The purpose of this study is to assess the supply chain risks of critical minerals that form the foundation of strategic industries such as electric vehicle batteries, semiconductors, and renewable energy equipment. Focusing on Korea’s “Top 10 Strategic Critical Minerals,” it identifies the import dependency structure and key partner countries, and proposes ways to strengthen supply chains through trade agreements. The analytical scope of this report follows the classification of Kowalski and Legendre (2023) and links raw materials, intermediates, and scrap by HS6 codes for each of Korea’s ten strategic critical minerals. The report consists of two main parts: a global supply chain and risk analysis, including Korea’s import structure (Chapters 2-3), and an agreement network, clause analysis, and strategic proposals (Chapters 4-6).

Chapter 2 analyzes the global supply chain structures and risks of Korea’s ten critical minerals. Lithium is supplied as raw ore from Australia and Chile, while China handles refining. Argentina and Zimbabwe have recently emerged as new suppliers, and the United States is pursuing localization efforts under the IRA. Nickel is mainly supplied by the Philippines and New Caledonia, while Indonesia has restricted ore exports and expanded intermediate production. The intermediates are exported to China for refining, and the final high-value-added products such as alloys are produced mainly in the United States and Europe. The Democratic Republic of Congo monopolizes cobalt ore production, with Canada and Finland handling most refining. In 2023, excess supply and weak demand contracted the market, while recycling activities centered in the United States and the United Kingdom expanded. Manganese production is concentrated in South Africa, Gabon, and Australia. China leads intermediate production but has reduced exports due to domestic prioritization. Japan and Spain supply high-purity refined products, while Indonesia and South Africa are expanding their smelting capacities. China dominates both natural and synthetic graphite production but began tightening export controls in 2023, prompting supply diversification. Tanzania and Madagascar have emerged as alternative sources, while Japan and Germany are expanding production of synthetic graphite based on technological advantages. For rare earths, China maintains dominance across all stages—from mining to permanent magnet manufacturing. In response, the United States and the EU have strengthened cooperation with Australia and Vietnam, while Malaysia has become a refining hub, and Myanmar and Laos have developed as chemical compound exporters.

Chapter 3 examines Korea’s import dependency for the ten critical minerals, classified by FTA status and supply chain stage. For lithium, imports are almost entirely from FTA partner countries, with dependence reaching about 99 percent for both lithium hydroxide and lithium carbonate as of 2023. While lithium hydroxide imports rely heavily on China, imports from Chile are increasing. Lithium carbonate remains concentrated in Chile and China. Nickel shows high dependence on non-FTA countries for ore imports but high FTA dependence for compounds. Nickel oxide and hydroxide are fully imported from FTA partners, while nickel sulfate and chloride record 93 and 85 percent dependence, respectively. Intermediates are largely imported from non-FTA countries such as Indonesia and Türkiye, and unalloyed nickel shows lower dependence (about 65 percent) on FTA partners. Overall, dependence on Chinese-refined nickel compounds stands out across product stages. Cobalt imports are mostly from FTA partners but are concentrated in a few countries. Concentrates, oxides/hydroxides, and scrap are wholly imported from FTA partners, while intermediates such as matte are 86 percent FTA-sourced. Imports of oxides/hydroxides are mainly from China and Belgium. Manganese ore and concentrate imports come 98 percent from non-FTA countries, predominantly South Africa; however, refined products such as manganese dioxide are nearly all imported from FTA partners, mainly China, Japan, and the United States. Graphite imports are highly concentrated by product in either China or the United States: natural graphite relies 97 percent on China, while “other forms” depend 80 percent on U.S. imports. Synthetic graphite imports show nearly full FTA dependence (over 98 percent), though electrode-grade imports are concentrated among a few countries, and other types remain China-dependent. Rare earth imports are almost entirely FTA-sourced, but actual supply remains concentrated in China and Japan, limiting effective diversification.

Chapter 4 analyzes the structure and evolution of global critical mineral agreement networks using IEA data. Before 2010, such agreements were few, but since 2021, networks have expanded rapidly through multilateral frameworks such as the Mineral Security Partnership (MSP) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), alongside numerous bilateral MOUs. Network analysis shows that the EU exhibits the highest centrality, acting as a core hub connecting resource producers and consumers. This indicates the EU’s elevation as a central actor in mineral supply chain governance, grounded in its extensive network of FTAs. The EU has introduced “Energy and Raw Materials (ERM)” chapters within FTAs that include export tax bans, non-discrimination in pricing, and binding ESG compliance obligations. Japan incorporates mineral-related provisions within Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), exemplified by the Australia-Japan EPA, which bans export restrictions to secure supply stability. Japan is also expanding mega-FTA negotiations with Latin American countries to enhance resource access. The United States has shifted from traditional FTA reliance toward leading multilateral initiatives such as the MSP or IPEF. The most notable development is the U.S.-Japan Critical Minerals Agreement (CMA), established in March 2023 under the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). The CMA grants Japan FTA-equivalent status under U.S. law for EV subsidy eligibility and institutionalizes bilateral cooperation on critical minerals. Post-agreement data indicate a shift in Japan’s sourcing of five key minerals (cobalt, graphite, lithium, manganese, nickel) toward the United States and Canada, particularly in nickel and manganese imports. Following the IRA and CMA, Japanese investment in U.S. battery and material sectors increased markedly in late 2022 and 2023, while joint patent applications in mining, refining, and recycling also rose, reflecting deepening technological integration. These trends demonstrate that the CMA functions not only as a trade mechanism but as a combined platform for trade, investment, and technology cooperation aimed at realigning allied supply chains.

