
| Á¦¸ñ | Global Economic Governance at a Crossroads: Replacing the G-7 with the G-20 | ||
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| Ãâó | Brookings | µî ·Ï ÀÏ | 2011-03-29 |
| U R L | http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2004/04globaleconomics_colin%20i%20%20bradford%20%20jr/pb131.pdf![]() |
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Foreword: Finance ministers representing the Group of 7 (G-7) industrialized countries met in Boca Raton, Florida, in early February amid concerns about the weakening of the U.S. dollar. One factor in the dollar¡¯s decline is the U.S. trade deficit, which is partly due to the undervalued Chinese yuan. The involvement of China, which is not a G-7 member, illustrates both the glaring gap in global governance and the increasing economic and policy interdependence between industrial countries and major emerging market economies (EMEs). As one observer, referring to the Boca Raton meeting, put it, ¡°China is the 800- pound gorilla and it isn¡¯t even part of the negotiations.¡± But China is a member of the G-20—a larger, more representative group of finance ministers that has attracted worldwide attention as a useful forum for discussing and negotiating policies on global economic issues. Policymakers should upgrade the G-20 to head-of-state level and use it to replace the increasingly ineffective G-7 for several reasons: future demographic and economic changes will further shift the balance away from G-7 countries and toward the large EMEs; globalization presents new challenges that require more representative global governance approaches; and EMEs have played a key role in the origin, impact, and solutions of recent global economic crises. |
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