With the expansion of BRICS into BRICS+ in 2024, it has shown the potential for establishing a global order led by Global South countries. BRICs, officially launched in 2009 with four countries (China, Russia, India, Brazil), approved the accession of four new member countries (UAE, Egypt, Iran, Ethiopia) for the first time in 13 years since South Africa joined in 2011, and Indonesia formally joined as a member in 2025. Consequently, as of 2023, BRICS+ is a massive economic bloc, accounting for 28.1% of global GDP and 48.7% of the world’s population. Discussions are underway as to whether it will emerge as a new alternative to Western-centric economic cooperation, such as the G7, and the Bretton Woods financial order.

Particularly as economic and security cooperation with the Global South strengthens, centered around China and Russia, and the so-called Global South rises, BRICS+ is drawing attention as a focal point for Global South cooperation. China is expanding industrial, technological, financial, and supply chain cooperation with developing countries through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), while Russia is expanding its influence centered on security cooperation. This has led the United States, among others, to closely monitor whether BRICS+ will bring structural changes to the international order. Especially in the 2020s, amid complex crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine War, and the Israel-Hamas conflict, coupled with the escalating US-China competition, Global South countries are adopting diplomatic strategies that seek their own national interests by balancing between the US and China/Russia to diversify risks. Global South countries, including the new members, aim to achieve various goals — such as attracting domestic industries, acquiring technology, and securing stable supply chains — by strategically utilizing BRICS+. Recently, cases of South-South cooperation centered on BRICS+ member countries have also been increasing.

Against this backdrop, this study aims to derive policy implications for South Korea’s foreign economic policy by answering the following questions: (1) Why is BRICS+ expanding, and what are the motivations of the countries to join BRICS+? (2) Is strategic interdependence among BRICS+ countries increasing? (3) Will the economic power of BRICS+ in the global market be strengthened? (4) What are the future directions and challenges for BRICS+? Accordingly, this study focuses on 11 countries: the 10 BRICS+ nations and Saudi Arabia, which deferred its accession.

The expansion of BRICS+ was influenced by the rise of the Global South and the backlash against the Western-led international order. In particular, intensified Western containment of China and Russia provided the motivation for them to pursue the expansion of BRICS. The weakening of multilateralism and disappointment with Western leadership post-pandemic activated the discourse on the ‘rise of the Global South’, which led to high interest and positive responses from emerging countries regarding BRICS expansion. As Russia and China use BRICS+ as part of their strategy to counter the US, there is a view that sees BRICS+ as an anti-Western bloc. However, this dichotomous perspective has limitations, as it oversimplifies the complex participation motives of other BRICS+ members. It is true that BRICS+ member states are dissatisfied with the current order led by a few advanced nations. However, for original members like India, Brazil, and South Africa, as well as the new members, BRICS+ functions not as participation in an anti-Western coalition, but as a consultative body to reform the global governance system — which is unfair to developing countries — and to secure their own strategic and economic interests. Amid growing uncertainty in the international order due to the US-China strategic competition and the Russia- Ukraine War, many member states seek to use BRICS+ as a means for economic and diplomatic diversification. For example, BRICS+ provides Iran with a channel to bypass economic isolation, and offers Egypt and Ethiopia opportunities to receive financial support without relying on the IMF or World Bank. Furthermore, BRICS+ serves as a platform for countries like the UAE, which have felt marginalized in the Western-centric system, to enhance their global standing.

Above all, BRICS+ is becoming a key consultative body driving international cooperation that reflects the demands of the Global South. Member states are strengthening cooperation on common challenges for developing countries, such as climate change, health, and the eradication of hunger and poverty, in addition to calling for increased representation for developing countries at the IMF and reform of the UN Security Council. At the 2025 Rio Summit, they emphasized cooperation to protect the interests of the Global South, including a partnership to eradicate poverty, a declaration on climate finance, and the establishment of inclusive and fair global AI governance. This shows that BRICS+ is evolving from its existing financial cooperation into a multidimensional cooperative body representing the interests of the Global South across a wide range of fields, including health, climate, digital, and new technologies. Meanwhile, BRICS+ movements toward local currency settlement, the establishment of a grain exchange board, and cooperation in energy and advanced technology suggest the potential for economic solidarity among member states. Recently, the tariff policies of the Trump administration have also acted as an external factor promoting intra-bloc cooperation within BRICS+.

