may revive alliance- based approaches.