With the launch of the second Trump administration, U.S.-China trade negotiations have once again shifted to the center of policy debates. U.S.-China trade negotiations shape bilateral economic relations in the short term and influence the long-term reorganization of the global economic order, making them a core subject of both theoretical and policy analysis.

This study aims to address three main questions. First, while U.S.- China trade negotiations take the form of bilateral negotiation on the surface, their underlying structure is multilayered and complex. The negotiations are not only a bilateral game between the United States and China, but also takes into account linkage to multilateral implications, as both sides simultaneously manage their relations with third countries.

Second, U.S.-China negotiations are not limited to tariffs and trade. They constitute a multidimensional game in which technology, industry, investment, and security issues are closely linked. It is essential to analyze issue linkage strategies in negotiations to understand the underlying structure of negotiations that appear to be tariff centered on the surface.

Third, during the Trump administration’s second term, a significant change has been observed in China’s response patterns. While China continues to respond to U.S. pressure, it increasingly combines reactive strategies with proactive strategies. This study explores how changes in China’s strategies have evolved from reactive to proactive strategies.

Based on these premises, we attempt to explain U.S.-China negoti- ations from the perspective of a multidimensional complex game. A multidimensional complex game refers to a strategic game in which players strategically link domestic, bilateral, and regional/multilateral forums by linking multiple issues―such as tariffs, export controls, and investment screening. It conceptualizes the negotiations as a process in which China involves bilateral and multilateral games simultaneously, by weaving tariffs, technology, resources, and security.

Using official primary documents released by the Chinese government since 2017, we categorize China’s strategies toward the United States along two dimensions: reactive versus proactive, and domestic versus external. China’s strategies are classified into four types: (1) reactive- external, (2) reactive-domestic, (3) proactive-external, and (4) proactive- domestic. Reactive-external strategies refer to passive responses that mirror or closely match U.S. measures. Reactive-domestic strategies focus on introducing policies, laws, and institutions similar to those of the United States in order to mitigate the effects of external pressure on China. Proactive-external strategies are policies to take preemptive measures against the United States. They also aim to shape favorable external conditions through independent international cooperation or by constructing regional or global orders outside existing institutional frameworks. Proactive-domestic strategies link bilateral and domestic arenas to enhance China’s capacity for preemptive responses to sustained U.S. pressure. As the U.S.-China trade war has become prolonged, China’s strategy toward the United States has evolved from a mainly reactive approach to a more proactive one. Unlike during the first Trump administration, when China mainly relied on reactive responses, the 2025 trade negotiations show that China has maintained traditional reactive- external measures, such as retaliatory tariffs, while simultaneously complementing them with proactive strategies. This shift suggests that China is increasingly managing the negotiation landscape by flexibly combining issue linkage and bilateral-multilateral strategies rather than relying solely on immediate retaliation.

This study offers policy implications for South Korea. First, as U.S.- China trade negotiations continue to evolve, South Korea should pay attention to the evolving dynamics of U.S. strategy toward China, because the United States is likely to increase its demand for policy alignment with the U.S. allies. Second, by incorporating China’s per- spective into the analysis of U.S.-China negotiations, South Korean policymakers could have a more balanced understanding of the evolving nature of negotiation dynamics. Third, given that changes in China’s domestic institutional arrangements often translate into more proactive external strategies, it is critical to closely monitor domestic develop- ments within China. Fourth, systematic analysis of changing nature of China’s strategy will help detect possible shifts in China’s approaches toward the United States as well as third countries, thereby supporting more timely and flexible policy responses. Fifth, from the perspective of a multidimensional complex game, it is noteworthy that with its flexible implementation of laws and institutions, China could take a differentiated approach between the United States and its allies.

국문요약

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 목적과 필요성
2. 중국 대미 전략의 대내외적 기원 규명(2020~25년)

제2장 중국 대미 전략의 메커니즘
1. 다차원적 복합게임
2. 중국 대응 전략의 동태적 변화

제3장 중국 대미 협상 전략의 기원
1. 국내 역량의 축적(2020~25년)
2. 산업·기술 역량의 심화
3. 국제협력과 대안적 규범 설계

제4장 중국 대미 협상 전략의 동태적 변화
1. 대응 유형과 메커니즘
2. 유형별 사례 분석

제5장 트럼프 2기 행정부 출범과 중국의 대미 협상 전략
1. 2020년 1단계 합의와 전략적 전환
2. 2025년 미중 협상의 재점화: 공세와 타협의 양면 전략
3. 2025년 중국의 대미 협상 전략: 세부 협상 전략의 실행/활용

제6장 결론 및 시사점
1. 결론
2. 정책적 시사점

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary