Together with the global expansion of projects to realize carbon neutrality, demand for key minerals—used as raw materials for renewable energy power generation such as solar panels and wind turbines, as well as for electric vehicles (batteries)—is rapidly increasing. One major concern is that China holds a dominant position across all stages of the global critical minerals supply chain, from mining (ore and concentrate) to refining and smelting (basic and processed metals), and recycling (scrap). In particular, China’s influence in the refining and smelting sector is overwhelming, and the nation also exerts significant control over the mining stage for certain minerals. In response, major countries including the United States, the EU, Japan, and the Korean government are strategically working to establish stable supply chains in this area, aiming to reduce reliance on China (de-Chinaization) and to transition energy structures towards decarbonization. Notably, although Korea is a major manufacturer in advanced industries such as electric vehicle batteries and semiconductors, its dependence on China for refined and processed products of critical minerals like lithium, cobalt, and nickel exceeds 70%, posing significant vulnerabilities in its supply chain.

China holds a dominant position as both a major supplier and consumer within the global critical minerals supply chain, but it exhibits various strengths and weaknesses at different stages. This study divides the supply chain into the stages of mining (ore and concentrate), refining and smelting (basic and processed metals), and recycling (scrap) to analyze China’s influence and vulnerabilities. It also examines strategies on the part of the Chinese government and enterprises to fortify their supply chains, drawing implications for Korea’s stable mineral procurement.

Chapter 2 of the study analyzes China’s control measures and vulnerabilities in the global critical minerals supply chain. While China firmly dominates the refining and smelting stages of the global critical minerals supply chain, it is relatively vulnerable in the mining stage. This is because, despite holding some advantages in ore deposits and production, China’s domestic industrial demand is not fully met, resulting in a high dependence on imported raw materials. Moreover, China has an industrial structure that imports basic raw materials for refining and smelting, meaning that as metal production increases, the demand for raw material imports also rises accordingly. Additionally, our analysis comprehensively considers mineral-specific (basic raw material) reserves, production volume, external dependence, and the Trade Specialization Index (TSI) to evaluate China’s strengths and weaknesses, linking these to the strategies China pursues. China mainly enforces export controls on Group 1 minerals—such as rare earth elements, gallium, and germanium—over which it holds an absolute advantage, using these controls as tools for economic pressure or strategic leverage. For instance, in response to US semiconductor equipment export controls against China, China banned exports of gallium and germanium to the US. For Group 2 minerals (those with advantages in reserves and production but insufficient to fully meet domestic demand), export control systems are also applied, but the focus here is more on domestic supply and demand management. For example, China has tightened export controls on antimony since 2019 to stabilize domestic supply amid internal shortages and growing demand for home appliances in 2024. Meanwhile, minerals classified as Group 3 (disadvantaged minerals) such as copper, aluminum (bauxite), lithium, cobalt, and nickel show high Chinese market shares at the refining stage but suffer from insufficient domestic reserves and production, leading to heavy reliance on overseas sources for raw materials. Copper and aluminum are widely used as base minerals, while lithium, cobalt, and nickel are essential for core industries like secondary battery cathode materials. Any disruption in the supply of these raw materials could impact China’s overall industrial sector. In response, China focuses on domestic resource development, securing overseas mines, and recycling to strengthen resource security and supply chain resilience.

Chapter 3 analyzes domestic mineral resource development and recycling strategies. In the area of domestic development, China strategically manages its mineral resources based on the Mineral Resources Law and the five-year National Mineral Resources Plan. In 2024, a comprehensive revision of the Mineral Resources Law was made to explicitly link resource security with national security, strengthening the legal foundation by introducing provisions for the stable acquisition of strategic minerals and supply chain stability. The National Mineral Resources Plan includes comprehensive strategies not only for domestic resource development but also for securing overseas resources, controlling protective minerals, and stockpiling. The plan (2016–2020) officially designated 24 strategic minerals. In particular, regarding domestic mineral resource exploration and development, various policies are in motion to promote exploration, innovate technologies, and foster mining industry clusters linked with related downstream industries. As of 2023, China’s investment in geological exploration and fixed assets in mining has increased for three consecutive years. Exploration investment has been focused on base minerals, but following policies to expand exploration of strategic minerals, new deposits of lithium, rare earths, and others have recently been discovered. Consequently, China’s global lithium reserves ranking rose from 6th to 2nd in the world. Additionally, China is expanding its influence in deep-sea resource development by securing exploration rights for gas hydrates in the South China Sea and polymetallic nodules in the international deep-sea CCZ (Clarion-Clipperton Zone) area.

In the area of resource circularity, China is actively promoting recycling policies to realize a circular economy and ensure the stable supply of critical minerals. The government plans to establish waste recycling systems (collection and sorting → pre-treatment → refining and recycling) in key sectors such as waste home appliances and spent batteries by 2025, and aims to standardize these systems by 2030. This nationwide system construction and standardization is led by the China Resources Recycling Group (CRRG). The CRRG provides comprehensive solutions by integrating functions such as acquiring and merging leading industry companies, waste collection, processing, distribution, and standard setting. As of April 2025, the CRRG has established nine subsidiaries focused on areas like spent battery recycling and non-ferrous metal recovery, integrating and standardizing the previously fragmented systems across these fields. In the recycling sector, spent electric vehicle batteries have emerged as a crucial means of securing key minerals such as lithium, nickel, and cobalt. Although China has not yet fully built institutional frameworks and standardized markets for spent battery recycling, it has adopted advanced policies faster than any other country and continuously optimizes its regulations through trial and error. Major companies like CATL have already established a closed-loop recycling system and are expanding their influence across the entire supply chain through cooperation with domestic and international automakers. Accordingly, by 2050, China is projected to maintain unparalleled dominance based on the world’s largest spent battery processing capacity, raw material supply, and technological capabilities.