BRICS+ countries exert significant influence in the energy, critical minerals, and grain markets, as the membership includes major producers of crude oil, natural gas, and grains, as well as exporters of critical minerals. What is particularly noteworthy is the gradual increase in commodity trade among BRICS+ countries and the very low volume of trade with G7 nations. In other words, commodity trade between the G7 and BRICS+ is not active, which also suggests that the space for BRICS+ to align with the G7 during a complex crisis is diminishing. Meanwhile, commodity trade between non-BRICS+ Global South countries and BRICS+ is on an upward trend, which can be interpreted as the strengthening of BRICS+’s economic influence over the wider Global South. BRICS+ is strengthening cooperation on agriculture, energy, and critical minerals, and bilateral cooperation is also becoming more active.

In the manufacturing sector, China plays a core role in BRICS+ production, with over 83% of BRICS+ manufacturing exports originating from China. The countries with the next highest manufacturing export shares are India and the UAE, but their shares are very low compared to China’s. Consequently, manufacturing cooperation within BRICS+ is centered on China, and it should be seen that the Partnership on New Industrial Revolution (PartNIR), the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership, and the BRICS Industry Ministers’ Meeting are also, in effect, led by China. BRICS+ has expanded its export share to other BRICS+ members and third countries, centered on traditional manufacturing sectors like electrical/electronic equipment, machinery, and automobiles, with the export share of intermediate goods gradually increasing between 2013 and 2023. However, unlike the G7, the export share of capital goods has stagnated, suggesting that BRICS+ countries are engaged in cooperation closer to building a supply chain through intermediate goods trade, rather than acting as an export base.

Investment inflow into BRICS+ amounts to $330.6 billion (as of 2024), accounting for 21.9% of total global investment. Of this, China’s share alone accounts for 7.7% of the global total. In contrast, investment outflow from BRICS+ is only 15.1%, indicating a significant net investment inflow. The BRICS+ investment cooperation strategy is mainly composed of financial support through the multilateral financial institution, the New Development Bank (NDB), and investment cooperation via platforms (Business Council, Business Forum, PartNIR). In 2015 and 2021, they also agreed to promote investment among BRICS countries through the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership.

Meanwhile, contrary to concerns, bilateral investment among BRICS+ members is not large compared to their investments in the G7, and the investment sectors are also limited. An analysis of policy-driven investment trends, centered on sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), to gauge the investment policy direction of each BRICS+ government shows that major countries such as China, Russia, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia have recently been expanding their investments, focusing on advanced industries such as IT and bio industry. However, due to the nature of policy finance — seeking long-term returns — investments are heavily concentrated in politically stable and large markets like the G7 (especially the US and UK), suggesting limitations to bilateral investment cooperation within BRICS+. The reason for this phenomenon is that China and India are effectively the only countries within BRICS+ with high technological levels and large consumer markets, while the remaining countries have high demand for infrastructure and resource development. Financial cooperation among BRICS countries stems from the belief that their voting power in major multilateral financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank is low, and that the dollar-centric settlement structure can be disadvantageous due to factors like foreign exchange losses. In particular, after the financial crisis, restrictions on the voice of developing countries in the IMF and World Bank heightened the sense of crisis that the supply of international financial liquidity could operate primarily for the benefit of advanced nations. Consequently, China has long attempted to internationalize the RMB to reduce its financial dependence on the US, and RMB transactions have indeed increased slightly. In addition to traditional finance, BRICS+ countries have formalized the establishment of a BRICS digital payment network to expand digital financial cooperation, which is also linked to building a financial settlement safety net. Accordingly, the original five countries are leading the development and commercialization of CBDCs. BRICS financial cooperation is divided into emergency liquidity support (e.g., currency swaps, Contingent Reserve Arrangement), development finance through the NDB, and digital financial cooperation, and has produced various achievements.

