Since the end of World War II, the European Union’s (EU) defense and security architecture has relied almost entirely on the US-centered North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO). While integration at the EU level has made significant progress in the economic and financial integration, defense and security remain relatively underdeveloped due to ongoing tensions between member states’ sovereign authority and supranational leadership. However, the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 marked a fundamental turning point in Europe’s security landscape. Not only was it the first full-scale war on the European continent since World War II, but it also coincided with renewed criticism from the Trump administration regarding the EU’s excessive dependence on NATO and demands for increased defense spending. As a result, the EU came to recognize more acutely the necessity of securing strategic autonomy and strengthening its own defense capabilities. In response, the European Commission announced a strategy to reinforce the defense industrial base and build an autonomous and competitive defense posture by 2030, launching full-scale policy efforts to enhance the competitiveness of EU-based defense firms and promote joint procurement.

Even before the Russia-Ukraine war, the EU had sought to enhance cooperation among member states through mechanisms such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defense Fund (EDF), and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD). PESCO provides a framework for closer cooperation in defense and security, with 75 projects currently under development, while the EDF supports the development of innovative defense technologies and equipment with a budget of €8 billion for the 2021-27 period. The EU Defense Innovation Scheme (EUDIS) aims to foster an innovation ecosystem for start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Following the war, however, the EU has adopted more proactive, immediate, and robust defense measures. Notably, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) aims to supply one million rounds of artillery ammunition to support Ukraine, with a particular emphasis on expanding manufacturing capacity within the EU. In addition, the European Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS) - the EU’s first-ever defense industrial strategy - encourages member states to invest more, better, and collectively. The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) initiative is a €150 billion loan-guarantee program designed to support joint weapons procurement and represents the largest defense-related financial instrument ever established at the EU level. Furthermore, the European The Defense Industry Programme (EDIP) will provide €1.5 billion in grants between 2025 and 2027 to strengthen the EU’s defense posture by enhancing industrial competitiveness and promoting joint procurement. The EDIP consists of three pillars: strengthening the competitiveness and responsiveness of the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), improving the timely availability and security of the supply of defense products, and supporting Ukraine’s Defense Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB). Together, these measures aim to ensure the sustained development of Europe’s defense industry and establish a supply chain capable of rapidly procuring critical materials during crises.

Nevertheless, the EU defense market faces a structural challenge of fragmentation. With 27 member states operating under different procurement systems and regulatory frameworks, building a pan-European defense procurement market remains difficult. As a result, as of June 2023, 76% of weapons procured by EU member states were imported, with the United States accounting for a dominant 63% share. Defense industries within the EU, are primarily concentrated in France, Germany and Italy and, the EU aims to use these countries as anchors for a renaissance of the European defense industrial base. In this process, the EU’s defense industrial innovation roadmap emphasizes that disruptive technologies - such as artificial intelligence, quantum, cyber capabilities and space- based systems - are fundamentally transforming the nature of warfare. Accordingly, the EU highlights a ‘spin-on’ development approach that rapidly integrates cutting- edge civilian technologies into the defense sector.

Meanwhile, the South Korean government has set itself the goal of becoming the world’s fourth-largest defense exporter by 2027 and has designated advanced defense industries as a national strategic sector. In its Defense Science and Technology Planning Document for 2025–2039, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) has outlined a roadmap to secure ten strategic technologies, including AI, manned–unmanned teaming, quantum technologies, and space capabilities. In addition, the government plans to provide comprehensive support for overseas expansion by defense firms through the establishment of a “K-Defense Export Fund” and expanded tax incentives. Korea’s defense industry is particularly competitive in terms of mass-production capacity, rapid delivery, high performance relative to cost, and strong government backing. Poland has emerged as a key partner, accounting for a substantial share of Korea’s defense exports, with major platforms including the K2 main battle tank, the K9 self-propelled howitzer, and the FA-50 light attack aircraft. However, Korea’s level of core technological capability in advanced domains remains at approximately 82% of that of the most advanced countries, indicating a need for further improvement, and its export structure remains overly concentrated in a limited number of markets.

As the EU actively seeks to enhance its own defense competitiveness, particularly by supporting EU-based defense firms and prioritizing European-origin products in joint procurement- there is a risk that Korean defense companies may face growing barriers to entry in the European market. Nevertheless, the potential synergies arising from the complementary strengths of Korea and the EU should not be overlooked. While the EU excels in advanced technology, Korea has strengths in production capacity and cost efficiency. Moreover, as the EU seeks to reduce excessive dependence on the United States while enhancing its internal defense capabilities under the banner of strategic autonomy, Korea could be a valuable partner. This, in turn, suggests new opportunities for Korean defense firms. Accordingly, this study proposes the following policy recommendations.

First, Korea should pursue the joint establishment of defense industry clusters in Eastern Europe, centered on existing major export destinations such as Poland and Romania. By building maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) facilities and localized production systems, Korean firms can meet “Made in Europe” requirements. Defense companies should analyze the industrial ecosystems of individual Eastern European countries and differentiate their roles accordingly. For example, Poland could serve as a hub for tank and self-propelled artillery assembly and maintenance, while Romania could be developed as a base for artillery ammunition and component production. By creating a horizontally integrated supply chain, Korean firms can secure continuous orders across the EU. Second, a strategic and reciprocal offset framework is needed. Rather than focusing solely on exports, Korea should design models that combine localized technology transfer with industrial cooperation to secure a sustainable position in the EU market. At the government level, the scope of offset recognition should be negotiated in advance, and guidelines for technology protection should be established to prevent excessive demands for technology transfer. At the same time, firms should design technology-transfer models that are phased and conditional, and which contribute to local industrial development while preserving technological sovereignty. Long-term contracts with local firms and the operation of technical training programs will be essential to facilitate natural integration into EU supply chains.

Finally, Korea and the EU should expand their joint R&D initiatives in advanced and disruptive technologies of shared strategic importance, such as AI, space, and cyber capabilities, and operate joint testbeds. The establishment of a Korea–EU joint defense innovation fund would allow risks to be shared through co-investment, while institutionalized cooperation between Korea’s Agency for Defense Development and EU research institutions could support joint research on reconnaissance satellites, military PNT (positioning, navigation, and timing), and AI-enabled battlefield experimentation. At a corporate level, Korean companies should form multilateral consortia with EU firms in areas such as AI-based battle management systems and drone swarm operations and actively participate in joint prototype development.