Chapter 5 proposes directions for agreement provisions supporting Korea’s critical mineral supply chain stabilization, investment protection, and skilled labor mobility.

First, institutional measures are required to mitigate sudden export restrictions by resource-holding countries. Cases such as Indonesia’s nickel ore export ban and China’s graphite export controls disrupt supply planning and investment decisions. Agreements should mandate advance notification (6-12 months) for new restrictions and provide a 2-3-year grace period for existing investors. Rapid consultation mechanisms—for instance, ministerial meetings convened within five days of a supply disruption—should be institutionalized to enable joint responses. Violations of export restriction obligations should be subject to dispute settlement under the WTO or the agreement itself.

Second, legal safeguards are needed to protect Korean investors against growing political and institutional uncertainty in emerging resource economies. Agreements should prohibit retroactive application of new regulations to pre-existing investments, define licensing procedures and responsible authorities across exploration, mining, and refining, and ensure transparency. Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions must be included to address expropriation or unfair, inequitable treatment.

Third, mobility clauses are required to ensure deployment of technical personnel essential to projects. Due to labor and visa barriers, Korean skilled engineers often face delays in facility construction and commissioning abroad. Agreements should create special visa and work permit quotas for “core technical personnel” and establish mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) for Korea’s national technical licenses. While respecting local employment obligations, Korean specialists should be allowed to operate on-site for one to two years to provide training and technical transfer, linking labor mobility with capacity-building.

Chapter 6 synthesizes the results from previous analyses to classify potential counterpart countries into three categories and propose differentiated agreement strategies.

The first category, “strategic core partners,” includes Canada, the United States, and Australia—major resource holders and rule- makers in the global mineral governance system, as well as Korea’s key suppliers. Comprehensive, high-standard agreements anchored in international norms are recommended. Drawing from the U.S.- Japan CMA model, these should prohibit export restrictions, establish transparent investment screening and enforceable ISDS procedures, and include regulatory frameworks for MRA-based qualification recognition and fast-track visa issuance.

The second category, “supply chain and network partners,” includes Japan, India, the United Kingdom, Germany, and China. These countries possess advanced processing technologies and significant market influence. Agreements should pursue strategic reciprocity by requiring scientific justification and advance notification for export restrictions, modernizing existing Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) to clarify ambiguous clauses, and enhancing stabilization provisions. Labor mobility should focus on expanding joint R&D and technology exchange programs.

The third category, “resource-rich and specialized supply partners,” includes Indonesia, Chile, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa, Brazil, and Vietnam. A development- cooperation-linked approach is most effective: combining Korean investment in refining facilities, technology transfer, and infrastructure assistance with commitments for stable resource supply. Agreements should incorporate MIGA’s political risk insurance (PRI) and link official development assistance (ODA) financing to reduce investment risks. Labor mobility measures should align with local training programs led by dispatched Korean technical experts.

Finally, the report presents overarching recommendations for future negotiation strategies.

First, ESG should be positioned not as a regulatory burden but as a tool for mutual cooperation, contributing to partner countries’ sustainable development while establishing resilient supply chains and responding collectively to G7/EU-led governance frameworks. Second, MIGA’s guarantee schemes should be institutionalized within agreements, embedding ESG compliance into project design phases to lower corporate investment risks.

Third, domestic policy instruments such as the National Resource Security Act should be aligned with external negotiation agendas on critical mineral designation, stockpiling, and recycling targets. Parallel efforts should include establishing HS codes and customs standards for recycled materials such as black mass.

Lastly, Korea should integrate and coordinate numerous MOUs and bilateral committees under a unified framework, ensuring coherence and performance monitoring. Drawing from the Korea-Australia example, accumulated public-private consultative mechanisms should be used to review implementation progress and connect new cooperation initiatives, ensuring that agreements deliver tangible results beyond declarations.

국문요약

제1장 서론
1. 연구의 배경 및 목적
2. 연구의 범위와 구성
3. 선행연구와의 차이점

제2장 핵심광물 글로벌 공급망과 리스크 진단
1. 리튬
2. 니켈
3. 코발트
4. 망간
5. 흑연
6. 희토류
7. 광물별 광산 현황
8. 소결

제3장 한국의 핵심광물 및 소재별 수입의존도 분석
1. 리튬
2. 니켈
3. 코발트
4. 망간
5. 흑연
6. 희토류
7. 소결

제4장 글로벌 광물협정 분석
1. 광물협정 네트워크 분석
2. 주요국의 광물협정 분석
3. 주요 협정의 공급망 안정화 효과: 미-일 핵심광물협정을 중심으로
4. 소결

제5장 한국의 협정 체결 현황 및 주요 조항 설계방안
1. 한국의 핵심광물협정 체결 현황
2. 광물 수출 제한 대응을 위한 협정 조항 설계
3. 투자 보호를 위한 협정 조항 설계
4. 안정적 광물 공급망 구축을 위한 인력 이동 원활화 방안
5. 소결

제6장 요약 및 핵심광물협정 추진 전략
1. 요약
2. 협정대상국 선정
3. 협정대상국 유형별 협상 전략
4. 핵심광물협정 활용 전략

참고문헌

부록

Executive Summary