This study aims to outline the direction of South Korea’s policy towards Myanmar by examining the current political and economic situation in Myanmar and reviewing the Myanmar-related policies of major countries. Myanmar, having shown hope for political transformation after political reforms in 2011 and the establishment of a civilian government in 2015, has returned to its past trajectory as the military reasserted control through a coup in 2021. The country now finds itself in a state of turmoil, with the military struggling to fully consolidate its hold on power. The current situation in Myanmar shows no clear hope for democratization.

The international community broadly condemned the Myanmar military’s coup. The United States and Europe, in particular, have imposed strong economic sanctions on Myanmar, which is now once again under military rule. Countries sensitive to democracy and human rights issues, such as South Korea and Japan, as well as ASEAN and some of its member states have also joined in these sanctions. However, the degree of participation varies according to each country’s circumstances, though they generally resort to a sanctions-based response towards Myanmar, ranging from selective to comprehensive sanctions.

In contrast, China and Russia have taken a more flexible stance on Myanmar’s military coup, displaying a more engaging approach. They have politically supported the Myanmar military, undermining UN sanctions and condemnations led by Western nations. While they advocate for a quick stabilization of Myanmar’s current political situation, they regard the coup as an internal affair and refrain from interference. Economically, they continue to expand cooperation with Myanmar. Russia, in particular, has significantly increased its military support for the Myanmar military since the coup. Thus, these two countries adopt an engagement approach, which varies from selective to comprehensive engagement based on the degree of involvement.

For South Korea, Myanmar was seen as the last “land of opportunity” in Southeast Asia following its political liberalization in 2011. Official development assistance and investments in Myanmar increased significantly. However, since the military coup in 2021, the South Korean government has suspended almost all political and economic relations with Myanmar, aside from humanitarian aid. While this cannot be considered comprehensive sanctions, it represents a fairly high level of selective sanctions. At the same time, there are various incentives to restore relations with Myanmar, such as South Korea’s ties with ASEAN, economic security considerations, supply chain issues, and investment opportunities in Myanmar. This presents a dilemma between the reality of military rule in Myanmar and the economic benefits that could be gained from the country.

Nonetheless, given the core direction of South Korea’s foreign policy, it is premature to pursue economic opportunities in Myanmar at this time. In the short term, it is unlikely that South Korea’s policy towards Myanmar will change before the 2025 elections, which will be held by the military. The question then arises: what approach should South Korea adopt depending on the political scenarios that may unfold in Myanmar after the 2025 election? If the post-election government is essentially a continuation of military rule, South Korea’s policy and stance towards Myanmar should remain unchanged in the short term. If, however, pro-democracy forces manage to take control and initiate reforms either before or after the election, South Korea’s policy could be adjusted to align more quickly with the new political landscape. Lastly, if Myanmar descends into a state of civil war or becomes a failed state, South Korea’s policy will need a complete shift, focusing primarily on refugee assistance, peacekeeping in response to the conflict, and protecting South Korean nationals in Myanmar.

South Korea’s Myanmar policy in each of these scenarios will inevitably intersect with the policies of other major countries engaged with Myanmar. Depending on the scenario, the policies of the United States, Japan, and South Korea are likely to move in similar directions. Although there may be differences in pace, South Korea may find it essential to collaborate with these countries in rebuilding Myanmar should it resume a path towards democratization or in countering China’s growing influence under military rule. China and Russia may find prolonged military rule advantageous and are likely to expand their influence as much as possible. Finally, ASEAN’s approach is expected to be largely aligned with South Korea’s, allowing for potential synergy. However, ASEAN may show greater tolerance towards Myanmar’s military government, and, if military rule stabilizes over time, ASEAN may eventually recognize and cooperate with such a regime. In this context, South Korea will need a rationale to reconcile the contradiction between the “severed ROK-Myanmar relations” and “cooperation with Myanmar as a part of ROK-ASEAN cooperation.”