Chapter 4 addresses China’s strategies for securing mineral resources overseas. The Chinese government identified the overseas acquisition of mineral resources as a key policy direction in the National Mineral Resources Plan (2016-2020). It pledged to mobilize various policy tools, including mining cooperation based on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), exploring joint investment models linking mining and infrastructure, establishing multilateral and bilateral cooperation platforms, supporting Chinese companies’ overseas mineral investments, and participating in global mining governance. Looking at global mineral (metal resource) investment trends since China officially launched the BRI in 2013, several points stand out. First, investment by private enterprises in metal resources has expanded significantly. Second, the primary investment regions have diversified from a previous focus on Australia to include Sub-Saharan Africa, South America, and East Asia. And third, while investments have continued to focus on base minerals, there has been a gradual increase in investments targeting critical metals such as lithium, nickel, cobalt, uranium, and niobium. Based on comprehensive support from the Chinese government, both state-owned and private enterprises have focused on securing base minerals (iron, copper, aluminum) and critical metals (lithium, nickel, cobalt, uranium, niobium) primarily in Sub-Saharan Africa, South America, and East Asia—key regions for China’s mineral supply. All the major minerals secured overseas by China belong to its group of disadvantaged minerals (i.e., those in which China is relatively weaker domestically). While every country secures its disadvantaged minerals through key supplying nations, China is particularly threatening because it invests aggressively enough to gain control over production within supplying countries. For example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo—where about 70% of the world’s cobalt ore production (with over 50% of global reserves) is concentrated—Chinese companies currently account for over 40% of cobalt ore production. Similarly, in Indonesia, which holds 42.3% of nickel ore reserves, 50% of mining production, and 42% of refining production, Chinese companies are estimated to control about 75% of nickel refining capacity. In other words, China has not only strengthened the raw material stages (ore mining and refining) of critical minerals such as cobalt and nickel—previously its weak links—but has substantially overcome these vulnerabilities. Examining the strategies behind these achievements, first, China has built multi-layered cooperation platforms (region-state, state-to-state) with key mineral-supplying countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, South America, and East Asia, creating long-term negotiation mechanisms with local governments and conducting regular consultations. Second, China established regional funds to provide large-scale financial support (indirect financing) for domestic state-owned and private companies investing locally. Third, it has developed mineral production and processing facilities within key countries to strengthen localization capabilities.

Chapter 5 analyzes China’s export control strategies. China established its legislative plan for the Export Control Law in 2016 and began its enforcement on December 1, 2020. Subsequently, in 2024, China enacted the Regulations on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items and announced the List of Export and Import Administration for Dual-Use Items and Technologies, thereby strengthening its export control legal framework. We evaluate this as indicating China has established a complete legal foundation before the inauguration of the new US administration (Trump’s second term). Since the enforcement of the Export Control Law, China designated key mineral resources as dual-use items to reinforce resource security and, from 2023 onward, has actively used export controls on advantageous mineral resources as a strategic response card. In retaliation to US semiconductor equipment export controls, China restricted exports of major minerals such as gallium and germanium. On December 3, 2024, China implemented export bans specifically targeting the US on dual-use minerals including gallium, germanium, and antimony for the first time. Between 2023 and 2024, China implemented export controls citing the need to protect national security and interests. Some minerals, such as graphite and antimony, were controlled to address internal supply issues and to adjust the list of temporarily controlled items. However, after the inauguration of Trump’s second term in 2025, China escalated the weaponization of mineral resources more explicitly, enacting export control measures immediately upon announcement and clearly signaling these as pressure tactics against the US. For example, the export controls on seven types of Chinese rare earths directly pressured the US defense industry, a move publicly emphasized by Chinese media. Minerals designated as dual-use export control items by China generally correspond to strategic minerals in which China holds a reserve and production advantage, and many have already been designated or are expected to be listed. Coming into 2025, we see a tendency to convert minerals previously on the export licensing management list (e.g., titanium, molybdenum) into dual-use controlled items, or to expand the range of controlled items among existing controlled minerals (e.g., tungsten, rare earths). Controls have also been strengthened on minerals included in the dual-use control lists of other countries, such as indium, molybdenum, and bismuth. Going forward, additional minerals such as vanadium, fluorite (rare earth elements not yet controlled), magnesium (with an expanded control list), beryllium, and aluminum are highly likely to be added to the control list. Regarding the export trends of minerals designated as dual-use export control items between 2023 and 2024, such as graphite and antimony, China has sharply reduced exports of basic raw materials (ore and concentrate) while increasing exports of refined metals and processed metals with higher added value. This strategy is evaluated as an effort to maximize national benefits by shrinking exports of raw materials—whose end users and purposes are difficult to track due to multiple processing stages—and expanding exports of higher value-added finished products.

Chapter 6 proposes the following response measures for the Korean government and companies based on the aforementioned analysis: Since Korea lacks deep-sea mining technology and experience, cooperation with technologically advanced countries such as the United States is necessary. Korea should also actively participate in establishing rational mining regulations that consider environmental protection to secure deep-sea resources. Korea needs to secure competitiveness in the battery recycling industry through a private-sector-led ecosystem construction complemented by institutional support from the government. Cooperation with Chinese companies in refining and smelting within major mineral supplying countries is essential. Regarding minerals such as fluorite and magnesium, which China is likely to attempt to control exports of in the future, the Korean government and companies need to proactively prepare by adjusting stockpiles and diversifying import sources. As China is expected to expand export controls not only on minerals themselves but also on refining and smelting technologies, it is urgent to promote cooperation with countries that have similar demands in refining and smelting sectors.