At the same time we can observe that the U.S. has the world’s largest intellectual property surplus and keeps expanding it, while China’s intellectual property deficit has been growing every year. Given the two contradictory facts - China’s high innovation productivity and low intellectual property balance - we can conclude that China is strong at “innovation” but weak at “invention.” Knowing this, the U.S. eventually began to target this vulnerability. This is the U.S.’ Tech-Decoupling strategy.

To achieve U.S.-China tech decoupling, the U.S. has been strengthening trade and investment sanctions against China. In specific, the U.S. has been utilizing the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA), Section 889 of the 2019 National Defense Authority Act, and the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA). In return, China is responding to the U.S. sanctions with the new “Long March” strategy rather than a tit-for-tat strategy. In other words, China has been setting long-term aims and responding to the U.S. sanctions by improving institutional arrangements, refining industrial policies, and developing its own technologies such as “Dual-circulation strategy” and “New Infrastructure Plan.”

Ironically, increasing pressure from the U.S. is expected to further strengthen China’s R&D capabilities in advanced technology and accelerate its competitiveness in emerging industries. With the onset of the 4th Industrial Revolution, China is rapidly closing the quality gap and technology gap in major industries where Korea has a comparative advantage. If Korea does not adequately respond to changes, it may be difficult to maintain a comparative advantage over China. Thus, now that U.S.-China tensions are intensifying, Korea is facing a pivotal moment in determining the future path of its economy.