However, as US countermeasures intensify in response to expanded financial cooperation, and the US formalizes the launch of stablecoins, challenges for BRICS+ financial cooperation are coming to the fore. Above all, the main challenges include: right-sizing the CRA fund to reflect the expanded membership and improving the efficiency of the risk management system; streamlining NDB voting rights; and building the digital infrastructure for the digital finance system centered on BRICS Pay and BRICS Bridge, as well as responding to stablecoins. Furthermore, the fact that countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia use a dollar peg, and that their positions differ from those of Russia and Iran, which advocate for de-dollarization, is another factor to consider in the advancement of financial cooperation.

Based on previous analysis, this study suggests directions for cooperation between South Korea and BRICS+ countries, focusing on the future development path and challenges of BRICS+. First, BRICS+ is expected to develop in a direction that reduces economic dependence on the West. This can be seen as BRICS+ acting as an alternative cooperative body rather than an exclusive bloc. Accordingly, cooperation is expected to expand around: (1) strengthening economic cooperation in traditional industries, (2) leading global agendas that reflect the voices of developing countries (e.g., climate change, energy security, SDGs, poverty), and (3) expanding cooperation in advanced industries and technology. It is projected that the bloc-formation of BRICS+ will not threaten the existing international order system, contrary to some concerns. This is also linked to the following challenges. The main challenges facing BRICS+ are that member states have differing positions on the future direction of BRICS+, as well as on their stance toward the US, the accession of new members, and de-dollarization. The fact that they face US countermeasures, which also require a response, is another challenge. However, it is anticipated that as US containment of BRICS+ countries becomes more overt and its economic impact grows, it will create a space for BRICS+ countries to-solidify their solidarity.

Therefore, South Korea needs to strengthen: (1) expansion of minilateral cooperation, (2) joint responses to global agendas, (3) reinforcement of commodity supply chain cooperation, and (4) expansion of “software” cooperation to build cooperative networks with BRICS+ countries. However, rather than engaging with BRICS+ as a single bloc, it is necessary to maintain a direction that pursues South Korea’s economic interests through minilateral and bilateral cooperation with individual countries, while simultaneously expanding Korea’s economic footprint within the BRICS+ nations.

국문요약

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 배경과 목적
2. 경제 블록화의 개념
3. 연구의 방법과 구성

제2장 BRICS의 확장 배경과 회원국의 전략적 이해
1. 글로벌 질서 변화와 BRICS 확장
2. BRICS+의 회원국별 전략적 이해
3. BRICS+의 협력 방향과 주요 의제
4. 소결

제3장 글로벌 원자재 시장 내 BRICS+의 위상과 협력
1. 곡물
2. 에너지
3. 광물
4. 원자재 부문 전략적 의존성
5. 소결

제4장 BRICS+의 글로벌 제조업 시장의 경제적 위상과 협력
1. BRICS+의 제조업 협력 의제
2. 상품 및 부가가치의 생산 역량
3. 수출 시장 점유율
4. 주요 업종별 분석
5. 소결

제5장 BRICS+의 투자 협력 현황과 평가
1. BRICS+의 투자 협력 전략
2. BRICS+의 정책금융 투자
3. 주요국의 세부 투자 현황과 특징
4. 소결

제6장 BRICS+의 금융 협력 현황과 평가
1. BRICS+의 금융 협력 전략
2. BRICS의 금융 협력 메커니즘
3. 소결

제7장 결론 및 시사점
1. BRICS+의 경제 블록화 가능성에 대한 평가
2. 한국의 대외 협력 시사점
3. 연구의 한계

참고문헌

부 록

Executive Summary